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Het was een jne samenwerking, bedankt!
Ook prof. Tom Van Ourti verdient een speciaal woord van dank. Tom is samen met
prof. Anne Gielen co-auteur van het onderzoekswerk in hoofdstuk 3. Hij stond er altijd
voor open om ons onderzoek te bespreken en te herbespreken, altijd met veel oog voor
detail. Hij zorgde ervoor dat ik me tijdens mijn verblijf aan de Erasmus Universiteit
Rotterdam meteen thuis kon voelen en dat ik kon terugvallen op een jne groep collegas.
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General introduction
Strongly advocated by some, rejected by others, preventive care has been a hot topic in
public health discussions. Even though preventive health care accounts for only a minor
part of the health care budget of most countries  it amounts between 1% and 4% of
total health care expenditures in most OECD countries (OECD Health Data, 2013) we
have seen a steady increase in large scale preventive care programs, both in developed and
developing countries. Examples thereof are HIV campaigns, deworming drugs programs,
children vaccination programs or bed nets against malaria in developing countries and
inuenza campaigns or cancer screening and vaccination programs in developed countries.
In this doctoral research, we will not examine the sense or nonsense of preventive care,
since we would enter the domain of evidence-based medicine. We note that the benets
of certain types of cancer screening are debated or evidence about health improvements
remains inconclusive (see e.g. Bach et al. (2012), Djulbegovic et al. (2010), Marmot et
al. (2013), Oakley Jr & Johnston Jr (2004), Reade et al. (2013), Smith et al. (2010)).
We focus on existing medical preventive care programs.1 Because of externalities (e.g. in
the prevention of communicable diseases) or the program cost-benet ratio, prevention
programs require high participation rates. In the United States, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention have set clear participation objectives next to quality targets
which are measured and evaluated over time (National Center for Health Statistics,
2012). For example, the 2010 participation target for cervical cancer screening in the
past 3 years for women aged 18 or more is set at 90%; the target for breast cancer
screening in the past 2 years for women aged 40 or more is set at 70% and the target for
inuenza vaccination is set at 90% of the over-65. Similarly, European countries dene
participation targets for their large scale prevention programs. First of all, we observe that
participation rates rarely meet let alone exceed the desired targets, even for prevention
measures that are generally considered to be cost-e¤ective such as inuenza vaccination
for the elderly (Nichol, 2003). Secondly, participation in prevention is not equal among all
1Medical preventive care is used as opposed to lifestyle choices such as diet or physical exercise.
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targeted individuals and might give rise to health disparities by socioeconomic status, by
education level, by geographic location, by sex or by other dimensions. The individuals
decision to participate (or not) in preventive care programs is the main thread throughout
our research project.
The individual participation decision has been studied in the literature, both theoret-
ically and empirically. The seminal paper of Mo¢ tt on non-take-up behavior in means
tested benets serves as a starting point. More recently, take-up of (preventive) health
care services has been studied in the health economics literature (e.g. Byrne & Thomp-
son, 2001; Etner & Jeleva, 2013; Howard, 2005; Maurer, 2009; Picone, Sloan & Taylor,
2004; Schmitz & Wübker, 2012; Whynes et al., 2007; Wu, 2003). In economic models,
private incentives, i.e. broadly dened costs and benets, are generally considered the
main drivers of the preventive care participation decision. Participation benets include
reduced mortality and morbidity. Participation costs include nancial, non-nancial, so-
cial and psychological costs. Empirical applications relate the participation decision to
individual characteristics and beliefs.
Private incentives are important determinants of preventive care participation. We
discuss them mainly in the rst chapter of this PhD. However, a broader understanding
of non-participation behavior should equally include social interaction e¤ects and policy
design. The former relates to direct non-market interactions between individuals. The ar-
gument is that the individuals participation decision relates to the participation decision
of others in the individuals peer group. The fact that other people participate or do not
participate can have a social spillover e¤ect. Kremer & Miguel (2007) state that social
e¤ects can result from imitating behavior, social learning about e.g. how to use certain
medication e¢ ciently, social learning about the benets and costs of preventive programs
and epidemiological externalities. Depending on the dominating driving force, peer e¤ects
can be positive or negative. The policy design of a preventive care program is a second
element that might a¤ect the participation decision. Di¤erences between programs may
arise from eligibility rules, information campaigns, invitation procedures, the technology
that is used, the level of organization, delays in enrollment or delays in learning about
the screening results. . . By deciding upon the design of the prevention program, policy
makers endogenously inuence take-up rates, nudging peoples behavior into a certain
direction. Most policy reforms operate on an individuals private incentives by altering
prices and (non-) monetary costs and benets. In addition, this might indirectly generate
social interactions e¤ects. Understanding how these social interactions inuence individ-
ual behavior is important for policymaking since they could reinforce or o¤set the policy
2
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e¤ects on the individuals private incentives to take-up preventive care. Social interaction
e¤ects might therefore lead to higher or lower participation rates than otherwise expected
and a social program might reach non-targeted individuals and households through social
spillovers. On the other hand, policy interventions, such as mass-media campaigns, can
also aim directly at changing social norms and social interaction transmission mechanisms.
It is clear that private incentives, social interaction e¤ects and policy design are interre-
lated and di¢ cult to disentangle empirically. A carefully designed empirical strategy is
necessary. This identication challenge will be taken up in chapters 2 and 3. Let us now
discuss more into detail to the di¤erent chapters.
Chapter 1. Di¤ering types of medical prevention appeal to di¤erent indi-
viduals (joint work with Erik Schokkaert)
In chapter 1, we analyze participation in medical prevention with an expected utility
model that is su¢ ciently rich to capture diverging features of di¤erent prevention pro-
cedures and disorders. We distinguish primary and secondary prevention for both fatal
or non-fatal diseases. Moreover, we introduce a exible relationship between the specic
disease for which the prevention procedure is set up and the general background health
of the individual.
We derive four main hypotheses from the theoretical model. First, current health is
positively related to participation in prevention for fatal diseases (e.g. cancer) and nega-
tively for diseases in which good current health mitigates the e¤ects of the disease (e.g.
the u). Second, mortality risk, future costs and benets only matter for fatal diseases.
Third, decreases in program complexity and prevention costs positively correlate with
participation for all disease and prevention types. Fourth, increases in current income
positively a¤ect participation for fatal diseases, but the income e¤ect can be either pos-
itive or negative for non-fatal diseases. These hypotheses are analyzed empirically using
European wide data of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE).
We look at six types of preventive care (mammography, dental caries screening, inuenza
vaccination, blood pressure screening, blood sugar screening, cholesterol screening). The
observed correlations provide support for the theoretical predictions.
3
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Chapter 2. Neighborhood peer e¤ects in the use of preventive care
Individual participation in preventive care may depend on preventive health behavior
in an individuals peer group. Chapter 2 analyzes the e¤ects of policy changes and social
interactions in preventive care participation in the context of new social policies (PRO-
GRESA2) in Mexico that aim at encouraging preventive care. The program is targeted
at the extreme poor in rural areas and is designed as a conditional cash transfer pro-
gram, meaning that families receive cash transfers conditional on the household engaging
in a set of behaviors. Program requirements include, amongst others, participation in
various types of preventive care, such as child growth monitoring, child immunization,
blood pressure tests, usage of deworming drugs and cervical cancer screening. We fol-
low the promising approach of analyzing social interactions in real world peer groups.
Identication of social interactions is based on a partial-population design.
Results indicate that PROGRESA succeeded in increasing preventive care usage among
program eligible households. In addition, endogenous social interactions increase preven-
tive care usage for various types of prevention. The magnitude of the e¤ects di¤ers across
prevention types. E¤ects are especially pronounced for annual child growth and weight
monitoring. The overall treatment e¤ect of PROGRESA on prevention can be decom-
posed in a direct e¤ect related to nancial incentives and an indirect e¤ect related to
social interactions. The indirect e¤ect accounts for 10% up to 60% of the total treatment
e¤ect.
Chapter 3. Unintended spillover e¤ects of inuenza vaccination: a regres-
sion discontinuity approach.
In chapter 3, we investigated direct and spillover e¤ects of an extension of the target
group for the Dutch inuenza vaccination program to all Dutchmen aged 65 years and
over in 1996. Members of the target group qualify for free inuenza vaccination and
receive a personal invitation letter from their GP. Using a rich dataset that combines
survey data on health with administrative records from Statistics Netherlands, the quasi-
random variation that was introduced at age 65 by the reform is exploited to analyze
vaccination behavior and its impacts on the arguably even more important outcomes of
morbidity, medical care use, sickness absence and mortality. While the e¤ects on the
2PROGRESA is an acronym for Programa de Educacion, Salud y Alimentacion (the Education, Health
and Nutrition Program).
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targeted population are useful to evaluate direct policy e¤ect, our primary aim is to
estimate policy induced spillovers onto non-targeted individuals, in our setting the adult
children of targeted individuals.
Our results indicate a positive direct policy e¤ect on vaccination coverage of the par-
ents (an increase in vaccination rates from about 30% to 50%), accompanied by a negative
spillover e¤ect from parents to children (a decrease in vaccination rates from about 9% to
5%). In addition, we estimate that the inuenza vaccination program saves 0.8 individuals
out of 100,000 at the age threshold, and reduces the number of individuals consulting a
GP and using prescribed medicines with 10 percentage points during the typical inuenza
months. Mortality and GP visits of the adult children are not a¤ected, but the occur-
rence of inuenza-like symptoms increases from 45% to 55% and sickness absence among
this group increases from 14% to 22%. We explore several possible channels that might
generate the negative spillover e¤ects and nd suggestive evidence that a social stigma
costs is revealed to children who are not targeted by the vaccination program when
their oldest parent crosses the age threshold. A potential trigger for the social stigma
cost is the explicit framing of the target group in the invitation letter sent out to eligible
parents. Our results also underline the importance of public health campaigns to pay
attention to the e¤ects of information dissemination on public perceptions and attitudes
on (voluntary) preventive care participation.
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Chapter 1
Di¤ering types of medical prevention
appeal to di¤erent individuals
Joint work with Erik Schokkaert
1.1 Introduction
Medical prevention, e.g. vaccination and screening, has become increasingly important in
the health care systems of advanced countries. Health practitioners are concerned about
the relatively low participation rates, even for prevention measures that are generally con-
sidered to be cost-e¤ective (such as inuenza vaccination for the elderly and breast cancer
screening for women between 50 and 69 years old). A careful look at this participation
pattern reveals huge interindividual and intercountry di¤erences. Moreover, participation
also varies widely between di¤erent procedures for the same individuals. Gaining a better
understanding of the causes of these di¤erences across individuals and types of prevention
is denitely relevant from a policy point of view.
However, the importance of analyzing medical prevention decisions goes beyond the
policy aspect. The large degree of interindividual variation also makes it an interesting
domain to apply the theory of decision-making under uncertainty. Our main contribution
to the literature is that we integrate existing evidence on participation in medical pre-
vention. Rather than focusing on one specic procedure, our aim is to build and test a
model that is su¢ ciently rich so as to give some insights into the di¤erent results that are
found with respect to di¤erent prevention procedures. We analyze the individuals deci-
sion to participate in prevention and how it is a¤ected by the type of prevention o¤ered
and the disease characteristics. First, we compare in the same model both primary and
7
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secondary prevention. The former refers to interventions that aim at avoiding or reducing
the occurrence of a disease (e.g. vaccination), and the latter to measures that aim at re-
ducing the health consequences of a disease by detection and treatment in its early stages
(e.g. cancer screening). Second, we distinguish between fatal (e.g. cancer) and non-fatal
(e.g. dental caries) diseases. Third, we introduce into our model a exible relationship
between the specic disease for which the prevention procedure is set up and the general
background health of the individual. In some cases, individuals may care more about the
specic disease when their background health is worse (e.g. inuenza), in other cases they
may care more when their background health is better (e.g. dental caries). We show how
these various possibilities change the comparative statics of the prevention decision and
test the di¤erential predictions with data from SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing and
Retirement in Europe).
We stay in the tradition of the expected utility-approach to study individual preventive
medical behavior (see, amongst others, Dervaux and Eeckhoudt, 2004; Picone et al., 2004;
Howard, 2005; Witt, 2008). The expected utility-model has recently come under sharp
criticism. It is now widely accepted that it is unable to explain real-world observations
if one assumes a narrow specication of utility (e.g. focusing only on health and income)
and perfectly informed individuals. Taking a test imposes not only monetary (and time)
costs, but also a psychological burden, which, according to the available surveys on mo-
tivations, may be crucial in explaining variations in preventive care participation (see,
e.g., Whynes et al., 2007). Moreover, while the literature has shown that subjective prob-
abilities inuence individual decisions, it has also become clear that the subjective risk
perceptions vary only very partially with objective risk factors (Carman and Kooreman,
2011). Therefore, the expected utility model only makes sense as an explanation of be-
havior if all variables used in the model are individual-specic or an individual-specic
interpretation of an objective parameter. This is acknowledged by most authors in the
eld, and we also adopt this interpretation.
In our empirical work we focus on six cases: breast cancer screening, dental caries
screening, inuenza vaccination, cholesterol screening, blood pressure screening and blood
sugar screening. These six procedures cover the range of interesting possibilities suggested
by our model. We estimate probit models with the pooled data of the rst two waves of
SHARE. There have been previous empirical studies analyzing partly the same prevention
procedures with SHARE data (Maurer, 2009; Schmitz and Wübker, 2011 and Jusot et
al., 2012 for inuenza vaccination; Wübker, 2012a, 2012b and Jusot et al., 2012, for
mammography; Listl, 2011 and Listl et al., 2012 for dental care). To the best of our
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knowledge, we present the rst attempt to compare the results for the di¤erent procedures
within a coherent theoretical approach, testing specic hypotheses about the di¤erential
comparative static e¤ects. In accordance with the estimation strategies inWübker (2012a)
for breast cancer screening and Listl et al. (2012) for dental care, we explain (part of)
the intercountry di¤erences through the introduction of institutional features that are
specically related to the prevention procedures analyzed. These specic features can
be related to the parameters from our theoretical model. This approach appears more
promising than controlling for general characteristics of a countrys health care system
(Jusot et al., 20121).
The remainder of chapter 1 is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes our model
with di¤erent types of disorders and characteristics of the process of medical prevention.
Comparative static results for the prevention decision are derived in Section 1.3. Section
1.4 discusses the empirical testing of the hypotheses that are derived from the theoretical
model. In general the performance of the model in explaining the di¤erences between
the procedures is very satisfactory and robust to di¤erent specications. Section 1.5
concludes.
1.2 Model of medical prevention
We propose an expected utility (EU) model that captures an individuals decision to
participate in medical prevention for a specic disorder. Participation in prevention is
taken to be a binary decision and is pursued when the expected utility of participation
exceeds the expected utility of non-participation, i.e. EU > 0; with
EU = EUparticipation   EUnon participation (1.1)
Eq. (1.1) presents the individual decision model in its most simplied form. In what
follows, we further detail the expected utility model as both participation and non-
participation in prevention may lead to multiple potential health states characterized
by a probability and a utility pay-o¤. Rather than specifying a continuous value for the
severity and survival rate of a disorder, we dene several disease development stages and
a clear, binary distinction between fatal and non-fatal diseases. This simplication with
respect to disease characteristics allows, on the one hand, for a richer specication on the
characteristics of the individual and the type of prevention, and, on the other hand, does
1None of the general characteristics used in this article turn out to have a signicant e¤ect for the
explanation of inuenza vaccination and breast cancer screening.
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not unnecessarily complicate the interpretation of the results. We will rst work out the
model for secondary prevention. Then, we will discuss primary prevention and show how
it ts into the same model.
1.2.1 Secondary prevention
During each period t2, the individual derives utility u(:) from income y, general back-
ground health represented by an index h and prevention-specic health m. Utility is con-
cave in income, with u1(y; h;m) > 0 and u11(y; h;m)  0.3 A better general background
health corresponds to a higher index score h with u2(y; h;m) > 0 and u22(y; h;m)  0.
Variablem represents the severity of the specic medical disorder for which the prevention
procedure is set up. It takes one of four discrete values (0 < e < l < d), ranging from
0, i.e. the individual does not su¤er from the disorder, to d, the terminal stage of the
disorder, in which the disorder cannot be treated anymore. The values e and l indicate
early and late stages of the disorder respectively. The stages are mutually exclusive. The
individual believes that she will develop the specic disorder with probability p. The
out-of-pocket costs of treatment for the individual are ce and cl for, respectively, early
and late stage treatment. They are independent of the individuals background health. If
treated, the patient is cured of the illness, but relapse in a later period remains possible.
The prevention behavior of the individual determines whether the disease develops into
early or late stage.
Throughout the main analysis, we impose separability between utility from income
and from health, i.e. u(y; h;m) = v(y) + w(h;m). This assumption is widely used in the
literature.4 Appendix 1 presents the results for the unrestricted utility function u(y; h;m).
2In our model a periodis dened as the normal amount of time in which an individual has to choose
whether or not to participate in prevention. For inuenza, a period is a one-year interval, since an
individual will have to decide to participate in prevention every year before the inuenza season starts.
For breast cancer screening on the other hand, the normal screening interval is two years. Furthermore,
we assume for simplicity and clarity that this amount of time corresponds to the period in which a disease
can develop into a severe illness that requires curative care, or in case of a fatal disease, that might result
in death. While this is true for many diseases such as e.g. inuenza, this is not always the case. The
assumption can however be relaxed and our model adapted so that the prevention period and the period
of disease development do not necessarily coincide. In this section, we drop the subscript t for notational
convenience.
3We dene ux(y; h;m) as the derivative of u(y; h;m) with respect to the xth argument of u(:). Anal-
ogously, uxz(y; h;m) is the cross derivative of u(y; h;m) with respect to the xth and the zth argument of
u(:).
4Income can be used for consumption goods that are complements to good health, e.g. travel, or
substitutes for good health, e.g. assistance with self-care or a guide dog for the blind. The existing
empirical results with respect to the sign and the magnitude of the cross-e¤ect between health and
income (or consumption) are inconclusive (Finkelstein et al., 2009).
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In addition to utility from current income and health, the individual takes into account
future utility Vt+1 which depends on the future streams of income and health. It is
discounted with factor  and corrected for the individuals mortality risk (px;t+1) from
any other cause but the prevention-specic disorder. The general utility specication that
will reappear in each health state is then the following:
v(y) + w(h;m) + (1  px;t+1)Vt+1 (1.2)
Our two-dimensional representation of health allows us to distinguish between three
types of specic disorders in terms of their interaction with the general background health
status.5
Complements Consider rst the case of a rather minor medical problem, which does
not a¤ect the background health of the individual: dental caries is an obvious example.
In this case, it is natural to assume that quality of the teethmatters more for healthier
individuals. This is represented in our model by
w1(h;m1) < w1(h;m2);8h if m1 > m2 (1.3)
Comorbidities An alternative situation is the case of comorbidities, where the oc-
currence of the disease has a stronger e¤ect on health if background health is worse. A
good example is inuenza, since a healthy individual will su¤er less from it than a sick
individual, and runs a smaller risk of complications. If the utility loss due to the disorder
is mitigated by a better initial health, this results in
w1(h;m1) > w1(h;m2);8h if m1 > m2 (1.4)
Independence In principle it is also possible that the e¤ect of the new disorder is
largely independent of the initial overall health status, resulting in
w1(h;m1) = w1(h;m2);8h;m1;m2: (1.5)
Perhaps an extreme diagnosis like that of a life-threatening cancer could be an example
of independence, although in many cases comorbidities would be relevant for cancer also.
5We dene h as a unidimensional indicator. General background health could alternatively be dened
as a multi-dimensional concept, in which the di¤erent dimensions of h interact with the severity of the
specic disease m. This would make the model less tractable without generating important additional
insights.
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The classication of di¤erent diseases in one of the three categories is ultimately an
empirical matter.
1.2.1.1 Potential health states in case of non-participation
The default situation is one where the individual does not participate in preventive care.
Ex ante, she believes with a probability 1 p that she will be healthy and with a probability
p that she will be hit by the disorder. In the latter case, the disease will develop to the
late stage, and there are two options. Either the disease is non-fatal and can be cured
with treatment at a cost cl, or, the disease is fatal (e.g. certain cancers, or aggressive
viral diseases such as Ebola) and cannot be cured, resulting in the individuals death.
When the individual dies, we assume that she no longer benets from current or future
income. To that end, we introduce an indicator function I(nf) that equals 1 if a disease
is non-fatal and turns 0 for fatal diseases. The expected utility in the non-participation
case can therefore be written as
EUnon participation = (1  p)uHE + puS; (1.6)
where the utilities in the healthy (HE) and sick (S) states are given respectively by
uHE = v(y) + w(h; 0) + (1  px;t+1)Vt+1 (1.7)
uS = I(nf) [v(y   cl) + w(h; l) + (1  px;t+1)Vt+1] (1.8)
1.2.1.2 Potential health states in case of participation
Secondary prevention allows early treatment of the disease (m = e) at a lower cost of
treatment ce < cl. Let us take breast cancer screening as an example. In the typical
case, mammograms are used as screening technology. There are alternatives, such as self-
control of the breasts or examination of the breasts by the general practitioner (GP) or a
more invasive breast tissue biopsy. Every screening technique entails di¤erent monetary,
psychological (e.g. distress), physical (e.g. pain) and transaction costs (e.g. waiting and
travel time). On the other hand, prevention can also induce positive emotions such as
reassurance or relief. We indicate the intensity of the preventive procedure by  > 0,
the out-of pocket monetary cost by c and the psychic costs and benets by f() (with
@f()
@
> 0).
In the case of a positive test, the screening technique successfully detects the presence
of the disorder. A true negative test rightly shows that an individual does not su¤er
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from the disorder. In some cases (including that of breast cancer), the rst test round
is not perfectly accurate. However if the rst test is negative, no follow-up test is taken.
If the disorder was undetected, individuals can end up in the late or terminal stage of
the disorder. This is called a false negative test result.6 The utility consequences of the
di¤erent potential health states are as follows:
uP = v(y   c   ce) + w(h; e) + (1  px;t+1)Vt+1   f() (1.9)
uTN = v(y   c) + w(h; 0) + (1  px;t+1)Vt+1   f() (1.10)
uFN = I(nf) [v(y   c   cl) + w(h; l) + (1  px;t+1)Vt+1]  f() (1.11)
where the superscripts P; TN; FN refer to positive, true negativeand false negative
respectively.
The probabilities of ending up in the di¤erent health states depend on the e¤ectiveness
of the prevention program as measured by the test sensitivity (se 2 [0; 1]). Test sensitivity
is dened as the probability that a test will be positive for an ill individual and can be
expressed in terms of the numbers of positive (NP ) and false negative tests (NFN):
se =
NP
NP +NFN
(1.12)
We can then write the probabilities to end up in a certain health state in terms of p and
se:
pP = p se (1.13)
pTN = (1  p) (1.14)
pFN = p (1  se) (1.15)
If we combine the utility pay-o¤ and probabilities, we can formulate the expected utility
in case of participation in a preventive care program:
EUparticipation = p se uP + (1  p) uTN + p (1  se) uFN (1.16)
6After a positive test result, a more conclusive second test (e.g. breast tissue biopsy) can reveal that
the disorder was falsely suggested in the rst round while the individual does not have the disorder. This
is dened in the literature as a false positive test. The frequency of false positive results is captured by
the test specicity, which is the probability that the test yields a negative result for an individual without
the disorder. In order to simplify our analysis we abstract from the possibility of a second screening
round. The results from a more complete model are similar. They can be obtained from the authors on
request.
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From the point of view of the patient, test sensitivity se is important for those who
are hit by the disease. In utility terms, the relevance of a larger value for se is expressed
by the di¤erence between uP and uFN . If the screening test gives perfect information
we have NFN = 0 and se = 1. In principle, one can expect that the medical prevention
technology implies a positive relationship between sensitivity se on the one hand and test
intensity  on the other. This relationship need not be monotonic, though.
1.2.1.3 The full model
The individual will participate in prevention if EU > 0; with
EU = EUparticipation   EUnon participation
= p se uP + (1  p) uTN + p (1  se) uFN (1.17)
 p uS   (1  p)uHE
= p se uP   uFN+ (1  p) uTN   uHE+ p uFN   uS (1.18)
It is useful to consider the relative ranking of the di¤erent states. For most realistic
values of f(), i.e. if psychological costs and distress due to prevention exceed psycholog-
ical benets from reassurance, and preventive care costs are not excessive, it is clear from
eqs. (1.7) to (1.11) that uHE > uTN > uP , and that uS > uFN . It is su¢ cient to assume
that uP > uS to get a full ranking. For fatal diseases (with uS = 0), this assumption
boils down to the innocuous premise that taking an e¤ective preventive action to avoid
death yields a positive utility outcome (uP > 0). For non-fatal diseases, we derive from
eqs. (1.9) and (1.8):
uP   uS = v(y   c   ce)  v(y   cl) + w(h; e)  w(h; l)  f(); (1.19)
A positive value implies that the utility gain due to early discovery and treatment
instead of late treatment is larger than the psychological costs related to prevention. In
that case, we can conclude that:
uHE > uTN > uP > uS > uFN (1.20)
If we accept eq. (1.20), the rst term in eq. (1.18) is positive and represents the utility
gain from a correct diagnosis and early preventive e¤ort. Increasing sensitivity se leads
to more e¤ective prevention, and hence to a utility increase. The second and third term,
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on the other hand, are obviously negative. The second term represents the utility loss for
a healthy person when participating in prevention. The third term indicates the utility
loss due to a wrong screening diagnosis.
There are, however, two extreme cases: always-compliers and never-compliers. Some
individuals enjoy prevention and will always comply. This is the case if psychological
benets exceed psychological costs and monetary prevention costs are limited. In this
case uP > uFN > uS and uTN > uHE, so that all three terms in eq. (1.18) turn positive.
On the other hand, it is possible that for some individuals, the psychological costs are
prohibitively high, so that uS > uP > uFN . This implies that p uS > p se uP + p
(1  se)uFN and that the expected utility from prevention given by eq. (1.17) is always
negative. These individuals never comply with prevention. We exclude the extreme cases
from the further analysis.
1.2.2 Primary prevention
Primary prevention (for example immunization or Aspirin use to prevent cardiovascular
diseases) reduces the probability of developing a disorder. The aim is not to detect and
treat a disease in its early stages, but to keep the individual healthy in the rst place.
The expected utility for non-participation in prevention is identical to the specication in
eqs. (1.6) to (1.8). The expected utility for participation changes, because the potential
health states are di¤erent.
In case the individual participates in primary prevention, two potential health states
exist: the individual can either become sick or remain healthy. The former occurs when
the preventive technology is not e¤ective (NE). A sick patient will be referred to late-
stage treatment (or will die if the disease is fatal). The utility pay-o¤ and the probability
of ending up in this state are:
uNE = I(nf) [v(y   c   cl) + w(h; l) + (1  px;t+1)Vt+1]  f() (1.21)
pNE = p(1  ef) (1.22)
where ef is a parameter that denotes the e¤ectiveness of the primary preventive technol-
ogy.
Alternatively, the individual remains healthy when she is not a¤ected by the disease
or the preventive technology e¤ectively protected her from contracting the disease. Let
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us call this the e¤ective state (E). The utility pay-o¤ and the probability of ending up in
this state are:
uE = v(y   c) + w(h; 0) + (1  px;t+1)Vt+1   f() (1.23)
pE = 1  p(1  ef) = (1  p) + p ef (1.24)
Remark that the expressions are very much in line with the specications we have used
to model secondary prevention. Eqs. (1.21) and (1.23) are identical to eqs. (1.11) and
(1.10), respectively. If we reinterpret the sensitivity parameter for secondary prevention
as the e¤ectiveness parameter for primary prevention, it is clear that pNE = pFN and
pE = pTN + pP . In fact, the main di¤erence between both types of prevention is that the
positive test state with early treatment for secondary prevention is replaced by the true
negative state in case of primary prevention. The expected utility for participation can
be written as follows:
EUparticipation = [(1  p) + p ef ] uE + p(1  ef) uNE (1.25)
=

pTN + pP
 uTN + pFN  uFN ; for ef = se (1.26)
From eq. (1.20), we know that uTN > uP . The replacement of uP by uTN in eq.
(1.26), shows that, ex ante and ceteris paribus, in comparison with secondary prevention,
primary prevention makes it possible to realize an additional utility gain of the order
pP   uTN   uP .
1.3 Comparative statics of the prevention decision
Individuals that do not expect to die in the immediate future will be confronted for
a given disease with multiple decision moments to participate in preventive care. The
same decision problem will return in the next period and this process continues until
the uncertain moment of death. This means that the individual decides whether or not
to participate in prevention in the current period, taking into account future utility and
future preventive e¤ort. To model this full process, one would need a multi-period model.
However, such a multi-period model is mathematically burdensome. We sketch its main
features in Appendix 2, but here we focus on a simplied two period model that is su¢ cient
to yield the main insights.
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In this simplied model, we assume that the individual lives during two periods and
dies at the end of the second period. In period 1, the individual decides whether or
not to participate in the preventive program, while in period 2, the individual does not
participate in prevention and simply gets utility from income and health. The expected
utility in period 2 is una¤ected by individual behavior and is characterized as follows:
V2 = (1  p2) [v(y2) + w(h2; 0)] + I (nf) p2  [v(y2   cl) + w(h2; l)] (1.27)
Let us now implement the decision rule eq. (1.1) for the rst period. This gives for
secondary prevention:
EU1 = p1  se [v(y1   c   ce) + w(h1; e) + (1  px;2)V2] (1.28)
+(1  p1) [v(y1   c)  v(y1)]  f()
+I(nf)
"
p1  (v(y1   c   cl)  v(y1   cl))
 p1  se (v(y1   c   cl) + w(h1; l) + (1  px;2)V2)
#
and for primary prevention (with se = ef):
EU1 = p1  se [v(y1   c) + w(h1; 0) + (1  px;2)V2] (1.28)
+(1  p1) [v(y1   c)  v(y1)]  f()
+I(nf)
"
p1  (v(y1   c   cl)  v(y1   cl))
 p1  se (v(y1   c   cl) + w(h1; l) + (1  px;2)V2)
#
Except for the rst line, expressions (1.28) and (1.28) are identical. We will now
derive the comparative statics for the utility di¤erence EU1 for the e¤ect of the future,
of background health and of income. The computations for other parameters can be found
in Appendix 4 and will be discussed only briey.
The future It follows from eqs. (1.28) and (1.28) that
@EU1
@
= (1  I(nf)) p1  se (1  px;2) V2 > 0 (1.29)
@EU1
@px;2
=  (1  I(nf)) p1  se   V2 6 0 (1.30)
@EU1
@V2
= (1  I(nf)) p1  se   (1  px;2) > 0 (1.31)
The future only inuences the prevention decision in the case of a fatal disease, i.e. if
I(nf) = 0. Indeed, with a non-fatal disease, all the relevant consequences occur in the rst
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period and every health state has the same prospects with respect to the future. For fatal
diseases, prevention provides an opportunity to avoid death through early treatment and
thus increases the probability to benet from future utility. Participation in prevention
rises as the present value of the utility gain related to prevention, increases. This happens
when the level of future utility V2 or the weight  given to the future increase or the
probability of dying from other causes px;2 decreases.
We implicitly assume that an individual has a general background health h2 in period
2, irrespective of being healthy, treated early or late in period 1. This assumption can
be relaxed to have e.g. a lower h2 when treated late, due to permanent health damage,
compared to being treated early or not needing treatment at all. This leads to di¤erent
utility values of V2 depending on the potential states in period 1. The consequence is
again that the future might matter for non-fatal diseases, and, that the marginal e¤ects
(w.r.t. ; px;2;V2) go in the same direction as described for a fatal disease.7
Income The partial e¤ect for current income y1 can be derived from (1.28) for sec-
ondary prevention:
@EU1
@y1
= p1  se v1(y1   c   ce) + (1  p1) [v1(y1   c)  v1(y1)] (1.32)
+I(nf) [p1  (v1(y1   c   cl)  v1(y1   cl))  p1  se v1(y1   c   cl)]
and from (1.28) for primary prevention:
@EU1
@y1
= p1  se v1(y1   c) + (1  p1) [v1(y1   c)  v1(y1)] (1.32)
+I(nf) [p1  (v1(y1   c   cl)  v1(y1   cl))  p1  se v1(y1   c   cl)]
The rst line in eqs. (1.32) and (1.32) is always positive. The second line is zero for
fatal diseases and can be positive or negative for non-fatal diseases. Therefore for fatal
diseases the overall income e¤ect is always positive. If the disease is non-fatal, the sign of
the overall income e¤ect depends on the relative size of the underlying parameters.
7Another assumptions that inuences the comparative statics with respect to the future is that the
frequency of prevention and the period of disease development coincide. If this is not the case, and e.g.
prevention is recommended to be taken yearly while the disorder needs more than a year to develop to the
late stage of the disorder, the prevention decision is taken in period 1 and potential curative treatment
occurs in period 2. The consequence of this discrepancy is that the future will also matter for a non-fatal
disease, and the marginal e¤ects (w.r.t. ; px;2;V2) go in the same direction as described for a fatal
disease.
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Table 1.1: Taylor conditions for positive income e¤ect of y1 on participation in period 1
Disease type fatal disease
non-fatal disease, non-fatal disease,
primary prevention secondary prevention
Taylor condition y1
always positive
e¤ect
c > p1  se cl c > p1  se (cl   ce)
A rst order Taylor expansion around y1 allows us to formulate approximate conditions
for @EU1
@y1
to be positive. The results are summarized in Table 1.1.8 For non-fatal dis-
eases, income will have a positive e¤ect if the (private) monetary costs of participation in
prevention (costs for screening or vaccination) outweigh the savings in terms of curative
treatment costs. If monetary costs are larger than monetary benets, this will have a
negative e¤ect on the incentives for prevention, and, with a concave utility function, the
negative impact will be more pronounced for poorer persons. This explains the positive
income e¤ect on participation in prevention. If costs are less than the benets, an anal-
ogous reasoning yields a negative income e¤ect. The conditions in Table 1.1 are easily
interpreted. In most realistic cases of secondary prevention we may expect a positive
income e¤ect. If, for example, curative treatment and early treatment are equally well
covered by health insurance, any monetary cost of prevention, as minor as it might be,
leads to a positive income e¤ect. In the case of primary prevention, the conditions for a
positive income e¤ect are stricter.
We can also draw conclusions about the e¤ect of y2 on the expected utility gain of
taking a preventive test in period 1. It has a positive e¤ect on participation, but only for
fatal diseases. The obvious intuition is that an income increase enhances future utility V2
and makes actual preventive e¤ort more benecial.
General background health The comparative static expressions for background
health h1 are given by:
@EU1
@h1
= p1  se w1(h; e)  I(nf) p1  se w1(h; l) (1.33)
for secondary prevention and for primary prevention by:
@EU1
@h1
= p1  se w1(h; 0)  I(nf) p1  se w1(h; l) (1.33)
8The details of the calculations are given in Appendix 3.
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The sign of this expression depends heavily on the type of illness and prevention, as well as
on the interaction between h andm as laid out in section 1.2. An overview of the di¤erent
possibilities is given in Table 1.2. Note that these results o¤er an alternative explanation
for the nding of Wu (2003), who found a positive e¤ect of health on participation in
breast cancer screening and a negative e¤ect on inuenza vaccination. Wu pointed at
psychological factors such as fear and anxiety, varying discount rates by health status
or di¤erences in GP advice according to health status to explain this discrepancy. Our
model provides an easy explanation within the context of a standard expected utility
model, based on the type of prevention and the disease characteristics.9
Table 1.2: Overview of the expected e¤ect of health on preventive action according to
disease and prevention type
Disease type fatal disease non-fatal disease
Complements h and m positive positive
Comorbidities h and m positive negative
Independence h and m positive no e¤ect
The e¤ect of future health on participation in prevention is similar to the e¤ect of future
income. A better future background health makes it worthwhile to pursue prevention in
the current period in the case of a fatal disease.
Other parameters The comparative statics for the other parameters can be found
in Appendix 4. We conclude from the results that participation in prevention is unam-
biguously increased by lowering complexity (), monetary (c) and psychological f()
costs of prevention, by lowering early treatment costs (ce), by enhancing the e¤ectiveness
of the preventive technology (se; ef). However as an increase in complexity () at the
same time raises monetary costs (c) and improves e¤ectiveness (se; ef), the positive and
negative e¤ects on participation should be weighed against each other. An increase in
curative (late) treatment costs has no e¤ect on preventive behavior for fatal diseases, since
no cure is available, and an ambiguous e¤ect for non-fatal diseases. For non-fatal diseases,
the e¤ect will be positive if the preventive technology is e¤ective and the monetary costs
of prevention are low, since in this case prevention provides a good alternative to curative
treatment. A similar conclusion can be drawn for risk perceptions p1. They have a positive
e¤ect on participation for fatal diseases, but an ambiguous e¤ect for non-fatal diseases,
which will be positive for e¤ective preventive procedures with low monetary costs.
9Similar arguments are given by Mullahy (1999) and Maurer (2009).
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1.4 Empirical analysis
For our empirical illustration, we analyze six types of disorders and their corresponding
preventive care options: breast cancer, dental caries, inuenza, hypertension, hyperc-
holesterolemia and diabetes. In the next subsection we briey describe the disorders and
summarize the corresponding behavioral hypotheses. We then present the available data
used in the empirical analysis. Finally, we present the results.
1.4.1 Setup of the empirical exercise
1.4.1.1 Six procedures
Breast cancer: fatal disease, secondary prevention, comorbidities or in-
dependence in health. Breast cancer is the most common cancer among European
women. It accounts for almost one in three new cancer cases and one in six cancer deaths.
One in nine women develops breast cancer at some point in her life, and this fraction has
increased over the years. Although primary prevention is not yet an option, it is pos-
sible to detect breast cancer and the chances of survival increase the earlier the cancer
is treated. For this reason, many countries have set up a preventive screening program.
Given the nature of breast cancer, we assume that late treatment of cancer results in
death during the period.10
Dental caries: non-fatal disease, secondary prevention, complements in
health. For preventive dental care, no government organized large scale preventive care
programs exist. Dental policies vary widely across European countries (Widström and
Eaton, 2004). The setup of preventive care is as follows. An (asymptomatic) individual
visits the dentist preventively (without feeling pain or having dental-related problems).
The dentist screens for dental caries and dental plaque. If the dentist observes irregular-
ities action is undertaken. In the case of no prevention or a false negative result, there
will be curative treatment of the advanced dental problem.
Inuenza: non-fatal disease, primary prevention, comorbidities in health.
Inuenza vaccination is one of the best-known and most studied examples of primary
prevention. Inuenza is a very common infectious disease that causes general discomfort
for most and death for some. In the latter case, death is often the result of a weakening of
10The American Cancer Society (2013) distinguishes between 4 cancer stages. If breast cancer is
detected and treated early (stage 1 or 2), the 5 year survival rate is nearly 100%, whereas survival rates
drop to 20% if cancer is detected in stage 4.
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the immune system caused by inuenza and an additional infection, e.g. pneumonia. The
Centre for Disease Control and prevention (CDC) in the United States estimates that
each year on average 5% to 20% of the population su¤ers from seasonal inuenza, i.e.
5000 to 20.000 infected individuals per 100.000 persons. The death rate from inuenza
in the period 1976 2007 is estimated between 1,4 to 16,7 deaths per 100.000 persons
(Thompson et al., 2010). When combining this information, it is clear that the case
fatality risk, which is the risk of dying when infected (or 1   I(nf) in our model), is far
less than 1%.11 Therefore, we consider seasonal inuenza to be a non-fatal disease.
Since the disease is infectious, immunization brings about positive externalities. Most
developed countries provide subsidized vaccination programs for certain vulnerable groups
within the population, such as chronically ill individuals or the elderly. In addition to
government programs, a number of companies also provide vaccination programs.
Hypertension: non-fatal disease, secondary prevention, comorbidities in
health. Hypertension refers to chronic high blood pressure. In the US, 41% and 55% of
non-institutionalized individuals aged above 45 or 65, respectively, indicate to su¤er from
hypertension in 2012 (Blackwell, Lucas & Clarke, 2014). Hypertension by itself is not
life threatening and can be controlled and treated through dietary and lifestyle changes
and/or medication. In combination with smoking, drinking or other chronic condition,
such as hypercholesterolemia and diabetes, the risk of dying from cardiovascular diseases
increases strongly.12 Therefore, we assume comorbidities in health. There are two types
of screening. First, individuals with a previous diagnosis of high blood pressure or of a
cardiovascular condition are screened to follow closely their health status and evaluate the
e¤ects of treatment against hypertension. Second, asymptomatic individuals, i.e. individ-
ual without increased risk for hypertension or cardiovascular diseases, have the possibility
to opportunistically measure their blood pressure, e.g. as part of a medical check-up by
the GP. Our model is relevant for the latter type of screening.
11It should be noted however that mortality varies substantially by inuenza virus type and age group.
Most of the inuenza and pneumonia related deaths occur among adults aged 65 or more. Hadler et
al. (2010) suggest case fatality rates per age group for seasonal inuenza of 0,001% 0,004% in the age
group of 0 to 17 year olds, 0,003% 0,011% for adults between 18 and 64 and 0,11% to 0,44% for those
aged 65 or more.
12Cardiovascular diseases are the number 1 cause of death in Western countries. In the US, the
incidence of heart diseases in 2012 is 18% and 30% for non-institutionalized individuals aged above 45
and 65, respectively (Blackwell, Lucas & Clarke, 2014). The mortality rate over the entire population in
2010 is 0.5% and 1.2%, for individuals aged above 45 and 65, respectively (National Center for Health
Statistics, 2014).
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Hypercholesterolemia: non-fatal disease, secondary prevention, comorbidi-
ties in health. Hypercholesterolemia refers to chronic high levels of cholesterol in the
blood. In the US, 45% and 54% of the individuals aged above 45 or 65, respectively,
su¤ers from high cholesterol levels or takes cholesterol-lowering medication between 2009
and 2012 (National Center for Health Statistics, 2014). High cholesterol levels puts an
individual at risk for, amongst other, heart diseases. Cholesterol levels can be lowered
mainly by medication. There are no direct signs or symptoms of high cholesterol, so that
screening, by means of a simple blood test, is required to ascertain its presence. As for
hypertension, we focus on opportunistic screening by asymptomatic individuals.
Diabetes: non-fatal disease, secondary prevention, comorbidities in health.
Diabetes is a chronic disease that occurs when the pancreas does not produce enough
insulin, or when the body cannot e¤ectively use the insulin it produces, leading to high
blood glucose levels. High blood glucose levels for prolonged periods cause damage to
blood vessels, nerves and other tissues. This can lead to serious health complications such
as cardiovascular diseases, stroke, blindness and kidney failure, especially in combination
with disturbances in lipid metabolism, hypertension and smoking. The e¤ects of diabetes
can be mitigated for a substantial period of time by adjusting the diet, physical exercise,
a healthy lifestyle, insulin injections and other medication. In our analysis, we focus on
opportunistic screening by asymptomatic individuals.
1.4.1.2 Hypotheses and empirical specication
Participation in prevention is a discrete decision. In our theoretical model we assumed
that individual i participates if EU i1 > 0, with EU
i
1 given in eqs. (1.28) and (1.28).
Adding a stochastic component "i capturing idiosyncratic factors, missing variables and
measurement errors, we can write the probability of participation as
P (i participates) = P (EU i1 + "i > 0) = P (EU
i
1 >  "i):
If we assume the random term to be normally distributed, this results in a standard
probit model. The comparative static hypotheses about EU1, as derived in the previous
section, can then be rephrased directly as hypotheses on the probability of participation.13
13Belkar et al. (2006) show that neglecting to distinguish between awareand unawareindividuals
may lead to a selection e¤ect. However, they also show that the problem is not very serious if censoring
is modest and positive dependence between awareness and choice is substantial(p. 44). This is likely to
be the case with our data.
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To keep track of our theoretical predictions, it may be convenient to look at Table 1.3,
summarizing the hypotheses for the empirical cases that will be analyzed.
Table 1.3: Overview of the theoretical hypotheses
E¤ect on par-
ticipation in
prevention
(period 1)
Disorder*
F, SP, Indep.
(e.g. breast
cancer)
NF, SP, Compl.
(e.g. dental
caries)
NF, PP, Comor.
(e.g. inuenza)
NF, SP, Comor. (e.g.
hypertension, diabetes,
hypercholesterolemia)
Decrease h1 negative negative positive positive
Increase y1 positive
ambiguous ambiguous ambiguous
(likely positive) (likely positive) (likely positive)
Increase px;2 negative no e¤ect no e¤ect no e¤ect
Decrease ; c positive positive positive positive
Increase p1 positive
ambiguous ambiguous ambiguous
(likely positive) (likely positive) (likely positive)
* F = Fatal; NF = Non-Fatal; SP = Secondary Prevention; PP = Primary prevention; Compl. = Complements;
Comor. = Comorbidities; Indep. = Independence
1.4.2 Data
Individual microdata are taken from SHARE. For breast cancer screening and inuenza
vaccination, government organized prevention programs exist that di¤er across European
countries. For both disorders, we combine the microdata from SHARE with information
from macrosources about the specic features of the prevention programs in the di¤erent
countries. Table 1.4 gives an overview of the relevant data and shows how they are related
to the variables in our theoretical model. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1.7
in Appendix 5.
Individual data Our individual data come from the rst (2004-2005) and second
(2006-2007) wave of the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (version
2.5.0). SHARE is a micro-dataset, targeted at individuals aged 50 years and over (plus
spouses). It covers more than 30,000 non-institutionalized individuals from 14 European
countries and Israel. A household is selected in a random procedure, but with the spe-
cic requirement that at least one individual is aged 50 years or over. SHARE provides
comparable and detailed individual and household information. A full description can be
found in Börsch-Supan et al. (2005).
The dependent variables are binary variables that equal 1 if the individual has had a
specic type of prevention in the last (two) year(s). The type of procedures include mam-
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Table 1.4: Overview of the data
Disorder
Data Breast cancer Dental caries Inuenza Other disorders
h1
Subjective health status
Objective health variables: ADL, Mobility, BMI, Grip strength
y1 Equivalent household income, broadly dened
px;2 Mortality risk over period of 10 years
; c
 Belonging to country
target group for screen-
ing
 Belonging to coun-
try target group for in-
uenza
 Probability of receiv-
ing an invitation letter
 Free or subsidized
vaccination
Population based pro-
gram completed
p1
 Belonging to country
target group for screen-
ing
Dentures - Belonging to coun-
try target group for in-
uenza
Past cancer diagnosis Trouble biting
Age and country spe-
cic breast cancer in-
cidence and mortality
rates
Control var. Education, Nationality, Gender, Age, Partner, Smoker, House owner, Country dummies by wave
mograms for women, preventive dental care14, inuenza vaccination, blood cholesterol
test, blood pressure test and blood sugar test. Reported participation rates for our sub-
samples are 55%, 42%, 33%, 52%, 68% and 54% respectively. Despite using two rounds of
SHARE, no panel structure can be easily implemented. Data on participation in breast
cancer screening and inuenza vaccination were collected through a self-administered
drop-o¤ questionnaire. For breast cancer screening, we restrict our sample to women
without a history of breast cancer. No respondent received the drop-o¤ questionnaire in
both waves, therefore we are limited to a pooled cross-sectional analysis for breast can-
cer screening and inuenza vaccination. In the case of dental prevention, an important
number of individuals answered the question on participation in preventive dental care in
both waves. We account for this by pooling all observations but clustering error terms at
the individual level. With respect to blood pressure, cholesterol and sugar tests, individ-
uals are asked whether or not in the past year they were tested by a doctor or a nurse.
This question was only surveyed in wave 2 through a self-administered drop-o¤ question-
naire.15 We focus on opportunistic screening by asymptomatic individuals, and exclude
14We set preventive dental care equal to one if individuals reported visting a dentist in the last twelve
months for preventive use or prevention and treatment combined. The value is set to zero if the individual
has not seen a dentist or has seen them only for treatment. Our empirical results are similar when using
an alternative specication with a value equal to one if the dentist is contacted for prevention use only
and zero otherwise.
15All other SHARE data discussed below were collected using a computer assisted personal interviewing
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individuals with heart conditions and diabetes for the subgroup of blood pressure and
cholesterol screening. Furthermore, we exclude individuals with a history of hypertension
or hypercholesterolemia, respectively for the subgroup of blood pressure and cholesterol
screening, as well as individuals who take specic medication for the disorder. For blood
sugar screening, we exclude individuals with a history of diabetes or who use medication
for diabetics.
As for the explanatory variables, we are particularly interested in variables that allow
us to distinguish between the di¤erent disease and prevention combinations, i.e. health
status and mortality risk. We supplement these with an income variable and various
control variables.
SHARE contains subjective and objective health information. Self-assessed health is
represented by four dummy variables, reecting di¤erent perceived health levels: poor,
fair, good, and, very good/excellent. In addition, there are many variables that capture
a part of an individuals general background health in a more objective way. We have
two indices: an index of limitations to six activities of daily living16, and an index of
limitations in mobility related to health.17 For each limitation the individual su¤ers from,
a score of 1 is awarded. Each index represents the sum of all relevant limitations, which
is subsequently rescaled (by the total number of potential limitations) to a value between
0 and 1, respectively meaning no limitations and all limitations apply. Furthermore, we
have information on the BMI and a score for the grip strength of the individual (ranging
from 0 to 100). We use the average score out of 2 measurements with the individuals
dominant hand.
The mortality risk (px;2) is captured by the question: What are the chances that you
will live to age X or more?. Age X is predetermined and depends on current age, e.g.
for all individuals aged 65 or less, age X is set at 75, for individuals aged between 66 and
70, age X is xed at 80, etc. Thus, the survival period may di¤er across individuals and
survival probabilities cannot be clearly interpreted. To make mortality risk comparable
across individuals, we estimate the probability of dying in the next 10 years using a
(CAPI) program. A self-administered drop-o¤ questionnaire can be biased, since lower socio-economic
groups tend to be underrepresented. Therefore, the answers to the drop-o¤ questionnaire might not be
representative of the population. However, Jusot et al. (2012) point out that prevalence rates obtained in
the drop-o¤ questionnaire correspond to available published OECD population data for most countries.
16The activity questions that are used (yes/no): are you able to... dress?, walk across a room?, bathe
or shower?, eat?, get in and out of bed? and use the toilet?
17The mobility questions that are used (yes/no): Are you able to... walk 100 metres?, get up from a
chair after sitting for long periods?, climb stairs?, reach your arms above shoulder level?, carry weights
over 5 kilos?
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Weibull specication. A Weibull function is frequently used to model longevity (Juckett
& Rosenberg, 1993; Wilson, 1994). The CDF of the Weibull distribution has the following
form:
F (x; k;) = 1  e ( x)
k
(1.34)
with k the shape parameter or death rate, x the time to death, and  the scale parameter.
With the survival probability (1   F (x; k;)) and two age points, i.e. current age and
age X, we can compute x and either  or k. In absence of additional information on
survival probability (e.g. for another time span), we need an assumption on the other
parameter. We make assumptions on the death rate, since it is easier to interpret than
the scale parameter. k = 1 implies a constant death rate at all ages, while k > 1
corresponds to an increase of the death rate with age, i.e. older people are more likely to
die. Longevity analysis using a Weibull specication suggests a death rate between 4 and
10 for individuals aged between 50 and 100 years (Weon, 2004; Wilson, 1994). Therefore,
in our empirical analysis we use k = 7 as the baseline death rate and perform a sensitivity
analysis for k 2 [4; 10]. The Weibull specication cannot meaningfully deal with certain
survival probabilities of 0% or 100%.18 However, since nobody can predict survival with
certainty, we adjust certainsurvival probabilities of 0% and 100% to slightly uncertain
probabilities of 0.01% and 99.99%. A similar approach has been followed in Picone et al.
(2004).19
Income is interpreted as equivalent household income (using the square root equivalence
scale), comprised of labor and retirement income as well as income from wealth (dividends,
rental income etc.). We use reported (not imputed) income data and lter out households
with zero or extremely high reported income. All amounts are expressed in euros using
the exchange rates provided by SHARE, and subdivided into deciles across the di¤erent
European countries (separately for each wave).
18Our Weiull specication does not allow to compute mortality probabilities for individuals who evalu-
ate survival at 0%, whereas mortality probabilities for individuals who evaluate survival at 100% do not
vary with parameter specications and always give a mortality probability of 0%.
19There exists some doubt as to whether or not the answers to survival questions have predictive value
for real longevity (Viscusi and Hakes, 2003). Moreover, sceptics point at a heaping of responses at focal-
point values of 0, 50 or 100 percent, which hints at biased response (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2002). On the
other hand, an individual has access to superior information about herself than is incorporated in a life
table. For a discussion, see e.g. Peracchi & Perotti (2011) or Wübker (2012b). Peracchi & Perotti (2011)
using SHARE data and Smith et al. (2001) using HRS data nd evidence that subjective beliefs about
longevity relate to observed survival patterns. For our purpose, however, it is not crucial whether or not
individual beliefs are an accurate reproduction of reality, since the prevention decisions of individuals will
be inuenced by their subjective beliefs including biases.
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There are a limited number of variables that relate to risk of a specic disorder. In the
empirical analysis of breast cancer prevention, we take up an indicator for whether or not
the individual has had a positive cancer diagnosis (except breast cancer) in the past. We
believe that the experience of another cancer will increase the subjective belief (and/or
objective risk) of developing breast cancer. The model for dental prevention is enlarged
with a variable indicating whether or not the individual experiences biting problems and
has dentures.
Control variables used in the empirical model are age (in classes of 5 years); education
(based on ISCED-97 scale)20; dummies for gender, partner, house owner, nationality
(native, EU-citizen or non-EU citizen), (past) smoker; and country dummies by wave.
These control variables capture elements of awareness, prevalence, need, future utility,
subjective beliefs and risk aversion.
Macro data Country dummies capture the e¤ect of intercountry variation, but re-
main a blackbox with respect to the underlying causes. While they are necessary when
comparing countries (and are also present in our model), we enrich the SHARE data with
information about health policies and health indicators from other sources. These can be
seen as rough and partial measures of  and c. The additional data are not individual
specic but group or region specic. Due to missing data or lack of comparable informa-
tion on health policies, Israel and Switzerland are left out of the analysis and only data
from the 13 remaining countries are used (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden).
For breast cancer, the WHO GLOBOCAN project provides age and country specic
information on incidence and mortality rates for 2008. The rates are expressed in cases
per 1000 individuals. The report on cancer screening in the European Union provides
information on the type of screening program (population-based or opportunistic21) and
20We create dummies for highest educational degree: primary education (ISCED 0-1), lower secondary
education (ISCED 2), upper secondary education (ISCED 3-4), higher vocational education and university
degree (ISCED 5-6).
21By population-based screening, we refer to an organized screening program (with a specied target
group, a specic screening test, intervals, quality assurance, monitoring and other procedures) managed
by an organization at a national or regional level. In addition to the high degree of organization, every
eligible individual served by the screening program is individually identied and personally invited to
attend screening. Opportunistic screening on the other hand refers to screening outside an organised
program and without personal invitation. The initiative to perform a screening examination is taken
either by the individual or the health-care provider. Opportunistic screening may or may not be performed
according to the public screening policy (if one exists), e.g. it may be applied to individuals outside the
targeted population or according to a di¤erent screening technique.
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the implementation status22 (von Karsa et al., 2008). In Germany, Denmark and Italy,
population based programs are administered at a regional level, with varying progress in
program implementation. We include the region-specic information on the implementa-
tion status of the breast cancer screening program in our dataset. Moreover, von Karsa
et al. provide details on the country target group for screening and on the chances of
receiving an invitation letter per country. All of this information was matched with the
characteristics of the individuals in our sample. For Spain and Sweden, regional di¤erences
in target group denitions were taken into account.
Information on inuenza vaccination policies and country di¤erences can be found on
the website and in the publications from the VENICE project.23 Many countries dene
di¤erent target groups for inuenza vaccination based on age (e.g. individuals aged 65 and
over), on existing illnesses (e.g. individuals with chronic lung diseases) and on professions
that have interactions with vulnerable groups (e.g. health care workers). We replicated the
target groups based on the specic rules for each country. In addition, we can distinguish
between three reimbursement schemes: free vaccination, partially-subsidized vaccination,
or no subsidies.
Comparable regional or country information for the other disorders is limited or inac-
curate, and is not included.
1.4.3 Results
Table 1.5 presents the averaged individual marginal e¤ects of the participation determi-
nants in the prevention of the di¤erent disorders. The analysis is performed on a large
number of individuals: 11,350 individuals for breast cancer screening, 35805 individuals
for dental prevention of whom 12972 have entries in both wave 1 and 2, 21495 individ-
uals for inuenza vaccination, 4029 individuals for cholesterol screening, 3339 for blood
pressure screening, and, 5649 for blood sugar screening. The analysis conrms results
previously obtained with SHARE by Schmitz and Wübker (2011), Jusot et al. (2012) and
Wübker (2012a, 2012b) for breast cancer screening and inuenza vaccination, but some
explanatory and control variables di¤er to match better our theoretical model. Of course,
since all our data are basically taken from a cross-section (and it is not possible to nd
convincing instruments), it would be wrong to give a causal interpretation to our results.
22It takes time to set up a population-based program. By implementation status, we refer to the
progress made in this process. The starting point is a planning phase, followed by a pilot project, a
rollout over the entire region/country and nally a completed population-based screening program.
23VENICE is an acronym for Vaccine European New Integrated Collaboration E¤ort.
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Signicant e¤ects should be interpreted as associations. SHARE targets individuals aged
50 years and over (plus spouses), which implies that individuals below 50 years old are by
denition partners and might not constitute a representative sample of the population.
We keep all individuals in our sample regardless of age, but perform the empirical analysis
also on individuals aged 50 and over (see Table 1.8 in Appendix 5). The empiricial results
and conclusions are similar.
The results in Table 1.5 show that a decrease in background health status, represented
by a higher BMI, ADL index or mobility index and a lower score on grip strength are
either insignicant or have the hypothesized sign. The pattern that emerges from the self-
assessed health dummies also conrms the hypothesis that a decrease in background health
decreases participation in breast cancer screening and dental prevention and increases
participation in prevention for the other disorders. Even though our results are to be
interpreted cautiously, it is very reassuring that the inclusion of multiple health variables,
capturing divergent aspects of an individual background health, lead to partial e¤ects
that go in the same direction and that conrm the hypothesized correlations.
The marginal e¤ects of self-assessed health are most pronounced for the types of pre-
vention that can be provided by a general practitioner (GP), i.e. inuenza vaccination,
cholesterol screening, blood pressure screening and blood sugar screening. An alterna-
tive explanation for these results could be that individuals with worse background health
simply visit more often a GP, who might inform them about preventive actions. In this
way, participation in prevention can be carried out in combination with a visit for an-
other reason and individuals can be encouraged to take-up prevention in ways not directly
captured in our model. We test whether this alternative channel is driving our results in
two ways. First, we perform the baseline analysis on the subsample of individuals who
have visited a GP in the past 12 months (results available on request). The e¤ects for
breast cancer screening, dental prevention and inuenza vaccination are almost identical
to the baseline results. With respect to the di¤erent blood tests, the signicant e¤ects
among the objective indicators remain present and indicate that a decreasing health leads
to a higher take-up of the test. The marginal e¤ects of self-assessed health decrease in
absolute value but the pattern remains visible and signicant at a lower signicance level.
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Second, we introduce two additional explanatory variables to our baseline specication,
i.e. the number of visits to the GP in the past 12 months and a GP quality index. We
adopt the GP quality index as proposed by Wübker (2012b). The GP quality index is not
available for all individuals. Using it reduces the number of observations by more than
60% for dental prevention, by 22% for breast cancer screening and inuenza vaccination
and by around 8% for the other disorders. The results can be found in Table 1.9 in
Appendix 5. The inclusion of GP visits and GP quality reduces the point estimates of the
marginal e¤ects as well as their signicance levels. Overall, the hypothesized correlations
remain present, both for objective health indicators and for self-assessed health. Moreover,
the results show that individuals who visited a GP more frequently in the past year are
signicantly more likely to participate in all types of prevention and that the quality of
the GP has a positive e¤ect on all types of prevention except dental prevention. These
results stand to reason. Introducing the GP-variables does not alter considerably the
overall pattern for the other variables (the most pronounced change is a decrease of the
income e¤ect for dental prevention).
Also as expected, mortality risk over 10 years is an important predictor in the model
of breast cancer screening, but has no signicant e¤ect on any other type of prevention.
Sensitivity analysis conrms these results. The signs and signicance do not change when
we vary the death rate gradually from k = 4 to k = 8:8. For k between 8.8 and 10, the
results are borderline signicant with p-values between 10% and 15%. Only in the model
of blood sugar tests, an increase in mortality risk over 10 years with 4  k < 4:6, slightly
decreases the probability of participation at a signicance level of 10%. However, since
SHARE is oriented towards individuals aged 50 and over, higher values for k, i.e. a more
important increase in the probability of dying as one ages, are more probable.
Controlling for education levels, we nd a positive e¤ect of income on preventive behav-
ior, although not always signicant. We nd that in particular deciles 1 to 3/4 participate
less in prevention. The income e¤ects are most pronounced for breast cancer screening
and dental prevention. The former is in line with the theoretical predictions. An alterna-
tive income specication, i.e. dening income deciles at the country level (by wave), does
not change our results in any important way (results available upon request).
Next, we have individual specic information that serves as proxy for (subjective and/or
objective) disease risk. We nd that an earlier diagnosis of non-breast cancer increases the
probability of participation in breast cancer screening on average by 8.5 percentage points.
This can be explained by higher (subjective and/or objective) risk of developing breast
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Table 1.6: Determinants in the take-up of prevention: macro data on policy design
breast cancer inuenza
screening vaccination
Variables Marginal e¤ects (SE) Marginal e¤ects (SE)
Breast cancer specic
Age and country specic incidence -0.007 (0.018)
Age and country specic mortality 0.141 (0.058)**
Country target group 0.060 (0.024)**
Prob. receiving invitation letter 0.172 (0.023)***
Pop. based program complete 0.179 (0.021)***
Inuenza specic
Country target group based on age 0.079 (0.017)***
Country target group based on illness 0.058 (0.008)***
Subsidized vaccination 0.085 (0.014)***
Free vaccination 0.162 (0.014)***
Note: Coe¢ cient estimates from probit regressions are reported with robust standard errors.
For dental prevention, standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Signicance levels of
coe¢ cients: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, All regressions control for health, mortality risk, income, education,
nationality, gender, age, partner, past an current smoker, house owner, country dummies by wave
as discussed in section 1.4.2. In addition, the regressions for breast cancer screening includes a dummy
for having had a cancer (except breast cancer)
Database: SHARE, wave 1 and wave 2
cancer or by an increased attention on the part of the health care providers. Preventive
dental care is negatively related to having dentures and having trouble biting. This is not
surprising, since the former probably reduces the need for regular preventive care, while
the latter requires curative rather than preventive care.
In Table 1.6, we add the additional information from macrosources to the microdata
from SHARE. With the exception of breast cancer incidence, all variables show very sig-
nicant positive marginal e¤ects. We observe that the participation decision is positively
a¤ected by age and country-specic mortality rates. Breast cancer screening is higher for
individuals who are targeted, who receive an invitation letter and who live in a country
or region that has fully enacted a population based program. The probability of taking
up a vaccine increases if an individual belongs to a target group. Finally, we observe that
monetary stimuli clearly increase the probability of receiving inuenza vaccination, by 9
percentage points for subsidized vaccination and an as could be expected an even stronger
e¤ect of 16 percentage points for free vaccinations. We conclude that policy features play
a very important role in the take-up of prevention. They do this without signicantly
altering the marginal e¤ects of health, income and mortality risk, they rather explain
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some of the intercountry variation.
1.5 Conclusion
We analyzed participation in medical prevention with an expected utility model. Rather
than focusing on one specic intervention, we aimed to explain the di¤erences for vari-
ous prevention procedures within one coherent model. This model is su¢ ciently exible
to distinguish primary and secondary prevention for either fatal or non-fatal diseases.
Moreover, we integrated the idea of di¤erent disease types characterized by a di¤erent
interaction with background health. The model yields di¤erent predictions in the di¤er-
ent cases. We tested these predictions with individual data from SHARE and the model
performed reasonably well.
Our main contribution is the construction of a exible theoretical model. We believe
that this is useful. Starting from a rather general model allows us to bring some coherency
into the disparate insights from the empirical literature, and to validate di¤erentiated
hypotheses for di¤erent cases.24 In this respect, the expected utility model (broadly
interpreted) seems to be an interesting starting point for further developments. These
developments should go in two directions.
First, our theoretical model can be rened further. Introducing a richer dynamic struc-
ture would make it possible to integrate past behavior and more sophisticated expectations
into the explanatory framework.25 More fundamentally, there are by now su¢ cient indi-
cations in the literature that the expected utility model cannot explain all of the empirical
regularities, not even when it is interpreted as in our model  in a purely subjective
way, taking due account of biases in the perception of costs and probabilities. Recent
papers in the behavioral economic literature have built in other realistic features into the
analysis of screening and prevention decisions: hyperbolic discounting and myopia (Byrne
and Thompson, 2001; Fang and Wang, 2010), loss-aversion over changes in beliefs (Fels,
2011), biased perceptions of risks in a rank-dependent utility model (Etner and Jeleva,
2013) and anticipatory feelings (Oster et al., 2011). While some of these developments are
very promising, it would be overly ambitious to try to build a general model of di¤erent
prevention decisions incorporating these mechanisms. For a comparative exercise, the ex-
pected utility model remains a convenient and exible starting point. However, it should
24A similar position is taken by Howard (2005, p. 893).
25Some authors have used information in the third wave of SHARE to analyse the inuence of reported
past behavior in regard to (non-)participation in breast cancer screening (Wübker, 2012a, 2012b) and in
preventive dental care (Listl et al., 2012).
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be checked how much the more sophisticated behavioral models add to the explanatory
power of an (extended) expected-utility model, especially in cases of primary prevention
and secondary prevention with screening as a necessary condition for treatment.26
Second, on the empirical side, we lack data on important parameters such as the
subjective rate of time preference or the subjective perception of probabilities. Future
work should try to collect direct measures of these parameters.27 Using such well-designed
measures would allow a more convincing testing of the hypotheses.
Throughout the chapter, we have focused on medical prevention procedures, mainly
because participation is modeled in a binary way, and we analyzed the prevention of a
particular disorder, rather than an improvement of the general health status. Our model
can be extended to include lifestyle choices, such as physical activity, eating healthy or
(quitting) smoking, as long as the preventive decision can be dened in a binary way and
the disorders that are prevented can be well-delineated.28 The extensions in this context
could include elements of ability (e.g. the ability to sport), preferences (for certain types
of food, activities) and addiction (for alcohol, smoking, etc.).
26The strongest arguments against using the expected utility model can be found in Oster et al.
(2011). However, they analyse medical testing decisions for Huntingtons disease where at this moment
no curative treatment is available.
27Examples in the literature are Bradford et al. (2010) for time preferences and Carman and Kooreman
(2011) for subjective probabilities.
28Take physical exercise as an example. First, we can dene half an hour of physical activity per
week as the threshold of participation in prevention. Above (below) the threshold, individuals (do not)
participate in prevention. However, there are many other potential thresholds. Second, engaging in
regular physical activity contributes to the prevention of - amongst others - cardiovascular diseases,
obesity and depression. Note that it might be di¢ cult to dene the disease characteristics when several
diseases are prevented at the same time. It is, however, always possible to focus on the main prevented
disease or group diseases with similar characteristics.
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Appendix 1: Relaxing the separability assumption
Empirically, there is no consensus upon the sign of the interaction between health and
income in the utility function. We therefore assumed separability throughout the main
text. In this Appendix we explore alternative assumptions. A positive relationship implies
u12(y; h;m) > 0, i.e. an individual enjoys an additional unit of income more when she
has a better general background health, or vice versa, when the individual earns a higher
income, she values health more. A negative relationship is dened as u12(y; h;m) < 0,
which means that an individual enjoys an additional unit of income more when she has a
worse general background health, or vice versa, when the individual has a lower income,
she values health more.
The general comparative static results for income are to be compared with eqs. (1.32)
and (1.32). For secondary prevention this gives:
@EU1
@y1
= p1  se u1(y1   c   ce; h1; e) + (1  p1) [u1(y1   c; h1; 0)  u1(y1; h1; 0)] (1.35)
+I(nf)
"
p1  (u1(y1   c   cl; h1; l)  u1(y1   cl; h1; l))
 p1  se u1(y1   c   cl; h1; l)
#
and for primary prevention:
@EU1
@y1
= p1  se u1(y1   c; h1; 0) + (1  p1) [u1(y1   c; h1; 0)  u1(y1; h1; 0)] (1.35)
+I(nf)
"
p1  (u1(y1   c   cl; h1; l)  u1(y1   cl; h1; l))
 p1  se u1(y1   c   cl; h1; l)
#
For a fatal disease, only the rst line matters, which is always positive, no matter how
the relationship between income and health is specied. For a non-fatal disease, the overall
e¤ect is unknown, since the second line can be either positive or negative. However, the
marginal e¤ect can be ranked according to the relationship between y and m. The overall
partial e¤ect will be ceteris paribus higher the more positive the relationship between y
and m:
The general comparative static results for health are to be compared with eqs. (1.33)
and (1.33). For secondary prevention this gives:
@EU1
@h1
= p1  se u2(y1   c   ce; h1; e) + (1  p1) [u2(y1   c; h1; 0)  u2(y1; h1; 0)] (1.36)
+I(nf)
"
p1  (u2(y1   c   cl; h1; l)  u2(y1   cl; h1; l))
 p1  se u2(y1   c   cl; h1; l)
#
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and for primary care:
@EU1
@h1
= p1  se u2(y1   c; h1; 0) + (1  p1) [u2(y1   c; h1; 0)  u2(y1; h1; 0)] (1.36)
+I(nf)
"
p1  (u2(y1   c   cl; h1; l)  u2(y1   cl; h1; l))
 p1  se u2(y1   c   cl; h1; l)
#
The partial e¤ects for health are more complex. For fatal diseases, the partial e¤ect is
positive when health and income are independent or negatively correlated. The e¤ect is
unknown when health and income are positively correlated. For non-fatal diseases, we are
only able to predict the sign of the marginal e¤ect if income and health are independent.
The results in this case are the same as for eqs. (1.33) and (1.33). When income and
health are negatively or positively correlated, the overall e¤ect is unknown, since both
positive and negative terms are present and their relative weight (given by p1 and se)
determines the overall sign.
Appendix 2: The T period model
Our simplied two period model can be generalized to a multi-period model. In our
approach, decisions in the di¤erent time periods are independent of past decisions. See,
e.g. de la Mata (2011) and Etner and Jeleva (2013) for a richer dynamic specication.
Take the number of periods to be T ; T can be individually specic. We assume that
in period T the individual dies, so that VT = 0. We solve the problem backwards. In
this Appendix, we keep the non-separable utility function. We introduce an indicator
I(prim) to indicate primary prevention. This makes it easier to incorporate primary and
secondary prevention within one specication.
We can dene EUT 1 to incorporate both primary and secondary prevention:
EUT 1 = pT 1  se [(1  I(prim))u(yT 1   c   ce; hT 1; e) + I(prim)u(yT 1   c; hT 1; 0)]
+(1  pT 1) u(yT 1   c; hT 1; 0)
+I (nf) pT 1(1  se)u(yT 1   c   cl; hT 1; l)  f()
 (1  pT 1) u(yT 1; hT 1; 0)  I (nf) pT 1u (yT 1   cl; hT 1; l)
+ (1  I(nf)) pT 1  se (1  px;T )VT (1.37)
= CPEUT 1
+(1  I(nf)) pT 1  se (1  px;T )VT (1.38)
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We can subdivide EUT 1 into two terms: a rst term captures the current period
di¤erence in expected utility (CPEUT 1) and a second term represents future utility.
We can also dene VT 1, which captures expected utility from period T   1 onwards.
Since expected utility depends on preventive behavior, we introduce an indicator function
IT 1(part) that equals 1 if the individual participates in prevention in period T   1
(i.e. EUT 1 > 0) and zero if the individual does not take part in prevention (i.e.
EUT 1 < 0).
VT 1 = (1  pT 1) u(yT 1; hT 1; 0) + pT 1I (nf)u (yT 1   cl; hT 1; l)
+IT 1(part)EUT 1
= (1  pT 1) u(yT 1; hT 1; 0) + pT 1I (nf)u (yT 1   cl; hT 1; l) (1.39)
+IT 1(part)CPEUT 1 + IT 1(part) pT 1  se (1  I(nf))(1  px;T )VT
It is clear from eqs. (1.38) and (1.39), that all references to future utility disappear for
a non-fatal disease (I(nf) = 1). Therefore, in that case the prevention decision depends
only on current period variables, and the comparative static results are the same as in
the two period-model.
The analysis for fatal diseases is more challenging, since in this case future utility will
not disappear from the model if the individual participates in prevention. For any period
t, we can characterize the decision process and the payo¤ as follows:
EUt = CPEUt + pt  se   (1  px;t+1) (1.40)
T 1X
i=t+1

Ii (part)CPEUi + (1  pi)uHEi
 i 1Y
j=t+1
[pj  se  (1  px;j+1) Ij (part)]
with
CPEUt = pt  se [(1  I(prim))u(yt   c   ce; ht; e) + I(prim)u(yt   c; ht; 0)] (1.41)
+(1  pt) [u(yt   c; ht; 0)  u(yt; ht; 0)]  f()
Vt =
T 1X
i=t

Ii (part)CPEUi + (1  pi)uHEi
 i 1Y
j=t
[pj  se  (1  px;j+1) Ij (part)]
In the case of a fatal disease, expected utility consists of current period expected utility
and future utility. Future utility becomes more important when the individual expects
to live longer (T   t larger), when the individual is more future-oriented ( larger), when
the mortality risk for other diseases is lower (px;j+1 smaller) and when the benet from
prevention is more important (pj  se larger). In the expression for future utility, we
take into account the individuals future prevention decisions. If prevention has a positive
payo¤ in the future, this payo¤ will be taken into account for current decisions as well.
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Comparative statics The comparative statics are similar to those in the two period
model. Note, however, that age (or, more accurately the individuals time horizon T   t),
becomes relevant in the generalized model. In what follows, we look at the comparative
statics of fatal diseases.
With respect to the future, we can conclude that the partial e¤ects have the same
sign, but since Vt gets smaller as an individual ages, the e¤ect of  and px;t+1 decreases
over time.
For the disease characteristics and treatment costs, the partial e¤ects have the
same sign as in the two period model, but the time horizon and the future prevention
decision will inuence the magnitude of the e¤ect. We assume for simplicity that the
test characteristics and the costs of treatment are the same in each period. However, this
assumption can be relaxed.
A higher subjective probability of having the disorder in period t still leads to an
increase in participation in the same period. However, the e¤ect of pt+1 on the probability
of participation in period t is not the necessarily the same as in the two periods model:
@EUt
@pt+1
= pt  se   (1  px;t+1)

It+1 (part)
@CPEUt+1
@pt+1
  uHEt+1

(1.42)
+pt  se2  2  (1  px;t+1) (1  px;t+2) It+1(part)
T 1X
i=t+2

Ii (part)CPEUi + (1  pi)uHEi
 i 1Y
j=t+2
[pj  se  (1  px;j+1) Ij (part)]
We can distinguish between two terms. On the one hand there is a direct e¤ect in
period t + 1, which is negative. If pt+1 increases, the individual is more likely to die,
and utility decreases. This decrease cannot be countered by the direct positive e¤ect
of prevention in period t + 1. On the other hand, there might be an indirect e¤ect
of prevention in the subsequent periods. If the individual participates in prevention in
period t+ 1 (It+1(part) = 1), she reduces the risk from dying and gains utility in periods
t + 2; t + 3; :::; T   1. The total utility gained depends, amongst other factors, on the
participation decision in the subsequent periods and the time horizon. The second term
can have a positive indirect e¤ect on the participation decision in period t. The overall
e¤ect is ambiguous.
The partial e¤ect of current income does not change. The e¤ect of a future marginal
change in income yj with t < j < T still has a positive e¤ect on participation in the
current period. Finally, the partial e¤ect of both current and future health in case of a
fatal disease is always positive, as long as health between the periods is independent or
positively correlated.
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Appendix 3: First order Taylor expansion
We start from eq. (1.32) and perform a Taylor expansion around y1, for secondary pre-
vention, this gives:
@EU1
@y1
= v1(y1) p1  se  v11(y1) [c  (1  p1  (1  se)) + ce  p1  se] (1.43)
 I(nf) [v1(y1) p1  se  v11(y1) [c  (p1  (1  se)) + cl  p1  se]]
and for primary prevention:
@EU1
@y1
= v1(y1) p1  se  v11(y1) [c  (1  p1  (1  se))] (1.44)
 I(nf) [v1(y1) p1  se  v11(y1) [c  (p1  (1  se)) + cl  p1  se]]
Since v1(y1) > 0 and v11(y1) 6 0, the e¤ect will always be positive for a fatal disease.
For a non-fatal disease, we derive the following Taylor condition for secondary prevention:
@EU1
@y1
=  v11(y1) [c + ce  p1  se  cl  p1  se] (1.45)
@EU1
@y1
> 0, c   p1  se (cl   ce) > 0, c > p1  se (cl   ce) (1.46)
and for primary prevention:
@EU1
@y1
=  v11(y1) [c   cl  p1  se] (1.47)
@EU1
@y1
> 0, c   cl  p1  se > 0, c > p1  se cl (1.48)
Appendix 4: Comparative static results
Characteristics of the testing procedure Starting from eq. (1.18), we derive for
secondary prevention:
@EU1
@se
= p1(u
P   uFN ) > 0 (1.49)
where the conclusion about the sign follows from eq. (1.20). An improvement of the
e¤ectiveness of prevention, without additional monetary or psychological costs, always
makes prevention more attractive. For primary prevention, we have
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@EU1
@se
= p1(u
TN   uFN ) > 0 for ef = se (1.50)
The comparative static results are straightforward for the costparameters  and c:
We have @u
xx
@z
< 0, for z = (; c) and for xx = (P; TN; FN). We therefore conclude that
@EU1
@
< 0 (1.51)
@EU1
@c
< 0 (1.52)
As could be expected, increased costs make preventive e¤ort less attractive. If an increase
in  leads to an increase in c, the negative e¤ects are reinforced. If, on the other hand, a
policy change increases , and, at the same time, se, positive and negative e¤ects should
be weighed against each other.
Characteristics of the disease The e¤ect of a change in p1 is less straightforward.
Taking the derivative of eq. (1.17), we get for secondary prevention:
@EU1
@p1
=

uHE   uTN+ se uP + (1  se)uFN   uS (1.53)
= [v(y1)  v(y1   c)] + se [v(y1   c   ce) + w(h1; e)) + (1  px;2)V2] (1.54)
+I(nf) [v(y1   c   cl)  v(y1   cl)  se (v(y1   c   cl) + w(h1; l) + (1  px;2)V2)]
which has an obvious interpretation. The relative ranking of utility states in eq. (1.20)
shows clearly that if the individual is healthy (states uHE; uTN), participation in preven-
tion leads to additional costs and a utility loss, while if she is ill (states uS; uP ; uFN), it
depends on the underlying parameters, such as the costs and the e¢ ciency of the pre-
ventive procedures, whether prevention leads to a gain or a loss. As p1 increases there
is a shift away from the utility loss when healthy, towards the utility gain or loss when
sick. The former leads to a positive e¤ect on participation in prevention, captured by the
rst term in eq. (1.53), while the latter may result in a positive or a negative e¤ect on
preventive behavior, captured by the second term in eq. (1.53). The positive e¤ect will
dominate, i.e. @EU1
@p1
> 0, for a fatal disease and for preventive procedures with a high
sensitivity se and/or low screening costs c. For primary prevention, the partial e¤ect is
similar, but uP is replaced by uTN , which ceteris paribus leads to a higher marginal e¤ect:
@EU1
@p1
=

uHE   uTN+ se uTN + (1  se)uFN   uS for ef = se (1.55)
= [v(y1)  v(y1   c)] + se [v(y1   c) + w(h1; 0) + (1  px;2)V2] (1.56)
+I(nf) [v(y1   c   cl)  v(y1   cl)  se (v(y1   c   cl) + w(h1; l) + (1  px;2)V2)]
We can also draw conclusions about the e¤ect of p2 on the probability of taking a
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preventive test in period 1. As noted before, it will only have an impact for fatal diseases.
In that case, we get from eqs. (1.27) and (1.31) that
@EU1
@p2
=  p1  se (1  px;2) (v(y2) + w(h2; 0)) < 0 (1.57)
The intuition is obvious. Future utility V2 unambiguously decreases as p2 increases,
since the individual is less likely to be healthy and more likely to be dead. As a result
EU1 decreases and prevention becomes less interesting. This is in accordance with the
conclusions from eq. (1.31).29
A last characteristic of the disease is the treatment cost, represented in the model by
ce and cl. Starting from eqs. (1.28) and (1.28), we get:
@EU1
@ce
=  p1  se v1(y1   c   ce) 6 0 (1.58)
@EU1
@cl
= I(nf) p1  [v1(y1   cl)  (1  se) v1(y1   c   cl)] (1.59)
An increase in the cost of early treatment only matters for secondary prevention. It
leads to a reduction in EU1 and, consequently, lowers the incentives for preventive
action. Higher curative (late stage) treatment costs have no e¤ect for fatal diseases, since
no cure is available. For non-fatal diseases the e¤ect is ambiguous, since the costs can
occur both in case of participation (state uFN) as in case of non-participation (state uS).
However, if se is high enough and/or c low, more expensive curative treatment increases
the incentives for preventive e¤ort. That was only to be expected. Prevention is the only
possibility to avoid the larger cost, but this cost avoidance can only work if prevention is
reasonably e¤ective (se high enough) and screening costs are limited.
Appendix 5: Additional empirical results
29If the time horizon is longer, as in the multi-period model, the e¤ects of p2 become more complex
(see Appendix 2). Given that the individual can choose to participate in prevention in period 2 as well,
she can counter partly the utility loss due to an increased risk of illness.
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Table 1.7: Descriptive statistics
Min Max Mean Standard deviation
Breast cancer screening 0 1 0.540 (0.498)
Dental prevention 0 1 0.405 (0.491)
Inuenza vaccination 0 1 0.327 (0.469)
Cholesterol screening 0 1 0.532 (0.499)
Blood pressure screening 0 1 0.694 (0.461)
Blood sugar screening 0 1 0.537 (0.499)
Number of GP visits 0 98 4.586 (7.173)
GP quality index 0 1 0.253 (0.234)
SAH: very good or excellent 0 1 0.290 (0.454)
SAH: good 0 1 0.381 (0.486)
SAH: fair 0 1 0.239 (0.427)
SAH: poor 0 1 0.090 (0.286)
ADL index 0 1 0.036 (0.134)
Mobility index 0 1 0.175 (0.268)
BMI 11 78 26.529 (4.436)
Grip strength dominant hand (average of 2 attempts) 0 91 29.551 (15.006)
Prob. death in ten years 5.14e-08 1 0.122 (0.211)
Age below 40 0 1 0.002 (0.044)
Age between 40 and 44 0 1 0.007 (0.082)
Age between 45 and 49 0 1 0.026 (0.158)
Age between 50 and 54 0 1 0.168 (0.374)
Age between 55 and 59 0 1 0.185 (0.388)
Age between 60 and 64 0 1 0.166 (0.372)
Age between 65 and 69 0 1 0.145 (0.352)
Age between 70 and 74 0 1 0.120 (0.325)
Age between 75 and 79 0 1 0.091 (0.287)
Age between 80 and 84 0 1 0.058 (0.234)
Age 85 and over 0 1 0.033 (0.180)
Gender: male 0 1 0.443 (0.497)
Gender: female 0 1 0.557 (0.497)
Nationality: native 0 1 0.980 (0.140)
Nationality: EU citizen (not native) 0 1 0.012 (0.111)
Nationality: outside EU 0 1 0.007 (0.086)
Has partner 0 1 0.748 (0.434)
Schooling: primary 0 1 0.325 (0.468)
Schooling: lower secondary 0 1 0.179 (0.384)
Schooling: upper secondary 0 1 0.305 (0.460)
Schooling: university 0 1 0.191 (0.393)
House owner 0 1 0.730 (0.444)
Smoked in the past 0 1 0.472 (0.499)
Smokes currently 0 1 0.197 (0.398)
Diagnosed cancer (except breasts) 0 1 0.039 (0.195)
Breast cancer: incidence (per 1000 cases) 0.077 5 2.794 (0.883)
Breast cancer: mortality (per 1000 cases) 0.012 2 0.777 (0.463)
Breast cancer: target group 0 1 0.724 (0.447)
Breast cancer: prob. receiving invitation letter 0 1 0.381 (0.444)
Breast cancer: pop. based program complete 0 1 0.542 (0.498)
Inuenza: target group (age) 0 1 0.528 (0.499)
Inuenza: target group (illness) 0 1 0.259 (0.438)
Inuenza: subsidized vaccination 0 1 0.334 (0.472)
Inuenza: free vaccination 0 1 0.292 (0.455)
Database: SHARE, wave 1 and wave 2
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Chapter 2
Neighborhood peer e¤ects in the use
of preventive health care
2.1 Introduction
Health and income are two major constituents of individual well-being. The rst foun-
dations for both are laid during pregnancy and childhood. A vast literature describes
the impact of good nutrition and health in utero and in childhood on, amongst others,
life expectancy, physical and cognitive development, schooling outcomes, labor market
opportunities, and income (see e.g. Behrman, 1996; Case et al., 2002; Case et al. 2005;
Currie, 2009; Currie & Madrian, 1999; Cutler et al., 2006; Van den Berg et al., 2006).
Children born in poor households are more likely to have worse health and begin life at
a distinct disadvantage in these di¤erent domains.1
Poverty was widespread in Mexico around 1997. Extreme poverty is concentrated in
rural areas accommodating about a quarter of the Mexican population, but 60% of the
extreme poor (World Bank, 2004, 2005). In 1997, the Mexican government set up a new
nationwide anti-poverty program, named PROGRESA.2 The program is targeted at the
extreme poor in rural areas and is designed as a conditional cash transfer program, mean-
ing that families receive social transfers conditional on the household engaging in a set
of behaviors. Program requirements include participation in perinatal care, child health
care and immunization, growth and weight monitoring of children, primary and secondary
1It is not entirely clear whether the correlation between low parental socioeconomic status (SES) and
the lower health status of their children implies a causal relation or that a third factor causes both e¤ects.
However evidence increasingly indicates that low parental SES causes poor child health (Currie, 2009).
2PROGRESA is an acronym for Programa de Educacion, Salud y Alimentacion (the Education, Health
and Nutrition Program). The program was renamed Oportunidades in 2002, but since we use data from
the period 1997-1999, we will refer to PROGRESA.
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schooling, adult preventive check-ups and nutrition monitoring and supplementation, and
nally participation in informational meetings where health and nutrition topics are dis-
cussed (pláticas). In this way, the program tries to break the feedback mechanisms that
lead to an intergenerational transmission of poverty. By focussing on perinatal care, chil-
drens health, nutrition, and schooling, the objective is to enhance poor childrens human
capital accumulation, and hence future opportunities. By providing monetary resources
to families in need and adult preventive care, current poverty is alleviated.3
In chapter 2, we analyze the impact of PROGRESA on the participation in and usage
of di¤erent types of preventive care. Our primary focus is the role of social interactions on
the individual or household decision to participate in preventive care. A social interaction
e¤ect occurs when an individual participation decision relates to the participation decision
of others in an individuals social group. Understanding how social interactions inuence
behavior is important for policymaking since they could reinforce or o¤set the direct
(nancial) incentives given by a social program. Social interaction e¤ects might therefore
lead to higher or lower participation rates than otherwise expected and a social program
might reach non-targeted individuals and households. In combination with (temporary)
direct incentives for behavioral change, social interactions can move a society from a
low adoption equilibrium into a high adoption equilibrium (Kremer & Miguel, 2007).
Once direct incentives are reduced, important social interaction e¤ects can support the
high participation equilibrium. This is especially important for a country like Mexico 
characterized by low participation rates in di¤erent types of preventive care that aims
at durably increasing participation rates.
We look at the use of deworming drugs, participation of females in cervical screening
by means of a Papanicolaou test (abbreviated as pap test), take-up of blood sugar and
blood pressure tests by adults, the weight and growth monitoring of children, and child
immunization. Despite a high burden of these diseases in Mexico compared to other
countries, participation in prevention was low or modest around the start of PROGRESA.
Vaccination rates among children were an exception with over 90% vaccination coverage.
An analysis of the program e¤ects on health indicates that PROGRESA had a signicant
positive e¤ect on both adults and childrens health (Barham, 2005, 2011; Gertler, 2000,
2004; Lagarde et al., 2007; Ranganathan & Lagarde, 2012).
3The monetary transfers are generally given to the mother of the family, under the implicit assumption
that resources managed by women are more likely to be used for schooling, nutrition and other family
necessities than money controlled by men.
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Estimating peer e¤ects has proven to be challenging because of problems of simultane-
ity, correlated unobservables and endogenous group membership (Manski, 1993). Early
research estimated peer e¤ects as the link between the propensity of the peer group 
mostly dened by the researcher based on ethnicity or geographic proximity  to en-
gage in a certain behavior and individual behavior, while controlling for as many group
characteristics as possible. Deri (2005) is an example of this approach for health service
utilization in Canada, Aizer & Currie (2004) analyze social network e¤ects for partici-
pation in publicly funded prenatal care and delivery services. It has been criticized for
not overcoming the above-mentioned identication challenges. More recently, researchers
use explicit randomization, where a random subset of individuals is treateddi¤erently,
and this random variation is used as information to identify social interactions more ac-
curately. This line of research exists both for exogenously assigned peer groups and for
existing peer groups. An example in health economics of the former is Carrell et al.
(2011) who analyze tness outcomes among students at the US Air Force academy who
are randomly assigned to squadrons. The problem with this type of study is that peer
groups are sometimes created articially and it is di¢ cult to establish whether estimates
are specic to the created situation or are informative for social interactions in the real
world. Estimates of peer e¤ects in naturally occurring peer groups are therefore poten-
tially more convincing. Kremer & Miguel (2007), for example, analyze peer e¤ects in the
usage of deworming drugs in Kenya using information on household social links. Rao
et al. (2012) estimate peer e¤ects in vaccination decisions among US students by using
random variation in the ease with which students have access to vaccination locations.
Oster & Thornton (2012) look at the role of social interactions in the usage of menstrual
cups in Nepal in a school environment.4
We follow the promising approach of analyzing social interactions in real world peer
groups. We exploit random variation in the eligibility status of individuals and treatment
status of localities in PROGRESA as identifying elements in a partial-population setting.
As will be discussed below, treatment and control villages are randomly chosen and el-
igibility status is exogenously determined by the government. This random variation is
unrelated to other elements that determine participation and allow us to deal with the
identication challenges. Similar methodologies have been applied by Lalive & Cattaneo
(2009) and Bobonis & Finan (2009), who analyze the role of peer e¤ects in school en-
rollment using PROGRESA data, and Dahl et al. (2014) who estimate peer e¤ects in
4For an overview of research on social interactions in di¤erent economic research elds, see e.g. Dahl
et al. (2014).
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parental leave take-up. In addition, an individual di¤erence in di¤erence approach is used
in which we analyze changes in behavior related to the introduction of PROGRESA. The
di¤erence in di¤erence approach makes it possible to control for general trends and time
invariant heterogeneity. Avitabile (2011) and Barzallo (2011) have done analyzes that
look at indirect treatment e¤ects of PROGRESA on health care utilization and health.5
They nd positive spillover e¤ects for participation in cervical screening (Avitabile, 2011)
for medical check-ups, and for child and adult health (Barzallo, 2011), while no indirect
e¤ect is found for blood pressure and blood sugar tests (Avitabile, 2011). Our approach
improves upon their analyzes, since we look at more types of preventive care and are
able to attribute the spillover e¤ect to endogenous social interactions. In addition to the
identication of endogenous social interactions, we also assess the relative importance of
social interaction e¤ects compared to direct nancial incentives in changing preventive
care participation.
In an inuential article, Kremer & Miguel (2007) discuss di¤erent channels through
which peer e¤ects might work: (1) a desire to imitate the decisions of ones social contacts,
(2) signaling6 or (implicit or explicit) information sharing on benets, costs or beliefs about
preventive care, (3) epidemiological externalities.7 The latter implies that for infectious
diseases, contact with an infected person or location might increase the disease risk. When
more social contacts are treated preventively, the risk to contract the disease decreases.
While epidemiological e¤ects lead to a negative relation between an individual and his or
her peersuse of preventive care, the other channels can give rise to either a positive or
a negative e¤ect. Thus, depending on the dominating channel, social interaction e¤ects
can be positive or negative. Evidence of the role of social interactions on participation in
or usage of preventive care is mixed. Most papers nd positive peer e¤ects (e.g. Aizer &
Currie, 2004; Deri, 2005; Godlonton & Thornton, 2012; Oster & Thornton, 2012; Munshi
& Myaux, 2006; Rao et al., 2007), others nd no e¤ect (e.g. Meredith et al., 2013), and
even negative e¤ects are found (e.g. Kremer & Miguel, 2007).
Our results indicate that PROGRESA was successful in increasing preventive care
usage both among eligible and non-eligible households in treatment villages relative to
5With indirect treatment e¤ects, we mean behavioral changes of the non-eligible population in treat-
ment villages.
6(Non-)Participation in prevention by a peer might send a signal that prevention yields a higher (lower)
level of utility. This might encourage (discourage) participation.
7Individuals might in addition also learn how to use a drugs or product from their peers. Given that
the preventive care that is analysed in this paper is either easy to apply (taking deworming drugs) or
administered by a health professional (vaccination, cancer screening, blood tests), this is less relevant in
our setting.
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households in control villages. We are able to isolate endogenous social interactions and
show that signicant positive interaction e¤ects are present for deworming drugs usage,
cervical screening, blood pressure tests, and annual child growth and weight monitoring.
The magnitude of the peer e¤ects, however, di¤ers across types of prevention. Social
interaction e¤ects are especially high for participation in annual growth and weight moni-
toring of children. Using the information on social interactions, the total treatment e¤ect
can be decomposed in a direct e¤ect, related to the nancial incentive given to eligible
households for complying with PROGRESA requirements, and an indirect social interac-
tion e¤ect. The indirect e¤ect accounts for 10% up to 60% of the total treatment e¤ect
for the eligibles, a non-negligible element in explaining the change in preventive health
behavior.
The remainder of chapter 2 is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents a brief discus-
sion of prevention care usage in Mexico, the PROGRESA program, and the data used in
the analysis. We elaborate on the research question and design in section 2.3. The main
results are presented in section 2.4, followed by a robustness analysis and a conclusion in
sections 2.5 and 2.6.
2.2 PROGRESA program and evaluation data
2.2.1 Prevention in Mexico
We look at the use of deworming drugs, participation of females in cervical screening,
take-up of blood sugar and blood pressure tests by adults, the weight and growth mon-
itoring of children, and child immunization. Sánchez-Castillo et al. (2004) state that
traditionally, Mexicos health concerns have been childhood malnutrition and infectious
diseases, although the latter has been overtaken by cardiovascular diseases, cancers, and
diabetes as the principal causes of death.
In the late nineties, we can state that except for immunization Mexico was un-
derperforming in di¤erent main aspects of health care. Table 2.1 provides a comparison
of some key indicators with respect to the chosen health variables based on OECD and
WHO data. Mexico is compared to two OECD countries, its neighboring country, the
US, and Chile, which has a similar GDP per capita. Rather than providing a detailed
overview of the Mexican health care system in comparison to other countries, the purpose
of the provided information is to show that Mexico in 1997 underperformed with respect
to the health variables chosen in our analysis and that action was needed.
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Table 2.1: OECD data (year 1997) on health indicators from Mexico, Chile and the US
Mexico Chile US
Doctor consultations per capita 2.3 8.2 3.7
Cervical screening rate (% of females aged 20-69 screened) (data from 2000) 9.7% 64.5% 
Cervical cancer mortality (deaths per 100,000 females, age standardized) 20.4 15 3.5
Diabetes mortality (deaths per 100,000 individuals, age standardized) 103 30.7 27.7
Circulatory disease mortality (deaths per 100,000 individuals,age standardized) 341.6 322.4 424.7
Infectious disease mortality (deaths per 100,000 individuals, age standardized) 34.3 30 21.5
Neonatal mortality (deaths per 1000 live births) 14 5.7 4.8
Infant mortality (deaths per 1000 live births) 23.8 10 7.2
Low birthweight infants (% of live births) 9.2% 4.8% 7.5%
Immunization rate: measles (% of children immunised) 91.0% 96.0% 91.0%
Note: Unless otherwise stated, the presented data is OECD Health data from 1997.
Despite the existence of a screening program since 19748, mortality rates for cervical
cancer which is fully treatable when discovered early were among the highest in the
Americas (Agurto et al., 2004; Lewis, 2004). In the year 2000, the participation rate in
Mexico was 10% among females aged 20 to 69 compared to 65% in Chile.9 The death
burden of diabetes 103 deaths per 100,000 individuals in 1997 was very high and over
three times as large in Mexico than in Chile or the US. The prevalence of hypertension
was 33.3% in men and 25.6% in women (Sánchez-Castillo et al., 2004). In 1997, diseases
of the circulatory system were as common in Mexico as in Chile, and 25% less common
than in the US. Infectious and parasitic diseases accounted for 34 deaths per 100,000
individuals (age standardized rates) in 1997 and the death rate was 10% higher than in
Chile and 50% higher than in the US.
Neonatal and infant mortality were double as high in Mexico in 1997 as in Chile and
three times as high as in the US.10 The percentage of children born with low birthweight
was 9% in Mexico, or twice as high as in Chile. Moreover, anaemia and micronutrient de-
ciencies were highly prevalent in Mexico. These conditions can be improved by providing
iron and zinc supplements, amongst others (Sepúlveda et al., 2006). Since the intro-
duction of the Mexican universal vaccination program in 1991, vaccination rates among
8The national cervical screening program in Mexico o¤ers free screening regardless of age and income
and tries to raise awareness among women aged 25 and over.
9Cited reasons for non-participation were a low quality of screening, a perceived breach of privacy
when the pap test is taken by male doctors, a lack of knowledge, a preference for ignorance since cancer
is perceived as deadly, and seeking of medical assistance when the cancer has already entered its late
stages rather than screening when feeling healthy (Agurto et al., 2004; Watkins et al., 2002).
10Child mortality was high despite important improvements that were made in the period 1980-1997
with a halving of the mortality rate among children under 5 years old (Sepúlveda et al., 2006).
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children were high, over 90% and comparable to those in the US and Chile. (Barham,
2005; Sepúlveda et al., 2006).
2.2.2 Program background
In 1997, the Mexican government initiated a large-scale social program aimed at com-
plementing the income of marginalized households in the poorest rural communities and
fostering human capital accumulation among children. Monetary transfers were handed
out as of 1998 and are conditional on compliance of behavior in two distinct components:
educationand nutrition and health.
The PROGRESA nutrition and health component is designed to improve health and
development from the very start of life. In a rst step, PROGRESA aims to decrease
the number of low birthweight babies. Low birthweight babies are more susceptible to
deciencies and diseases and run a higher risk of neonatal and infant mortality (Currie,
2009; Gertler, 2000). While some low birthweight babies are able to catch up with their
contemporaries, most of them tend to su¤er a development disadvantage throughout child-
hood with potential consequences on future opportunities (Gertler, 2000). PROGRESA
imposes pregnant women to have at least 5 prenatal care visits and o¤ers nutritional
supplements when needed.
In a second step, young children as well as their lactating mothers are required to
attend medical check-ups for growth and weight monitoring and immunization. Children
below 24 months are required to attend a check-up at least every two months, while
children between 24 and 60 months have an appointment scheduled every four months
(Gertler, 2004). Children who lag behind in physical development or are found to be
malnourished receive protein and micronutrient supplements, either directly or via their
lactating mother. Case & Paxson (2006) argue that poor nutrition during childhood likely
a¤ects future cognitive performance. The obligation of growth and weight monitoring for
infants combined with the distribution of nutritional supplements potentially has a high
pay-o¤ in terms of future human capital accumulation. Immunization policies aim to
avoid the occurrence of serious and/or contagious diseases, such as the measles, mumps,
tetanus, polio, hepatitis A and B, etc. The Mexican government has a vaccination scheme
for children that determines which vaccinations are required at what age.11
11This is detailed in o¢ cial norms, such as the Norma ocial Mexicana 031-SSA2-1999 on childrens
health or the Norma ocial Mexicana 036-SSA2-2002 which brings together prevailing norms and rules
on prevention, vaccination, toxic substances etc.
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In a third step, attention is paid to the health of adolescents and adults. In order to
receive transfers, every family member has to attend a yearly medical check-up. Special
attention is paid to reproductive health, family planning, the detection and (preventive)
treatment of parasites, of arterial hypertension, of diabetes mellitus, and of cervical cancer
(Gertler, 2000). The dangers of these disorders, and the benets of early detection and
treatment as well as health and hygiene habits, are discussed in obligatory pláticas, i.e.
village informational meetings for participating households.
PROGRESA is a targeted program. Beneciaries were identied in two steps (see INSP,
2005). First, highly marginalized rural villages with between 50 and 2,500 inhabitants
were selected for sequential entry into the PROGRESA program using a deprivation
index. The villages needed to have access to schooling and health care. Next, within the
selected villages, poor families were identied. A poverty index score was attributed to all
households based on an assessment of their permanent income and household composition.
Households with an index score below a certain region-specic threshold were considered
poor and could qualify for PROGRESA transfers. Eligibility status and the corresponding
rights and benets were clearly communicated through village-wide assembly meetings.
Eligibility status (and non-eligibility status) was awarded for three years and only eligible
families that lived in villages where PROGRESA was implemented became potential
program beneciaries. In 1998, PROGRESA was available in 34,400 localities (1.6 million
households), and coverage reached as many as 48,700 localities (2.3 million households)
in 1999 and 67,500 localities (3.1 million households) in 2001.
2.2.3 Evaluation data and sample selection
An important feature of PROGRESA is that it included an evaluation component. The
evaluation design allows the analysis of PROGRESA as a partial-population intervention12
that is phased in at random. For the evaluation, a subset of 506 localities were selected
from across seven states clustered around Mexico city. In October 1997, an initial survey
collected socioeconomic information to determine eligibility status of households in all
506 localities.13 On average, 52% of the households were eligible for PROGRESA, but
12A partial-population intervention refers to a design with treated and non-treated (control) clusters.
Within the treated clusters only a subset of units are o¤ered the treatment (Baird et al., 2012; Mo¢ tt,
2001).
13By July 1999, PROGRESA reclassied a large number of non-eligible households as eligible after
complaints that the initial procedure discriminated against the elderly poor who no longer live with
their children. The revised households (26% of the evaluation sample) are called the densicado group.
However, by August 2000, PROGRESA sta¤ found that many of the newly admitted households had not
collected any benet. Apparently, few densicado households had been notied of their revised eligibility
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the percentages vary substantially across localities. Finally, a set of 320 localities were
randomly selected as treatment group where PROGRESA was implemented as of April
1998. The remaining 186 communities acted as a control group and were phased in at the
start of 2000. The randomization of treatment and control groups has the advantage that
it should ensure that both groups are balanced in terms of observable and unobservable
characteristics. In addition, multiple surveys are conducted both before and after program
implementation. Using appropriate techniques, the e¤ects of PROGRESA can therefore
be reliably identied. Behrman & Todd (1999), have thoroughly examined whether pre-
program behavior and observable background characteristics are similar in control and
treatment groups. They conclude that the randomization procedure worked e¤ectively.
In the evaluation sample, extensive surveys have been carried out to document the
e¤ects of PROGRESA. There are two pre-implementation surveys (October 1997 and
March 1998) and three post-implementation surveys (October 1998, March 1999 and
November 1999) on all 24,000 households in the 506 localities. At the start of 2000, the
control group was phased in into the program and additional surveys were conducted. In
our analysis, we primarily use the two baseline surveys and the rst two post-program
surveys.
Each survey contains detailed information on household demographics, socioeconomic
status, education, income, expenditures, consumption and health. Not every survey con-
tains the same questions. Questions on the use of health care services and usage are asked
in March 1998, October 1998 and March 1999, whereas most pre-program background
characteristics are observed in October 1997. Next to household or individual specic
information, there are also locality surveys with information on local prices, wages and
public and health service availability.
Individual level data on prevention take-up is available for children aged 5 or younger.
We construct three preventive care participation indicators: whether a child had attended
at least one growth and weight check-up in the past year, whether a child had attended the
required number of growth and weight check-ups as imposed by PROGRESA, whether a
child complies with the prescribed vaccinations of tuberculosis and measles.14 Household
level data are available on whether or not, in the past year, someone in the household has
status for the program (Buddelmeyer and Skouas, 2004). Given that we limit our analyses to the rst
year of the program (March 1998 to March 1999), we consider these households as non-eligible.
14There is additional information on vaccination for other diseases, but we focus on take-up of the
vaccinations of tuberculosis and measles, since these are infrequent and therefore easily observed. There
is one shot at birth for tuberculosis and one shot before age 1 for measles with a renewal around age 6.
For tetanus and polio, there are at least four shots before the age of 5 and the data are not recorded
accurately enough to follow the vaccination history unambiguously (Barham, 2005).
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taken deworming drugs, has been screened for high levels of blood sugar or blood pressure.
With respect to cervical screening, we construct a variable that indicates compliance with
the prevailing Mexican screening norm, i.e. a pap test every three years (after normal
test results for two consecutive years). For each indicator of preventive care participation,
we have information on pre-implementation and post-implementation participation in
prevention, which we combine to construct the change in preventive care take-up. A more
detailed description of the construction of the preventive care variables can be found in
Appendix 1.
We limit our sample to households for whom we observe their preventive behavior
both before and after program implementation. Second, to improve the accuracy of the
data, we further restrict the sample to households where the survey is answered by the
household head, his or her partner or parents (-in-law) living in the same household.
Finally, for the children samples, it should be noted that not all children can be matched
perfectly over all surveys. Children who could not be matched unambiguously based on
gender, age and household composition are left out of the analysis.
The imposed restrictions entail a risk of sample selection and attrition. Descriptives in
Tables 2.11 to 2.17 in Appendix 2 do not show clear signs of sample selection. These tables
present descriptive statistics on individual and household characteristics of the entire
sample as well as the subsamples by type of prevention used in our empirical analyses. A
distinction is made between eligibles and non-eligibles in control and treatment villages.
Table 2.11 shows that among the group of non-eligible households, household heads and
their partner in control villages are more likely to have started primary education and be
able to read and write. Among the group of poor households, the partners of the household
heads in control villages are more likely to have started secondary education. Aside
from an educational imbalance in favour of control villages, di¤erences between control
and treatment villages are minor or non-existent, as one would expect from the random
assignment of villages. Among the poor, we nd a statistically signicant di¤erence in
civil status. In treatment villages, couples tend to be married more frequently than in
control villages, whereas in control villages couples are more likely to live together outside
marriage. Considering couples irrespective of mode of cohabitation, the di¤erences cancel
out. The main di¤erence between eligible and non-eligible households can be observed in
the marginality index (the criterion for the distinction between both) and other wealth
variables.
If we look at the subsamples in Tables 2.12 to 2.15, we observe, in general, similar trends
in the subsamples as in the entire evaluation sample. The subsamples are, however, better
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of total number of households within a locality (boxplot)
Source: Progresa data
educated, more literate and they have younger and fewer female household heads both for
eligibles and non-eligibles in control and treatment villages. Overall, the deviations from
the complete sample are limited, which gives us condence that our estimation results
are applicable to the population. The subsamples for growth and weight monitoring and
vaccination, i.e. Tables 2.16 and 2.17, contain younger and better educated households
than the entire sample. As could be expected, the households in this subsample consist
of more couples and have more household members. The di¤erences between control and
treatment villages show the same trend as those for the entire sample.
Another important issue to bear in mind is sample attrition. If attrition is correlated
with treatment, coe¢ cient estimates could be biased. We dene an attrition indicator
that takes a value 0 if the household took part in the pre-implementation survey of March
1998 and also answered questions on health related behavior in the post-implementation
survey of March 1999. A value 1 is attributed to households who were observed in the
March 1998 survey but not in the March 1999 survey. A missing value was attributed
to households who did not answer any question on prevention in the March 1998 survey.
Attrition is balanced across treatment and control villages with rates of, respectively,
13.6% and 13.3%. Appendix Table 2.18 presents a regression analysis of attrition patterns
across all households as well as in the subsamples of eligible and non-eligible households.
The results indicate that, when controlling for various household characteristics, attrition
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patterns are not a¤ected by treatment status of the villages and are similar for eligible
and non-eligible households. The likelihood of attrition is most a¤ected by the number of
household members and the age of the household head, i.e. additional household members
and an older household head decrease the likelihood of being out of sample. These and
other household and village characteristics are controlled for in our empirical analysis.
2.3 Research question and design
The basic idea is that social interactions might play a role in the decision to participate
or use preventive care. We use a linear-in-means model to estimate social interactions.
In this type of model, peer group average behavior is presumed to inuence individual
behavior.
We focus on small, naturally occurring peer groups. We assume that the social inter-
actions occur at the locality level, since we lack information on the actual social network
of an individual. Thus, the peer group of a household or a child are all other households
or all other sampled children, excluding children living in the same household, within
the same locality. This choice is justiable, since rural localities are quite small, with 52
households per village on average, and with fewer than 67 households in 75% of the eval-
uation localities (see Figure 2.1). Moreover, Adato (2000, p. vi) documents "a common
identity in poverty" within the localities. Despite the division created by PROGRESA,
there is a perception that everyone is poor, and that "beneciaries and non-beneciaries
continue to get along with each other ne and the sameas before" (Adato, 2000, p. vi).
This suggest that social relationships go beyond program eligibility status.
Our research design exploits the quasi-random variation in price for preventive care.
As discussed in the previous section, in the PROGRESA program evaluation component,
incentives to participate in preventive care are o¤ered to eligible individuals/households
in a random subset of villages. Eligibility is determined by a government xed poverty
threshold at the household level. Hence, treatment leads to exogenous variation between
treatment and control villages. The main idea is that in treatment villages, incentives
given to eligible individuals change their preventive behavior and by extension the average
behavior in the entire locality, which we consider to be a relevant peer group. Next
changes in peer group behavior might produce changes in individual behavior, including
the behavior of non-eligible individuals. Control villages provide a counterfactual situation
without government interference. The analysis makes use of the panel data nature of the
evaluation surveys to apply a di¤erence in di¤erence design. By focusing on changes in
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behavior rather than the actual behavior at a moment in time, we can abstract from
time-invariant (un)observed individual, village-level and other heterogeneity.
Our data do not allow us to distinguish between the di¤erent channels through which
peer e¤ects work. We can however establish whether or not social interactions reinforce
PROGRESAs direct incentives.
2.3.1 The model
Let Higv denote the change in preventive care participation and usage between March
1998 and March 1999 of child/family i in peer group g in locality v. The variable can take
values 0 (no change), 1 (from non-participation to participation) or -1 (from participation
to non-participation). Since peer group and locality are assumed to coincide, we drop the
subscript g.15
Each locality consist of several eligible (E) and non-eligible (N) individuals. Let us
now consider the preventive care decisions of an eligible individual j and a non-eligible
individual k within village v:16
HEjv = 
E + EH( j)v + ETv + "jv (2.1)
HNkv = 
N + NH( k)v + "kv (2.2)
where H( i)v denotes the peer group average change in preventive behavior excluding
individual i. An indicator Tv distinguishes between the randomly assigned groups of
treatment villages and control villages. Let Tv = 1 denote a treatment village and Tv = 0 a
control village. Only eligible individuals in village v are o¤ered treatment. The individual
specic error term of individual i is given by "iv. Given randomized treatment assignment,
Tv is uncorrelated with observable individual and peer group characteristics as well as the
individual error terms, i.e. E("ivjTv) = 0. The direct e¤ect of the PROGRESA program
on eligible individuals is captured by E. The parameters of interest are E and N ,
which capture the social interaction e¤ects. Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2) capture the idea that
an individuals participation decision is inuenced by the participation decision made by
all other individuals in the relevant peer group. As a robustness check (see section 2.4.6),
15The use of village-wide peer groups has the disadvantage that village-specic shocks to the studied
beliefs and behavior cannot be controlled for. Some papers infer family connections using information on
surnames, see e.g. Angelucci et al. (2010). This information is however not publicly available.
16For notational simplicity, we do not include observable characteristics.
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we analyze an alternative specication in which we consider only the average behavior of
eligible peers in the locality. Let us now look at the di¤erence in the expected change in
preventive behavior when residing in a treatment versus a control village.
E(HEjvjTv = 1)  E(HEjvjTv = 0) = E + E [E(H( j)vjTv = 1)  E(H( j)vjTv = 0)](2.3)
E(HNkvjTv = 1)  E(HNkvjTv = 0) = N [E(H( k)vjTv = 1)  E(H( k)vjTv = 0)] (2.4)
As is clear from Eq. (2.3), PROGRESA treatment has a direct program e¤ect (E)
and a social interaction e¤ect (E) on eligible individuals, whereas it only has a social
interaction e¤ect on non-eligible individuals as is shown in Eq. (2.4). Without additional
assumptions, it is not possible to distinguish between the direct and indirect e¤ect for
eligible individuals. However, N can be identied using locality treatment status as
an instrument for peer group average preventive behavior. Given that peer groups are
composed of eligible and non-eligible households combined, H( i)v is a weighted average of
eqs. (2.1) and (2.2). This leads to the following reduced forms for the peer group average
change in preventive behavior:
H( j)v = E + ETv + e( j)v (2.5)
H( k)v = N + NTv + e( k)v (2.6)
where coe¢ cients di¤er between peer groups of eligibles and non-eligibles. This is a
result of a di¤erent composition of the peer groups of eligibles and non-eligibles. First,
we exclude an individual/household from its own peer group, which leads to di¤erent
compositions. Second, because of di¤erent proportions of eligibles and non-eligibles at the
locality level, the fraction of eligible households in the peer group of an eligible household
is on average higher than in the peer group of a non-eligible household.17 Coe¢ cients
E and N capture the total program e¤ects on peer group average behavior and e( i)v
represent the group specic error terms.
Inserting eq. (2.6) into eq. (2.2) gives the reduced form of eq. (2.2) and relates the
treatment status of the village directly to the change in preventive behavior for non-
eligibles.
17In localities with a high [low] proportion of eligible households, each eligible household faces a peer
group with a high [low] fraction of eligibles. In localities with a high [low] proportion of non-eligible
households, each non-eligible household faces a peer group with a low [high] fraction of eligibles. This
divergence leads on average to di¤erent peer group compositions between eligibles and non-eligibles and
to a potentially di¤erent e¤ect of PROGRESA on peer group behavior.
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HNkv = 
N + N (N + NTv + e( k)v) + "kv (2.7)
= N + NTv + ekv (2.8)
where N can be interpreted as the spillover or intention-to-treat(ITT) e¤ect of the
PROGRESA program on the preventive behavior of non-eligibles. The social interaction
e¤ect N is given by the ratio 
N
N
For non-eligibles, the indirect e¤ect equals the total treatment e¤ect, as they are not
targeted by the program. From a policy point of view, we are not only interested in the
presence and magnitude of endogenous social interaction e¤ects, we are equally interested
in the direct program e¤ects on the preventive behavior of the targeted population, i.e.
E. However, as eqs. (2.1) and (2.3) show, it is not possible to separately identify E nor
E without additional assumptions. One natural possibility is to assume homogeneous
social interaction e¤ects among eligibles and non-eligibles, i.e. E = N , an assumption
implicitly taken by Mo¢ tt (2001) in his seminal work on partial-population designs. Tak-
ing this assumption, the total treatment e¤ect can be estimated by regressing the change
in preventive behavior on PROGRESA treatment status for the eligible population. In
order to see this, let us insert eq. (2.5) into eq. (2.1):
HEjv = 
E + E(E + ETv + e( j)v) + ETv + "jv (2.9)
= E + ETv + ejv with E = EE + E (2.10)
where E is the total treatment e¤ect, which can be decomposed in a direct (E) and
an indirect e¤ect (EE). They can be separately identied because of the additional
assumption E = N .
The homogeneity assumption implies that eligibles adapt their preventive behavior
to changes in peer group behavior in the same way as non-eligibles do. However, since
eligibles get specic information on prevention during obligatory information meetings
and receive conditional cash transfers, it is likely that they  in comparison with non-
eligibles rely more on individual signals, than signals from peers. Therefore, we posit
that E 6 N and that the results for E = N represent an upper bound on the
magnitude of the indirect e¤ects for eligible households.
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2.3.2 Identication
Estimating the causal e¤ect of social interactions in a linear-in-means model is challeng-
ing given multiple identication issues, such as simultaneity, correlated unobservables,
and self-selection into peer groups (Manski, 1993; Mo¢ tt, 2001). The simultaneity of
individual behavior relates to the fact that each member in a social group a¤ects every
other member. behavioral changes are jointly observed, and it is unclear who a¤ected
who. The correlated unobservables problem occurs when not all relevant individual, peer
group and environmental characteristics are controlled for. As shown by Mo¢ tt (2001),
a partial-population design whereby the outcome of a randomly chosen subgroup is
exogenously altered by some treatment  overcomes this issue. In the framework laid
out above, we note that simultaneity is broken down since treatment Tv directly a¤ects
preventive behavior of eligible individuals and by extension peer group average behavior
but it does not directly a¤ect the behavior of non-eligible individuals. Second, because
treatment Tv is quasi-random, it is not correlated with observed nor unobserved individual
and peer group characteristics. This eliminates bias due to correlated unobservables as is
made clear in eqs. (2.7) and (2.9). Finally, the problem of endogenous group membership
implies that individuals choose peers with similar tastes, attitudes and preferences, which
drives the correlation in decisions and behavior. Bias from this source is addressed by
determining peer groups prior to program implementation. Changes in group membership
that happen after the implementation of PROGRESA are either a causal result of the
treatment or orthogonal to the treatment.
Our identication strategy hinges upon three main assumptions: independence, exclu-
sion and monotonicity.
The independence assumption assures that the reduced forms are consistently es-
timated. It is implied by randomized treatment. We already established that pre-
implementation observable characteristics are fairly balanced with respect to treatment
status and sample attrition is not correlated with treatment status. In addition, Ta-
ble 2.2 shows that pre-implementation di¤erences in preventive behavior between control
and treatment villages are in general not statistically signicant. One exception is an-
nual child growth and weight monitoring among non-eligible households. Participation
in monitoring was 5 percentage points higher in control villages before PROGRESA was
implemented.
Second, in order to consistently estimate the size of the social interaction e¤ects using
two stage least square, the exclusion assumption implies that the targeting of eligible
62
2.3 Research question and design
households by PROGRESA only a¤ects the preventive behavior of non-eligible children
or households through the change in preventive care participation of the peer group.
There are some potential concerns. First, non-eligible households might have adapted
their preventive behavior to changes in health care supply and quality, which might have
developed di¤erently in treatment and control villages. Second, a change in preventive
behavior of non-eligible households might be the result of income spillovers. Third, non-
eligible households might have misunderstood their eligibility status or anticipated future
eligibility and changed their preventive health behavior. Fourth, an improvement in an
non-eligibles or his/her peerseducation might a¤ect the prevention decision. We discuss
the rst channel more into detail in section 2.4.4 and the second and third cannel in
section 2.4.5. Robustness checks suggests that the exclusion restriction holds. The fourth
channel is not likely to play a role in our setting. PROGRESA targeted primary and
secondary schooling, while we evaluate the preventive behavior of adults or very young
children (below the age of primary schooling). Moreover, since we analyze the rst year
after program implementation, it is unlikely that the education level of the household
head and his or her partner (the main decisionmakers in the household) are a¤ected by
the schooling objective of PROGRESA in this time period.
Third, two stage least squares requires the assumption that the PROGRESA reform did
not cause any eligible child or household to participate less in prevention (monotonicity).
Given the nature of the conditional cash transfer program, this assumption should hold
naturally.
Finally, the identication framework assumes implicitly that social interactions occur
between eligibles and non-eligibles within a village. The interaction e¤ects are not a¤ected
by spillover e¤ects that might occur between for example control and treatment villages
that are geographically close. In the literature, this assumption is denoted Stable Unit
Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) and is very often implicitly or explicitly assumed
to estimate social interaction e¤ects. Using GPS data, it is possible to locate the evalu-
ation villages and compute geodesic distances to other villages. We check the validity of
SUTVA in section 2.4.5 and conclude that social interaction e¤ects remain positive when
relaxing SUTVA, but some estimates lose signicance.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Descriptive evidence
Table 2.2 provides descriptive evidence on the e¤ect of PROGRESA on di¤erent types
of preventive care. Pre- and post intervention values are reported both for eligibles and
non-eligibles averaged over control and treatment villages. Several conclusions can be
drawn from Table 2.2.
First, the pre-PROGRESA participation rates for blood sugar test, blood pressure test,
and cervical screening are systematically higher among non-eligibles than among eligibles.
For the use of deworming drugs, the opposite is true. For prevention among children, pre-
implementation participation rates are comparable among eligibles and non-eligibles.
Second, the changes in preventive behavior between pre- and post-PROGRESA levels
suggest an increasing participation pattern in preventive care. The trend is especially
pronounced for the types of preventive care aimed at adolescents and adults and for growth
and weight monitoring at PROGRESA frequency. The fraction of households that is in
accordance with the cervical screening norm or took a blood sugar test almost tripled in
one year among eligible households in treatment villages, going from 22% to 64%, and it
almost doubled in the remainder of the population. Similar e¤ects are observed for child
monitoring at PROGRESA frequency. There are also substantial increases in preventive
behavior for deworming drugs usage and blood pressure tests. Participation, or usage,
increased by 60% to 120% for eligibles in treatment villages and between 40% and 60%
in other parts of the population. Annual growth monitoring and child vaccination have
high pre-intervention participation rates, over 80% and over 90%, respectively. Hence,
the change in behavior is much less pronounced. After program implementation, full
participation is almost attained. The increase is fairly equal for vaccination, while for
growth monitoring, the change in participation is more pronounced in treatment villages.
Third, in the post-intervention period, we observe that di¤erences between treatment
and control villages turn positive and signicant for eligibles, except for child vaccination.
Also, di¤erences in pre-post levels of preventive behavior turn signicant for the eligibles.
This is an indication of the total treatment e¤ects of PROGRESA on the beneciary
population and suggests a positive contribution of PROGRESA to health prevention.
We can infer from Table 2.2, for example, that the program increased compliance with
the cervical screening norm by 19,5 percentage points more among eligibles and by 21
percentage points for blood sugar and blood pressure tests. The program e¤ects implied
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Table 2.2: Descriptive evidence on the e¤ect of PROGRESA on participation in prevention
Eligible Non-eligible
Program Control Di¤erence (SD) Program Control Di¤erence (SD)
Deworming drugs usage
Drugs usage pre-program 0.511 0.507 0.003 (0.022) 0.439 0.463 -0.024 (0.017)
Drugs usage post-program 0.831 0.719 0.113 (0.018)*** 0.636 0.633 0.003 (0.016)
Change in drugs usage 0.321 0.211 0.109 (0.018)*** 0.197 0.170 0.027 (0.017)y
Observations 6616 3808 5280 3463
Cervical screening
In accordance with screening norm pre-program 0.220 0.247 -0.028 (0.021) 0.270 0.283 -0.014 (0.019)
In accordance with screening norm post-program 0.641 0.474 0.167 (0.026)*** 0.542 0.526 0.016 (0.021)
Change in accordance screening norm 0.422 0.227 0.195 (0.019)*** 0.272 0.242 0.030 (0.016)*
Observations 6403 3676 5001 3331
Blood sugar test
Blood sugar test pre-program 0.232 0.220 0.013 (0.020) 0.314 0.315 0.000 (0.020)
Blood sugar test post-program 0.642 0.420 0.222 (0.024)*** 0.539 0.522 0.017 (0.021)
Change in blood sugar test participation 0.409 0.200 0.209 (0.023)*** 0.225 0.208 0.017 (0.018)
Observations 6441 3685 5198 3386
Blood pressure test
Blood pressure test pre-program 0.355 0.339 0.016 (0.023) 0.459 0.469 -0.010 (0.022)
Blood pressure test post-program 0.769 0.539 0.230 (0.024)*** 0.675 0.646 0.029 (0.020)y
Change in blood pressure test participation 0.414 0.200 0.214 (0.022)*** 0.216 0.177 0.039 (0.019)**
Observations 6530 3717 5297 3446
Growth and weight monitoring (yearly)
Monitoring (at least yearly) pre-program 0.811 0.831 -0.021 (0.024) 0.824 0.873 -0.049 (0.023)**
Monitoring (at least yearly) post-program 0.988 0.946 0.042 (0.010)*** 0.962 0.965 -0.003 (0.010)
Change in monitoring (at least yearly) 0.177 0.115 0.062 (0.021)*** 0.138 0.093 0.046 (0.020)**
Observations 6518 3773 2148 1554
Growth and weight monitoring (PROGRESA frequency)
Monitoring (PROGRESA frequency) pre-program 0.244 0.254 -0.009 (0.010) 0.261 0.263 -0.002 (0.017)
Monitoring (PROGRESA frequency) post-program 0.788 0.674 0.113 (0.010)*** 0.659 0.629 0.030 (0.018)*
Change in monitoring (PROGRESA frequency) 0.544 0.421 0.123 (0.014)*** 0.398 0.366 0.032 (0.024)
Observations 5194 3056 1651 1208
Compliance with vaccination scheme
Vaccination compliance pre-program 0.925 0.929 -0.004 (0.008) 0.927 0.931 -0.004 (0.010)
Vaccination compliance post-program 0.989 0.991 -0.002 (0.002) 0.985 0.987 -0.002 (0.004)
Change in vaccination compliance 0.064 0.062 0.002 (0.008) 0.058 0.056 0.002 (0.010)
Observations 7088 4187 2451 1661
Note: Mean pre-program values are reported as measured in March 1998. Mean post-program values are reported as measured in October 1998 and/or March 1999.
Di¤erences are estimated using OLS regression with robust standard errors that allow for correlation of disturbance terms within localities. Signicance levels
of di¤erences: y p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: PROGRESA evaluation data
65
Chapter 2. Neighborhood peer effects in the use of preventive health care
by the di¤erence in pre-post preventive behavior between control and treatment villages
are made even more explicit in Table 2.3. Panel A.1 reproduces the ndings of Table 2.2
for eligibles and panel B.1 for non-eligibles. Panels A.2 and B.2 show that the magnitude
of the PROGRESA e¤ects are smaller once individual and household characteristics are
controlled for. Signicance levels remain the same.
Fourth, the pre-post di¤erences in preventive behavior among the non-eligibles are
indicative of the spillover e¤ects. A much smaller di¤erence in changes in preventive
behavior is observed between non-eligibles in control and treatment villages. With respect
to cervical screening for example, the di¤erence in the increase in compliance was 19,5
percentage points among eligibles in treatment and control villages, whereas it is only
3 percentage points among non-eligibles. The di¤erences remain, however, signicant
for deworming drugs usage, cervical screening, blood pressure tests and annual child
monitoring. This suggests the existence of spillover e¤ects and potentially of endogenous
social interaction. The e¤ects are small and non-signicant for monitoring at PROGRESA
frequency and vaccination. In the next subsection, we present the estimates of the social
interaction e¤ects.
2.4.2 Estimation of social interaction e¤ects
Table 2.4 reports the main results of the social interaction e¤ects estimates. Panel A
provides the IV estimates of the endogenous social interaction e¤ect, N ; from eq. (2.2). It
results from the estimates of the two reduced-form equations, eqs. (2.6) and (2.8). Panel B
reports the e¤ects of the former, while the latter is presented in panel C. Taking deworming
drugs usage as an example (column 2), the results should be read as follows: for each
non-eligible household who lives in a treatment village, the usage rate in the peer group
increases on average by 6.7 percentage points. This increase in peer group usage leads on
average to a 2.7 percentage point increase in the usage of non-eligible households. The
peer group responsiveness is generally stronger than the behavioral change of non-eligibles,
because the peer group partly consists of eligibles, whose behavioral change is nancially
incentivized. The relation between the peer group responsiveness and the household
responsiveness gives the social interaction estimator. As the household responsiveness
increases (decreases) relative to the peer group responsiveness, this translates into a higher
(lower) social interaction parameter.
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2.4 Results
The results in Table 2.4 indicate that social interaction e¤ects are positive and signif-
icant for four types of preventive care, i.e. deworming drugs usage, blood pressure test,
cervical screening, and annual child monitoring. The magnitude of the social interaction
e¤ect varies across the di¤erent types of prevention. They are especially important for
annual weight and growth monitoring of children.18 For vaccination compliance, no e¤ects
are found. For participation in blood sugar tests and child monitoring at PROGRESA
frequency, minor positive e¤ects are found, but estimated imprecisely.
Estimates are reported both with and without controlling for individual and house-
hold characteristics and peer group e¤ects. The estimates of the social interaction e¤ect
are robust to the inclusion of control variables, which is a good sign for our identica-
tion strategy. One exception is the social interaction e¤ect for vaccination compliance.
However, social interactions for vaccination compliance are unreliably estimated due to
a weak rst stage. We test for potential weakness of the instrumental variable using the
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic, which is robust to clustered standard errors. The F-
statistic shows that treatment status as instrument is except for vaccination compliance
not weak, which lends credibility to our baseline estimates.
What can we learn from the results in Tables 2.2 to 2.4? Immunization of children
below 5 years old against tuberculosis and measles has been generally adopted before
PROGRESA was set up and compliance among this group of children increased further
as they aged. Vaccination compliance was not di¤erent between eligibles and non-eligibles
in control and treatment villages. Table 2.3 shows no PROGRESA e¤ect among eligibles
or non-eligibles. The lack of direct impact of PROGRESA explains the absence of social
interaction e¤ects.
Participation in annual growth and weight monitoring of children was high before PRO-
GRESA started and increased to almost full participation one year later. Pre-intervention
monitoring according to PROGRESAs guidelines was much lower. Less than a third of all
children below 5 years were monitored regularly, but compliance more than tripled among
treated eligibles after one program year. It increased slightly less among the other groups.
The increase in child monitoring on an annual basis and according to PROGRESA fre-
quency is 6.2 and 12.3 percentage higher among the eligibles in treatment villages than in
control villages, respectively, providing evidence of a PROGRESA treatment e¤ect. The
18Annual participation in growth and weight monitoring was already high before PROGRESA was
introduced and increased further among the eligibles through the nancial incentives. It is possible that
non-participation became socially disapproved and the desire to conform higher than for other types of
preventive care.
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results in Table 2.4 establish the presence of social interactions for annual monitoring,
but not for monitoring at PROGRESA frequency.
With respect to adolescent and adult preventive health care, the patterns are similar,
but the actual magnitude of the e¤ects di¤er. Despite a relatively high prevalence of
cervical cancer and diabetes in Mexico (see Section 2.2.1), participation rates for cervical
screening and blood sugar tests were low. The pre-program participation for households in
our sample was below 25% for eligibles and a little above 25% for non-eligibles. Take-up of
blood pressure tests and the usage of deworming drugs was higher and uctuated between
35% and 50%. In Tables 2.2 and 2.3, we observe a large increase in preventive take-up in
all layers of the population for all four types of prevention. The increase among eligibles in
treatment villages is, however, much more pronounced, allowing us to conclude that there
was an important direct e¤ect of the stimuli to attend preventive check-ups. The change
in behavior among non-eligibles was also systematically higher in treatment villages than
in control villages, the di¤erence is, however, small, and not signicant for blood sugar
tests. Our social interaction estimates in Table 2.4 suggest that the spillover e¤ects from
eligibles to non-eligibles are the result of social interactions, with signicant e¤ects for
deworming drugs usage, participation in cervical screening and take-up of blood pressure
tests. For blood sugar tests, the social interaction e¤ect is not signicantly di¤erent from
zero once control variables are added.
We conclude that social interactions transmit policy incentives to enhance preventive
behavior among targeted individuals, to non-targeted individuals. It is not entirely clear
which channels are driving the social interaction e¤ects, but the results are consistent
with positive imitation e¤ects and (implicit or explicit) information sharing on benets.
For deworming drugs usage, these positive e¤ects outweigh potential negative externality
e¤ects.
2.4.3 Direct versus indirect e¤ect
Table 2.5 presents the decomposition of the total treatment e¤ect of PROGRESA on eligi-
bles and non-eligibles in a direct and an indirect e¤ect. Remember that the homogeneity
assumption implies that, most likely, the estimates of the direct and indirect e¤ect are
situated at their lower and upper bound, respectively. The analysis is performed for all
types of preventive care except vaccination, since we have found no indication of a direct
or indirect e¤ect for child immunization. Panel A shows the results for the eligibles and
panel B for the non-eligibles. Only the indirect e¤ect plays for the latter.
70
2.4 Results
Table 2.5: Decomposition of the total treatment e¤ect of PROGRESA
Dependent variable:
Deworming Cervical Blood sugar Blood pressure Monitoring Monitoring
drugs usage screening test test (yearly) (Progresa)
A. Eligibles
1. Total treatment e¤ect 0.109*** 0.187*** 0.202*** 0.219*** 0.066*** 0.138***
(Standard error) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023)
2. Social interaction parameter 0.383* 0.293** 0.149 0.334*** 0.675*** 0.362
(Standard error) (0.212) (0.124) (0.151) (0.120) (0.197) (0.281)
3. PROGRESA e¤ect on peer group 0.072*** 0.130*** 0.129*** 0.150*** 0.061*** 0.116***
(Standard error) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021)
4. Indirect e¤ect (2 x 3) 0.028* 0.038** 0.019 0.050*** 0.041** 0.042
(Standard error) (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.033)
5. Direct treatment e¤ect (1 - 4) 0.081*** 0.149*** 0.183*** 0.169*** 0.025*** 0.095***
(Standard error) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.008) (0.016)
Indirect e¤ect as % of total e¤ect 25.69% 20.32% 9.41% 22.83% 62.12% 30.43%
B. Non-eligibles
1. Total treatment e¤ect 0.023 0.028* 0.015 0.038** 0.042** 0.034
(Standard error) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.031)
2. Social interaction parameter 0.383* 0.293** 0.149 0.334*** 0.675*** 0.362
(Standard error) (0.212) (0.124) (0.151) (0.120) (0.197) (0.281)
3. PROGRESA e¤ect on peer group 0.059*** 0.095*** 0.101*** 0.115*** 0.062*** 0.094***
(Standard error) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022)
4. Indirect e¤ect (2 x 3) 0.023 0.028* 0.015 0.038** 0.042** 0.034
(Standard error) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.031)
5. Direct treatment e¤ect (1 - 4)      
(Standard error)      
Note: Coe¢ cients in rows 1 are the result of estimating eqs. (2.8) and (2.10). Coe¢ cients in rows 2 come from Table 2.4. Coe¢ cients in rows 3
are the result of estimating eqs. (2.5) and (2.6). All regressions have control variables as specied in Table 2.4. Rows 1 to 3 have robust standard errors
that allow for correlation of disturbance terms within localities. Standard errors in row 4 are computed using the delta method. Standard errors
in row 5 are robust and allow for correlation of disturbance terms within localities. They are obtained using an OLS regressions constraining
E = N . Signicance levels of coe¢ cients: y p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Source: PROGRESA evaluation data
Row 1 in panel A shows the estimation of the total treatment e¤ect as laid down in eqs.
(2.8) and (2.10), while row 4 shows the indirect e¤ect and row 5 the direct e¤ect. The
latter is only relevant for eligibles and is always signicant. It varies from a 2.5 percentage
points increase in annual growth monitoring to a 18.3 percentage points increase in the
take-up of blood sugar tests. The indirect e¤ect is smaller and increases participation
rates in prevention by 1.5 to 5 percentage points. It is, in general, smaller among the
non-eligibles than among the eligibles.
If we calculate the share of the indirect e¤ect in the total treatment e¤ect, we nd
that social interactions contribute to 20% of the total change in cervical screening. It
increases up to around 25% for deworming drugs usage and 22% for blood pressure tests
and 30% and 62% for child growth and weight monitoring, respectively at PROGRESA
frequency and on an annual base. At least for these types of preventive care, it appears
that social interactions explain a non-negligible part of the change in preventive behavior
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that is observed after the introduction of PROGRESA. It is striking that for blood sugar
tests, the total treatment e¤ect on the target population is large, but that this is almost
entirely due to the direct incentives. It has not spilled over to non-eligibles.
2.4.4 Health care supply and quality
Changes in preventive behavior can be a response to changes in health care supply and
quality, which we chose to neglect until now. If supply and quality developed di¤erently in
treatment and control villages, e.g. because of the implementation of PROGRESA, this
can have an e¤ect on the social interaction estimates. Agurto et al. (2004), for example,
conclude from focus groups and interviews that, amongst others, time costs, unfriendli-
ness of providers, inadequacy of counseling, and poor quality material and instruments
are important barriers to participation in cervical screening in Mexico and other Latin
American countries. Similar e¤ects could play for other types of preventive care. Changes
in o¤ered services, quality, or prices could thus perfectly lead to the observed changes in
health demand and behavior. The di¤erential increase in preventive health behavior be-
tween treatment and control villages might be the result of improvements in health supply
or quality in treatment villages relative to control villages or to a change in (time) costs
to attend medical services.
PROGRESA survey data contain information that makes it possible to test this mech-
anism. Pre- and post-intervention information is available on the type of health care
providers that are located in or around the locality, the type of services o¤ered, the open-
ing time, the perceived quality (su¢ cient sta¤ and material, clear explanation of problem,
quality of doctors and quality of nurses), and waiting time.19 Information on health care
providers and services are at the locality level, the other data are recorded at the house-
hold level. However, we average the household level information at the locality level,
since only a limited number of households have provided the information and restricting
our subsamples further to this group would eliminate many observations and potentially
create bias.
19We construct the following variables: a dummy variable that indicates whether any provider (hospi-
tal, doctor, health aid or midwife) was available in the locality. A variable, ranging from 0 to 7, indicating
the number of services available in the locality (pre-natal care, delivery care, baby care, immunization,
family planning service, hospitalization, diarrhea care). Opening time in hours per week. An index score,
ranging from 0 to 1 for the availability of sta¤ and equipment, based on 4 yes/no questions (has medical
centre su¢ cient doctors?, nurses?, medication?, material?). An index score, ranging from 0 to 1 for
the quality of doctors, based on 4 yes/no questions (is doctor respectful?, prepared?, responsible? and
condent?). A similar quality index variable for nurses. A dummy indicating whether doctors provide
clear information. Waiting time is indicated in minutes per visit.
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Table 2.7: Social interaction estimates when controlling for changes in health supply
characteristics N
1. Baseline 2. Health supply 3. Health supply
quality and time
Deworming drugs usage 0.383* 0.408** 0.468**
(Standard error) (0.212) (0.200) (0.188)
Cervical screening 0.293** 0.308** 0.313**
(Standard error) (0.124) (0.122) (0.126)
Blood sugar test 0.149 0.162 0.235*
(Standard error) (0.151) (0.148) (0.127)
Blood pressure test 0.334*** 0.359*** 0.389***
(Standard error) (0.120) (0.114) (0.110)
Monitoring (yearly) 0.675*** 0.677*** 0.656***
(Standard error) (0.197) (0.194) (0.207)
Monitoring (PROGRESA) 0.362 0.340 0.346
(Standard error) (0.281) (0.286) (0.282)
Note: Social interaction estimates from IV regressions are reported with robust standard errors that allow for
correlation of disturbance terms within localities. Signicance levels of coe¢ cients: y p<0.15,
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions have control variables as specied in Table 2.4.
Source: PROGRESA evaluation data
Table 2.8: First priority in spending additional monthly household resources (% of house-
holds)
All households Non-eligible households
Food consumption 77.0% 74.4%
Debt payment and saving 6.6% 7.8%
Housing expenses 5.4% 6.1%
Clothing and shoes 4.9% 4.7%
Investments in agriculture (seeds, animals, tools) 3.2% 3.9%
Medication 1.6% 1.9%
School supplies 1.0% 0.9%
Other expenditures (alcohol, toys, entertainment) 0.2% 0.3%
Source: PROGRESA evaluation data
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Chapter 2. Neighborhood peer effects in the use of preventive health care
In Table 2.6, the pre- and post-intervention values are indicated for treatment and
control villages as well as the di¤erences. Table 2.6 shows that almost all localities have at
least one health care provider (which was a program requirement). The number of services
is similar in treatment and control villages and has increased slightly after PROGRESA
started. There are two main conclusions. First, the descriptive evidence shows that
supply did not change in any important way after program implementation. Second,
di¤erences between control and treatment villages are minor. This is a rst indication
that the changes in preventive behavior probably do not results from changes in health
care supply or perceived quality.
Second, we report social interactions estimates in Table 2.7 when controls for health
supply, health care quality and waiting time are subsequently added. Column 1 reproduces
the baseline results, for all prevention types except vaccination where social interaction
e¤ects are non-existent. Controlling for health provision characteristics, the social inter-
action estimates are in line with or somewhat higher than the baseline results.20 Overall,
we conclude that di¤erences between control and treatment villages are limited and the
inclusion of control variables for health supply and quality do not a¤ect our results.
2.4.5 Alternative explanations
In order to support the validity of the results shown in Table 2.4, we address in Table
2.9 three alternative channels, brought up in section 2.3.2, that might have generated the
observed changes in preventive health behavior of non-eligible households in treatment
villages. The rst column reproduces the baseline estimates.
First, changes in preventive behavior of non-eligible households might be the result of
income spillovers. PROGRESA provides monetary transfers to program eligible house-
holds who comply with program requirements. There is a possibility of monetary transfers
from eligible to non-eligible households through gifts, loans or increased spending of eli-
gible households in shops of non-eligible households in their locality. Part of the income
spillovers can be used to increase medical consumption. Adato (2000) concludes from fo-
cus group research that sharing of benets by eligible households is rare, since benets are
perceived as small and used primarily to nance schooling costs (Lalive & Cattaneo, 2009),
increase food consumption and food quality, and buy clothing (Bobonis, 2004; Hoddinott
& Skouas, 2004). The increase in expenditures by eligible households might indirectly
20Especially the e¤ects of doctors who provide a clear explanation and doctor quality play an important
role. However, none of the new point estimates is signicantly di¤erent from the baseline estimates.
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benet non-eligible households if the additional expenditures are realized in shops owned
by non-eligibles. This is, however, not the case since only 20 out of the 506 villages have a
local supermarket or street market (Lalive & Cattaneo, 2009). Nonetheless, Angelucci &
De Giorgi (2009) present evidence that non-eligible households in treatment villages have
received more gifts and loans since PROGRESA was rolled out. The additional resources
are used to increase food consumption levels but are not su¢ cient to cover the increase
in food expenditures. It appears that little additional money is available for increased
medical consumption. Moreover, it seems that medical expenses are not prioritized. In
the March 1998 pre-implementation survey, it is asked what the top priority would be
to spend additional monthly household resources. Medication was among the possible
answers, and was prioritized by only 2% of the households (see Table 2.8). Food is pre-
eminently given the highest priority, in accordance with the results of Angelucci & De
Giorgi (2009), Bobonis (2004) and Hoddinott & Skouas (2004).
Given the limited evidence of income spillovers in treatment villages and the fact that
increases in nancial resources are primarily used to nance food consumption, we argue
that this channel provides no good alternative explanation for potential social interaction
e¤ects in prevention. Nonetheless, we provide a test for income spillovers. We add infor-
mation (from the post-implementation survey in October 1998) to the baseline specica-
tion on the amount of monetary gifts that a household has received and we add dummies
for receiving food and clothes through in kind gifts as proxies for income spillovers. Col-
umn 2 in Table 2.9 shows that the inclusion of gift variables does not a¤ect the baseline
estimates.
PROGRESA transfers not only lead to a potential increase of monetary resources
of non-eligible households, they also lead to an increase in income at the peer group
level, again potentially a¤ecting the preventive behavior. A regression analysis of pre-
implementation preventive behavior on the household poverty index (which captures per-
manent income corrected for household composition), the peer group average poverty in-
dex and additional household and peer group control variables (the same control variables
as used throughout our main analysis, see Table 2.4), reveals that peer group average in-
come does not signicantly a¤ect preventive behavior (results available on request). There
is one notable exception. In March 1998, deworming is positively correlated with house-
hold income and negatively correlated with peer group average income in our sample.
Both coe¢ cients are highly signicant (p<0.01). One explanation is that richer commu-
nities might have better public health provisions and a lower risk of parasite infections.
The negative correlation might lead to an underestimation of social interaction e¤ects for
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deworming. For the pap test, we nd a positive income e¤ect at the peer group level,
but only borderline signicant (p=0.07). This was not expected, as the pap test is free
of charge for all women, so that income should not play an important role, unless social
acceptance of the test is di¤erent according to the average income level of the commu-
nity. We controlled for pre-implementation peer group average income throughout our
empirical analysis.
Second, non-eligible households might have misunderstood their eligibility status or
anticipated future eligibility and changed their preventive health behavior. This is un-
likely to be the case, since households were notied clearly about their eligibility status.
Moreover, eligibility was awarded until at least November 1999 and during this period
non-eligible or new households were not able to attain eligibility status, irrespective of
income or behavior (Angelucci & De Giorgi, 2009). We test for anticipation e¤ects by
removing the 25% non-eligible households that are closest to the poverty cut-o¤ point,
and hence most likely to be inuenced by anticipation e¤ects. If anticipation e¤ects drive
our results, the removal of the poorest non-eligibles would reduce the social interaction
e¤ects drastically. The results in column 3 show that this is not the case. None of the new
point estimates are signicantly di¤erent from the baseline coe¢ cients. The most notable
decreases in coe¢ cient value are observed for blood pressure tests and growth monitoring
at PROGRESA frequency.
Third, it might be the case that environmental or public health factors have driven
the change in prevention participation among the non-eligibles in treatment villages. The
di¤erence in di¤erence approach captures time invariant heterogeneity. In column 4, we
add dummies for natural disasters (drought, ood, earthquake, frost, pest and a residual
category) that occurred between April 1998 and March 1999. The information is house-
hold specic, but we also add peer group averages. Moreover, we add dummies to control
for localities with sewer systems and public water networks. In localities with better
public health provisions, prevention participation may evolve di¤erently, especially with
respect to infections by parasitic diseases which are linked to public hygiene and sani-
tation (Meredith et al., 2013). The estimates presented in column 4 show no important
deviations from the baseline results.
Fourth, we assume that social interactions occur between eligibles and non-eligibles
within a village and not across villages (SUTVA). Spillover e¤ects across villages can
originate from shared health care suppliers, cooperations among neighboring localities,
interactions among villagers etc. We test SUTVA in two ways. The analysis presented in
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column 5 in Table 2.9 adds distance controls to the baseline regression. These controls
include the shortest geodesic distance to a treatment village, the number of treatment
villages within a 5 km and within a 10 km radius and the total number of villages within a
5 km and within a 10 km radius.21 Adding distance controls hardly changes the coe¢ cient
estimates. In column 6, we perform the baseline analysis, but on the subsample of localities
without another treatment village within a 5 km radius. This reduces our sample by
almost a third, which leads to larger standard errors. The social interaction estimates
for deworming, cervical screening and blood sugar test decrease by a third, whereas for
the other types of prevention the estimates increase by 15% to 30%. As a consequence of
the decrease in coe¢ cient values and the larger standard errors, estimates for deworming
and cervical screening are no longer signicant. To conclude, our results are mixed with
respect to relaxing SUTVA, social interaction e¤ects remain positive, but some estimates
lose signicance.
2.4.6 Alternative specications
As a last part of our robustness analysis, we analyze two alternative specications. First,
we add the fraction of eligible individuals in treatment villages as a second instrument,
next to village treatment status. We have not used the share of eligibles in treatment
villages as instrument throughout the main analysis, since it may not be exogenous if there
is any sorting of families in and out of the village based on unobservable characteristics of
the households or villages. This concern can be alleviated somewhat by xing the share
of eligibles at the pre-intervention level, which is what we do. The main reason for adding
a second instrument is to increase precision. The results in column 7 in Table 2.9 show
that standard errors decrease only moderately and that the coe¢ cient estimates are in
line with the baseline.
Second, we estimate the social interaction e¤ect N but with a di¤erent peer group.
We do not treat the entire village as the relevant peer group for a non-eligible household,
but only the subgroup of eligibles. The results are shown in column 8 of Table 2.9. The
social interaction estimates decrease drastically, except for annual child monitoring. This
result follows logically from the choice of peer group and could have been anticipated
from Table 2.2. If the peer group consists only of eligible households, the peer group
average change in preventive behavior is much more pronounced and stronger correlated
21On average, 30% and 69% of the localties have at least one treatment village within a 5 km and 10
km radius, respectively; 42% and 80% of the localties have at least on other village within a 5 km and 10
km radius, respectively. The shortest geodesic distance to a neighboring treatment village is on average
9.4 km .
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to the village treatment status. The non-eligible household responsiveness on the other
hand does not change. Thus, the relative decrease of the household responsiveness to the
peer group responsiveness translates into a lower social interaction parameter. This e¤ect
plays less for annual child monitoring since the change in behavior among eligibles is not
much above the change in behavior among non-eligibles, which means that the peer group
responsiveness does not alter much when opting for the alternative denition. While the
coe¢ cient values change quite drastically, the sign and signicance do not. The choice of
peer group is important, especially with respect to the magnitude of the social interaction
e¤ects (and thus the decomposition between direct and indirect e¤ects), but not with
respect to its existence and reinforcing role.
2.5 Conclusion
Individual participation in preventive health care may depend on preventive health be-
havior in the peer group of the individual. This chapter analyzes the importance of social
interactions in the context of new social policies in Mexico that aim to increase health
care usage among a targeted subgroup of the population. We followed the promising
approach of analyzing social interactions in real world peer groups. We exploited the
partial-population design with random variation in eligibility status of households and in
treatment status of localities in PROGRESA for the identication of social interactions.
Results indicate that PROGRESA was successful in increasing preventive care usage
among the eligible households. Non-eligible households in treatment villages have also
changed their preventive health behavior more than their counterparts in control villages,
providing evidence of spillover e¤ects. We were able to identify endogenous social interac-
tions under relatively weak assumptions and showed that social interaction e¤ects are
present for deworming drugs usage, cervical screening, blood pressure tests and annual
child growth and weight monitoring. No social interactions are found for immunization
of children and for blood sugar tests. The magnitude of the social interaction e¤ects
di¤ers across types of prevention. The results are robust to the inclusion of health supply,
quality and waiting time controls. The social interaction e¤ects remain when we consider
income spillovers, anticipation e¤ects and e¤ects from environmental shocks or di¤erences
in public sanitation. Relaxing the SUTVA condition leads to mixed conclusions, social
interaction e¤ects remain positive, but some estimates lose signicance.
Using the information on social interactions, the total treatment e¤ect can be decom-
posed in a direct e¤ect, related to the nancial incentive given to eligible households for
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complying with PROGRESA requirements, and an indirect e¤ect. The total treatment
e¤ect indicates that participation in prevention among eligibles increased as much as 20
percentage points for cervical screening, blood sugar and blood pressure tests, around 14
percentage points for growth monitoring at PROGRESA frequency, 11 percentage points
for deworming drugs usage and 7 percentage points for annual monitoring. The latter
started with a pre-program participation rate well above 80%. The indirect e¤ect due
to social interactions accounts for 10% up to 60% of the total treatment e¤ect for the
eligibles, i.e. a non-negligible share.
The presence of positive social interaction e¤ects has important policy implications.
Positive social interaction e¤ects reinforce behavioral changes produced by nancial in-
centives, and, in addition, allow to reach a subgroup of the population not targeted by the
social policy. First, this implies that to increase preventive behavior in the entire popula-
tion, policymakers do not necessarily need to target everyone and can focus on subgroups
as long as targeted and untargeted individuals interact with each other. Second, if positive
spillovers are important, temporary subsidies can increase participation in behavior, and
once a high adoption equilibrium is reached, it might be sustained even when subsidies are
later scaled back. When, for example, imitation e¤ects are driving the positive spillovers,
participation becomes more attractive for an individual since utility from conforming to
his or her peers behavior increases as more social contacts participate. The rise in utility
from imitation might compensate the utility decrease once subsidies are scaled back. Both
points are important to allocate scarce public resources to attain health improvements.
As Barham (2005), Gertler (2000, 2004) and Skouas (2005) have shown, PROGRESA
led to health improvements for children and adults and is a potential gamechanger in the
human capital accumulation of children and households. The results we have obtained in
this research project on policy e¤ects and social interactions are specic to the studied
setting. However, this settings is relevant for other countries as well. While Mexico was
one of the rst countries to set up a conditional cash transfer social program, a large
number of Latin American and Asian countries have created similar programs.
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Appendix 1: Construction of dependent variables
Table 2.10: Construction of dependent variables
Survey March 1998
(pre-implementation)
Survey October 1998
(post-implementation)
Survey March 1999
(post-implementation)
Individual level data
Annual growth and weight
monitoring (yes=1; no=0)
at least 1 check-up in
the past year
at least 1 check-up in the past 6 months (in
each survey), recoded to at least 1 check-up
in the past year
Growth and weight moni-
toring at PROGRESA fre-
quency (yes=1; no=0)
complies with the
prescribed number of
check-ups in the past
year
not used
complies with the
prescribed number of
check-ups in the past 6
months
Vaccination against measles
and tuberculosis (yes=1;
no=0)
complies with age
specic prescription for
vaccination (children
aged 5 or less)
complies with age
specic prescription for
vaccination (children
aged 5 or less)
complies with age
specic prescription for
vaccination (children
aged 2 or less)
Household (HH) level data
Deworming drugs usage
(yes=1; no=0)
someone in the HH
treated in the past year
someone in the HH treated in the past 6
months (in each survey), recoded to at least
someone treated in the past year
Blood sugar test (yes=1;
no=0)
someone in the HH
treated in the past year
someone in the HH treated in the past 6
months (in each survey), recoded to at least
someone treated in the past year
Blood pressure test (yes=1;
no=0)
someone in the HH
treated in the past year
someone in the HH treated in the past 6
months (in each survey), recoded to at least
someone treated in the past year
Cervical screening (yes=1;
no=0)
someone in the HH
complies with screening
norm in the past year
someone in the HH complies with screening
norm in the past 6 months (in each survey),
recoded to at least someone complies in the
past year
Individual level data are available on prevention use of children aged 5 years or younger.
Prior to program initiation (March 1998 survey), it was asked whether a child had at-
tended a growth and weight check-up in the past year and if so, how many times. After
program implementation, the same questions were asked, but for the past six months
(October 1998 and March 1999 survey). Two participation variables are constructed: one
variable that indicates whether a child had attended at least one check-up in the past year
(evaluated in March 1998 and March 1999), and another variable that indicates whether
a child had attended the required number of growth and weight check-ups as imposed
by PROGRESA, evaluated for the past year in March 1998 and for the past six months
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in March 1999. For the latter participation variable, we choose to focus on the post-
implementation period October 1998 to March 1999, rather than the period April 1998
to March 1999, since PROGRESA was only introduced in April 1998 and it is likely that
a switch in monitoring frequency takes at least some transition time. Vaccination data
are available on vaccination of measles, tuberculosis, tetanus and polio. In March 1998
and October 1998, vaccination history is recorded for children aged 5 or younger, while
in March 1999, the information is available only for children aged 2 or younger. We focus
on take-up of the vaccinations of tuberculosis and measles, since these are infrequent and
therefore easily observed. There is one shot at birth for tuberculosis and one shot before
age 1 for measles with a renewal around age 6. For tetanus and polio, there are at least
four shots before the age of 5 and the data are not recorded accurately enough to fol-
low the vaccination history unambiguously (Barham, 2005). When possible, we evaluate
vaccination status in March 1999 and compare it with vaccination status in March 1998,
however, for older children who are unobserved in March 1999, we derive post-program
vaccination from the October 1998 survey.
For the usage of deworming drugs and the check-ups for blood sugar and blood pressure,
household level data are available on whether or not someone in the household has taken
these drugs or tests in the past year (March 1998 survey) or in the past six months
(October 1998 and March 1999 survey). In the latter case, a yearly equivalent take-up
variable is generated in order to analyze changes in yearly participation before and after
program implementation. With respect to cervical screening, the data are also at the
household level, but more information is available. In March 1998, participants were
asked if someone in the household had ever participated in screening and if so, in which
year. After program implementation, participants were asked whether someone in the
household took a screening test in the last six months. In 1997, the o¢ cial Mexican norm
for cervical screening prescribed a test every three years (after normal test results for two
consecutive years).22 We create a variable that checks compliance with this norm both
before (evaluated in March 1998) and after the implementation of PROGRESA (evaluated
in March 1999) and analyze the changes in compliance.
Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics and attrition
22The recommended screening frequency is laid down by the o¢ cial Mexican screening norm NOM-
014-SSA2-1994 and its modications.
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Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics and attrition
Table 2.18: Relation between attrition and household characteristics
All Eligible Non-eligible
households households households
Treatment village 0.002 (0.015) -0.013 (0.016) 0.017 (0.017)
Very high village marginality index (ref. high) -0.021 (0.018) -0.012 (0.018) -0.023 (0.020)
Fraction eligible individuals in village -0.030 (0.038) -0.013 (0.038) -0.077 (0.048)
Household marginality index 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
HH: primary education -0.023 (0.011)* -0.021 (0.016) -0.024 (0.013)*
HH: degree in secundary education or beyond 0.005 (0.017) -0.007 (0.024) 0.016 (0.022)
HH: educational information missing -0.021 (0.027) -0.083 (0.030)*** 0.030 (0.042)
HH: literate -0.008 (0.011) -0.014 (0.013) -0.002 (0.015)
HH: age -0.002 (0.000)*** -0.002 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.000)***
HH: speaks indigenous language 0.014 (0.017) 0.004 (0.015) 0.019 (0.023)
HH: language information missing -0.018 (0.045) -0.058 (0.073) 0.000 (0.057)
P: primary -0.024 (0.012)** -0.042 (0.015)*** -0.004 (0.017)
P: secundary -0.016 (0.016) -0.040 (0.024)* 0.007 (0.021)
P: literate -0.003 (0.011) 0.017 (0.015) -0.023 (0.016)
P: age 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
P: speaks indigenous language -0.023 (0.012)* -0.031 (0.014)** -0.007 (0.016)
Civil status
Married 0.003 (0.020) 0.010 (0.033) 0.002 (0.027)
Partner but not married -0.003 (0.020) -0.002 (0.033) 0.003 (0.028)
Separated or alone 0.030 (0.022) 0.057 (0.040) 0.014 (0.027)
Widow 0.000 (0.018) 0.016 (0.032) -0.008 (0.022)
Household members (ref. 1 member)
2 household members -0.078 (0.016)*** -0.074 (0.035)** -0.084 (0.018)***
3 household members -0.117 (0.017)*** -0.108 (0.036)*** -0.130 (0.019)***
4 household members -0.134 (0.018)*** -0.156 (0.039)*** -0.129 (0.021)***
5 household members -0.138 (0.018)*** -0.151 (0.040)*** -0.145 (0.020)***
6 or more household members -0.143 (0.019)*** -0.165 (0.040)*** -0.139 (0.022)***
1 child 0.000 (0.009) -0.007 (0.019) 0.000 (0.010)
2 children 0.003 (0.012) 0.004 (0.023) 0.001 (0.014)
3 children -0.011 (0.014) -0.007 (0.024) -0.021 (0.017)
4 children -0.011 (0.015) -0.011 (0.026) -0.008 (0.018)
5 children -0.011 (0.018) -0.014 (0.027) 0.004 (0.025)
6 or more children -0.009 (0.018) -0.014 (0.028) 0.009 (0.028)
Wealth indicators
Floor: earth -0.013 (0.019) 0.003 (0.023) -0.028 (0.026)
Floor: cement -0.008 (0.019) 0.000 (0.024) -0.015 (0.025)
Roof: Asbestos 0.005 (0.021) -0.007 (0.030) 0.023 (0.024)
Roof: Tin -0.035 (0.016)** -0.037 (0.021)* -0.025 (0.022)
Roof: Carton -0.008 (0.019) -0.004 (0.024) -0.014 (0.025)
Roof: Palm leaves -0.040 (0.015)** -0.045 (0.019) -0.031 (0.022)
Roof: Tiles 0.006 (0.025) -0.003 (0.024) 0.024 (0.036)
Roof: cement blocks 0.022 (0.019) -0.004 (0.024) 0.037 (0.025)
Owner of agricultural land -0.021 (0.011)* -0.018 (0.014) -0.025 (0.011)**
Constant 0.417 (0.049)*** 0.487 (0.073)*** 0.396 (0.065)***
Note: HH refers to household head; P refers to partner. Attrition is estimated using OLS regression with robust
standard errors that allow for correlation of disturbance terms within localities. Standard errors between brackets.
Signicance levels of coe¢ cients: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: PROGRESA evaluation data
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Chapter 3
Unintended spillover e¤ects of
inuenza vaccination: a regression
discontinuity approach.
Joint work with Anne Gielen and Tom Van Ourti
3.1 Introduction
We study spillover e¤ects of preventive care policy on those individuals not targeted by the
policy. Many countries have preventive care policies in place that target specic groups.
For example, secondary preventive care such as screening for breast, colon or cervical
cancer , but also primary prevention for infectious diseases  such as vaccination for
inuenza is mostly recommended and/or incentivized for well-dened (often age-based)
groups in society. Target groups are mostly derived from observational studies describing
who is most at risk of contracting the disease, in combination with randomized controlled
trials (RCT) that analyze whether the policies/interventions think of screening, vacci-
nations, etc. do have benecial e¤ects on health outcomes. The ndings, while useful,
provide an incomplete picture by overlooking spillovers on the preventive behavior of those
not targeted; and the studies that do consider spillovers tend to su¤er from endogeneity
biases or limited external validity.1 Moreover, RCTs are mostly silent on e¤ects among
targeted and non-targeted individuals on arguably equally important outcomes such
1For infectious diseases, there is the additional concern that the potentially a¤ected preventive behavior
of the non-targeted population might a¤ect disease prevalence among the targeted population (see e.g.
Ward (2014)). Our study accommodates such externality e¤ects, but does not estimate the magnitude
of these externalities.
93
Chapter 3. Unintended spillover effects of influenza vaccination: a regression discontinuity approach.
as medical care savings or sickness absence. Both types of neglected e¤ects do a¤ect costs
and benets of preventive care policies and therefore constitute essential information to
guide optimal policy design and targeting of these policies.
Our particular application analyzes the inuenza vaccination policy in the Netherlands.
Since 1996/1997, all Dutchmen aged 65 years and over (or su¤ering from certain specic
diseases) receive a personal invitation for a free u shot. This allows to quantify the
behavioral change in terms of vaccination take-up, health outcomes and medical care
consumption among individuals crossing the age threshold. While the e¤ects on the
targeted population are useful for policy design, our primary aim is to estimate policy
induced spillovers onto non-targeted individuals which has proven di¢ cult in earlier work
(e.g. Rao et al., 2012). We use the subpopulation of children of the targeted over-
65 population since information on family ties in Dutch administrative records help us
overcome the usual identication challenges and allows the estimation of spillover e¤ects
from targeted parents to their non-targeted adult children in terms of sickness absence,
medical care consumption, health outcomes and vaccination behavior. The adult children
in our data are between 20 and 51 and generally do not cohabit with their parents.
In the Netherlands, it is estimated that about 10% of the population is a¤ected by
inuenza.2 Around 160 GP consultations and 12 hospitalizations per 10,000 individu-
als have been estimated to be inuenza-related. Age standardized mortality of inuenza
(as primary cause) is around 0.075 per 10,000 individuals, but inuenza is also related to
cardiovascular and pneumonia mortality, leading to an overall age-standardized inuenza-
related mortality rate of about 1 per 10,000 individuals of which 95% among individuals
aged 60 or more. Comparison of incidence rates of inuenza and inuenza related med-
ical care use and mortality across countries is di¢ cult due to di¤erences in surveillance
methods, and denitions of inuenza (Meerhof et al., 2004), but a common feature across
temperate regions of the world is that inuenza tends to recur every year.3 Annual vacci-
nation is the leading worldwide strategy for reducing the public health burden of inuenza.
The Netherlands adopted a protective vaccination policy targeted at chronically ill indi-
viduals with specic disorders, with the intention to directly protect individuals who are
most at risk of inuenza mortality. To increase participation, the Dutch health authori-
ties initiated in 1991 a series of interventions, tailored to the eligible population, including
2Obtaining exact estimates of the health burden of inuenza is di¢ cult due to the bias introduced by
vaccination coverage.
3The exact timing, duration and gravity of the u season di¤ers beween countries and from year to
year (WHO, 2014; CDC, 2014).
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public information campaigns, systematic documentation of individuals at risk, and mon-
itoring of vaccination participation. A major reform in 1996 extended the vaccination
target group by adding all healthy individuals aged 65 and over to the eligible popula-
tion. In addition, barriers to take up vaccination were reduced for the eligible population
by o¤ering free vaccination, sending personalized invitation letters, and simplifying the
process to obtain a free vaccination, but also by incentivizing the supply side by providing
remuneration to health care providers in charge of the vaccination program.4 The new
policies were successful and vaccination rates in the Dutch target group increased rapidly
after 1996 (van Essen et al., 2001; CBS, 2003; Mereckiene et al., 2012, 2014). Currently,
in line with guidelines of the European Commission, most European countries recommend
free inuenza vaccination for the elderly and the chronically ill (European Commission,
2014).5 Recommendations for u shots also include younger age groups in the United
States, but health insurance plans might not cover the costs of u shots.6
The crucial identifying element in our study design is the quasi-random variation in-
troduced by the personal invitations for a free inuenza vaccination for individuals aged
65 and over since 1996. We exploit the resulting discontinuity at the 65-age threshold
with a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design. The RD design is applied on survey
data and administrative records from Statistics Netherlands for the identication of the
policy-induced behavioral responses among the targeted population and spillover e¤ects
among their adult children, under fairly weak assumptions. Age-triggered (sharp and
fuzzy) RD designs have been applied in other contexts (Battestin et al., 2008; Card et al.,
2008-2009; Lemieux and Milligan, 2008; Carpenter and Dobkin, 2009; Stancanelli and Van
Soest, 2012), but is particularly attractive in the case of the Dutch inuenza vaccination
policy given that not actual age, but age on May 1st determines whether one receives an
invitation for a free u shot, and thus removes the typical concern that the treatment of
interest (invitation for a free u shot) coincides with eligibility for other welfare programs
or government transfers such as retirement benets which are based on actual age.7
Our results indicate that the vaccination policies targeted to the elderly increase immu-
nization by almost 20 percentage points (from about 30% to 50%) at age 65. This direct
4In 2008, the age threshold was lowered to 60, but this policy change is not analyzed in this paper.
5In only 4 EU member state countries, the full cost of the vaccination is borne by the recipient
(OFlanagan et al., 2012).
6Since 2010, CDC recommends inuenza vaccination for everyone older than 6 months (CDC, 2010),
and since the a¤ordable care act u shots are included in most health insurance plans.
7In the Netherlands, the health insurance system was dramatically reformed in 2006. However, neither
before 2006, and neither after 2006, there has been a discontinuity in the coverage of medical care insurance
(in general and for u shots) at the age of 65 (Mossialos and Thomson, 2002; Roos and Schut, 2008).
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e¤ect is accompanied by a decrease in the vaccination behavior of their non-targeted adult
children from around 9 to 5 percent. These direct and spillover e¤ects are strong and have
an impact over and beyond the vaccination decisions of the (un)targeted individuals. For
example, we estimate that the inuenza vaccination program saves 0.8 individuals out of
100,000 at the age threshold. We also nd a decline of around 10 percentage points at age
65 in the number of individuals that consult a general practitioner (GP) (from around 50%
to 40%) and the consumption of prescribed medicines (from around 70% to 60%) during
the typical inuenza months, but not during other months. Mortality and GP visits of
their adult children are not a¤ected, but the occurrence of u-like symptoms increases
from 45% to 55% and sickness absence among this group increases with 8 percentage
points (from 14% to 22%), suggesting that the lack of mortality and GP e¤ects among
adult children is due to their lower age, and not due to their relatively smaller change
in vaccination behavior (as compared to that of the elderly parents). For both parents
and adult children, we nd no statistically signicant e¤ects on hospital admissions, visits
to medical specialists, and consumption of unprescribed medicines. All our ndings are
robust to di¤erent specications at the 65-age threshold, and robustness checks suggests
that the identifying assumptions of our fuzzy RD design hold.
Interpretation of the direct policy e¤ects is straightforward as the reduced mortality,
GP visits and prescribed medicines at age 65 can be safely ascribed to the vaccination
policy at this age threshold. The estimates of primary interest the (unintended) spillover
e¤ects among the adult children of the targeted population are more di¢ cult to interpret.
We explore several possible channels that might have generated the negative spillover e¤ect
and nd suggestive evidence that a social stigma cost is revealed to the adult children
when their oldest parent crosses the age threshold. A potential trigger for the social
stigma cost is the explicit framing of the target group in the invitation letter sent out to
eligible parents.
Our research ts into the literature on the benets of inuenza vaccination, but also in
the broader literature that studies (unintended) spillover e¤ects (and social interactions)
on individuals not targeted by a policy. In the inuenza domain, few studies analyze
spillover e¤ects of inuenza vaccination (e.g. Jordan et al., 2006; Thomas et al., 2006),
and none of these studies considers the behavioral response in terms of vaccination up-
take of the non-targeted group. They rather evaluate mortality and morbidity outcomes
which might not only be a¤ected by changes in the vaccination behavior of the non-
targeted group, but also by changes in herd immunity. Existing studies also su¤er from
inconclusive evidence due to limitations in the study design, i.e. observational studies that
96
3.1 Introduction
are prone to the typical biases of selection, omitted variables bias and reverse causality;
and RCTs that might be based on selected samples or have only limited external valid-
ity (Nichol, 2008). Our study improves upon the existing evidence by providing causal
evidence of the spillover e¤ects on the adult children of the targeted population, by ex-
ploiting the random variation created by a population-wide vaccination program in the
Netherlands. Our study is also related to Ward (2014) which is, as far as we know, the
rst study of externality e¤ects. Ward (2014) evaluates the expansion of coverage from
the traditional target population (the elderly and the chronically ill) to the entire popula-
tion (including children and adults) in Ontario, Canada. She nds substantial decreases
in inuenza-related mortality and respiratory hospital admissions among the traditional
target population. Her study is explicitly concerned with herd immunity in the sense
that she studies the e¤ect of increased take-up among the newly targeted population (the
children and adults) on mortality, morbidity and medical care use of the traditional tar-
get population, keeping the vaccination behavior of the latter xed. Our study focuses
instead on spillover e¤ects that are triggered by changes in the vaccination behavior of
the non-targeted group (in our case: adult children), and our age-triggered RD design
makes sure that we condition on the overall vaccination coverage in the Netherlands.8 Our
study shows that such (unintended) spillover e¤ects can be substantial, and have adverse
consequences on morbidity and mortality of the untargeted population, which is in line
with the e¢ cacy and e¤ectiveness of inuenza vaccinations being higher among younger
compared to older individuals (Grohskopf et al., 2013).
Our work is also broadly related to the literature on social interactions (see Dahl et
al. (2014) for a recent example). A social interaction e¤ect occurs when an individuals
participation decision relates to the participation decision of others in an individuals so-
cial group. Our RD design in combination with exogenous social groups (in our case:
families) is perfectly suited to address the typical identication challenges of omitted
variables bias, reverse causality and endogenous group membership that arise when esti-
mating social interaction e¤ects.9 Kremer & Miguel (2007) argue that social interactions
might arise from (1) a desire to imitate the decisions of ones social contacts, (2) sharing
information or perceptions about costs and benets of using the technology or medica-
tion10; or stigma costs which might arise in our application on free inuenza vaccination
8Individuals with parents just below and above the age threshold face the same herd immunity or
overall vaccination coverage.
9One might worry that social interactions within the family are biased by shared family genes and
habits, but this would only be the case in our setup when unobserved family e¤ects di¤er at both sides
of the age threshold.
10Costs and benets in this context should be interpreted broadly. Research, within the context of
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since perceptions about the target group (individuals with specic disorders and the el-
derly) may matter for the participation of untargeted individuals (Mo¢ tt, 1983)11, or (3)
from a reduced personal incentive to vaccinate due to (epidemiological) externalities.12
We provide suggestive evidence that social stigma e¤ects are the dominant channel for
the observed negative spillover e¤ects.
While our estimates of the positive direct policy e¤ects and the negative spillover e¤ects
are based on population-wide random variation and have therefore higher external validity
compared to RCTwhich tend to be based on non-representative samples of the population,
one should remain prudent in extrapolating our estimates since they are local around the
65-age threshold. This limitation is particularly binding for the spillover e¤ects, but
less for the direct policy e¤ects since e¢ cacy and e¤ectiveness of inuenza vaccinations
is higher among younger compared to older individuals (Grohskopf et al., 2013). One
should also be careful when interpreting our spillover e¤ects since all estimates in our
study reect intentions to treat(ITT). Since we do not observe the vaccination of the
targeted parents and their untargeted children in the same dataset, we directly link the
age of the parents to the behavior of their children.
At the same time, our ndings are useful for policy. Our results suggest that vacci-
nation policy in the Netherlands is successful in increasing vaccination coverage among
targeted individuals and leads to substantial reductions in mortality, GP visits and the
use of prescribed medicines, but also generates negative spillover e¤ects between targeted
and untargeted individuals and increases inuenza-related symptoms and sickness absence
with respectively 10 and 8 percentage points among the latter group. The Dutch vac-
cination programs should pay more attention to the e¤ects of information dissemination
on public perceptions and attitudes on (voluntary) vaccination. One possible policy ad-
justment in this respect could be to less explicitly focus on the delineation of the target
group, or alternatively, more explicitly focus on the benets of indirect protection (next
to direct protection) when addressing the target group and the broader population. Our
the Dutch inuenza vaccination program and in other settings, shows that besides tangible costs, other
elements play a role in vaccination take-up, such as perceptions about the e¤ectiveness and the safety of
the vaccine, beliefs about the infection risk and disease complications, fear about side e¤ects, needles and
pain, knowledge on insurance coverage and time costs (Bish et al., 2011; Chapman et al., 1999; Nagata
et al., 2011; Rao et al., 2012; van Essen et al., 1997; Wu, 2003; Zijtregtop et al., 2010).
11A study by Krooneman & Verheij (2003) among 4000 Dutch citizens shows for example that the
most cited reason by healthy adults not to get vaccinated is that they do not belong to the target group
(reported by 56% of the healthy adults).
12Miguel and Kremer (2007) also mention sharing information on how to use a certain technology, but
since inuenza vaccination is administered by a general practitioner or a medical assistant, this channel
is less relevant in our setting.
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ndings also suggests that many (European) countries with similar inuenza vaccination
policies in place might face similar negative spillover e¤ects amongst family members.
The remainder of chapter 3 is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents background
information on the Dutch inuenza vaccination program, discusses the empirical approach
and explains the identication strategy. In section 3.3, we describe the data and section
3.4 discusses the main results. In section 3.5, we look for the underlying channels that
might drive the spillover e¤ects. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Identication
3.2.1 Identication challenges
Identifying spillover e¤ects within groups has proven to be di¢ cult since one faces the
important identication challenges of reverse causality, omitted variables bias (or corre-
lated unobservables) and endogenous group membership (or selection bias) (Manski, 1993;
Mo¢ tt, 2001). Reverse causality arises if one persons decisions a¤ect another persons
decisions and vice versa. This generates an identication problem when one attempts to
simultaneously regress both persons behavior on the other persons behavior. The omit-
ted variables bias problem surfaces when not all relevant characteristics of individuals
involved in the spillovers within the group are controlled for. The problem of endogenous
group membership implies that individuals tend to engage in social contacts with people
who have similar tastes, attitudes and preferences. This might drive the correlation in
behavior among people that have frequent social contacts, and one might mistakingly
interpret this correlation as a spillover e¤ect.
We overcome the identication problems of reverse causality bias and omitted variables
bias by considering a random subset of individuals (in our setting parents) in a social
group (families) that are o¤ered program participation at a di¤erent price (free inuenza
vaccination and invitation letter). This exogenous variation allows analyzing how others
(adult children) in the group change their behavior. Endogenous group membership is
addressed by studying spillover e¤ects within families. Since children do not choose their
parents, selection issues do not matter when analyzing spillover e¤ects.13 ;14 We provide
13More generally, seasonal inuenza infections and vaccination decisions are rather unlikely to change
existing social connections or create new ones.
14The selection issue might be seen as a special case of the omitted variables bias problem and shows
that the choice of families is not essential for our identication strategy (it is however essential to choose
a group within which spillover e¤ects are studied). Within this interpretation, family characteristics or
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more details of our empirical models in section 3.2.5.
3.2.2 The design of the Dutch free inuenza vaccination pro-
gram
3.2.2.1 Dutch inuenza vaccinations before 1996
In the Netherlands, increased inuenza activity is typically recorded between mid-November
and early March, and u shots are usually delivered between October and December. In
order to reduce inuenza related hospital admissions, morbidity and mortality during this
period, the Dutch Health council and health authorities identify high-risk groups who are
targeted for inuenza vaccination. In the eighties high-risk groups were dened based
exclusively on existing chronic disorders, such as diabetes, cardiovascular and pulmonary
conditions, HIV/AIDS, renal disease and immune dysfunctions. High-risk individuals who
were insured by a regional sickness fund obtained vaccination free of charge.15 High-risk
individuals who were covered by a private insurer or individuals who did not belong to
the high-risk group had to pay to receive vaccination.16 The take-up rate in the high-risk
group was rather constant and remained below 30% (Fedson et al., 1995; van Essen et al.,
2001).
In 1991, the national health authorities concluded that vaccination coverage among
chronically ill and elderly individuals was inadequate. A series of interventions were
started to increase participation. First, the general public and at risk patients were in-
formed about the existence and the benets of inuenza vaccination. Second, the position
of the general practitioner (GP) who occupies the role of gatekeeper in the Dutch health
care system was strengthened. The GP was encouraged to register and personally invite
at risk patients and organize clearly communicated vaccination moments.17 The central
role of the GP and the increased publicity rapidly increased inuenza vaccination in the
high-risk group from about 30% in 1991 to 50% in 1995 (see Figure 3.1).
(health) endowments that are correlated within families and that remain unobserved, will be addressed
by the RD identication strategy which assumes that the unobserved family characteristics or (health
endowments) in close vicinity to the discontinuity are randomly distributed.
15In the eighties, nineties and up to 2005, two thirds of the population - whose earnings (employment
or replacement income) fell below an income threshold - were compulsory insured for health care by a
regional sickness fund. The remaining third could (voluntarily) enrol in private insurance.
16More specically, in 1996 an individual had to pay 58.20 guilders to be vaccinated against inuenza,
which corresponds to 37.78 euros (in 2013 purchasing power).
17The fraction of GPs that e¤ectively heed these additional tasks increased rapidly. Registration of at
risk patients in a computer program was performed by 54% of the GP in 1994 and 82% in 1997. Personal
invitations were sent out by 40% in 1994, 77% in 1997 and 95% in 2000. Special vaccination hours were
organized by 72% in 1994, 86% in 1997 and 90% in 2000 (Hak et al., 2000; Tacken et al., 2002).
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Figure 3.1: Vaccination rates in the Netherlands
Source: Van Essen et al. (2001) ; CBS (2003) ; de Bakker (2001); Tacken et al. (2002-2010); Jansen
(2013)
3.2.2.2 The Dutch inuenza vaccination program since 1996
In 1996, a major reform was rolled out. All (healthy) individuals aged 65 or above were
added to the high-risk group. In addition, all high-risk individuals were made eligible
for free inuenza vaccination18, received a personalized invitation (around late Septem-
ber/early October) and GPs directly received a remuneration per vaccinated individual
of the high-risk population. At the same time new supporting agencies were set up and
inuenza prevention evolved into a nationwide preventive care program. The provision
of inuenza vaccinations to the high-risk group was simplied. Prior to the reform, an
individual rst needed to get a prescription from the GP, next go to the pharmacist to buy
the vaccine and revisit the GP for the administration of the vaccine. After the reform,
every GP had their own stock of vaccines which were directly administered to eligible
individuals. However, for individuals not targeted by the vaccination program, the old
arrangement still applied.
18Note that some employers provide (free or subsidized) u shots to their employees. In the period
1997-1998 to 2007-2008, 14% of the individuals who were vaccinated and who did not belong to the high-
risk group, indicated to do this at the initiative of their employer (own computations, health interview
surveys).
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Figure 3.2: Vaccination rates and high-risk group fraction by program age for the (pooled)
inuenza seasons 1997-1998 up to 2007-2008.
Source: Health Interview Survey, own computations.
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, the reform led to a sharp increase in vaccination rates
of the at risk population in 1996/1997 and further increased until 2005 both in the entire
population (up to 19%) and among individuals aged 65 or above (up to 80%).19 The
vaccination rate among high-risk individuals is one of the highest in Europe (Mereckiene
et al., 2012, 2014). Since 2006, participation in the high-risk group based on chronic
illnesses, is slightly decreasing.
By 1998, the high-risk group covered 19.3% of the Dutch population, of whom 12.7%
above and 6.6% below the age threshold (Tacken et al., 2003). Figure 3.2 shows the
fraction of individuals that belong to the high-risk group decomposed by age. The receipt
of a personal invitation and a free u shot at age 65, led to a sharp increase of vaccination
take-up of individuals at the age threshold. Participation rates climb further up to around
age 70 and stabilize thereafter. Carman & Mosca (2011) provide evidence that, within
the context of the Dutch inuenza program, individuals above 65 who start vaccinating
against inuenza continue to do so in the next year.
19Note that the overall vaccination rate of 19% is well below the rate where marginal benets of
additional vaccination coverage tend to zero. Using Canadian data of 1996-2006 on a similar vaccination
program as that in place in the Netherlands, that was expanded to the full population , Ward (2014)
estimates that the point of zero marginal benets is reached when the overall vaccination rate is around
33%
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3.2.3 Validity of the age-based RD design
RD designs based on discontinuities in age have the advantage that age cannot be manip-
ulated, but are therefore di¤erent from most other RD designs since everyone eventually
crosses the age threshold. Lee and Lemieux (2010) mention three potential concerns.
First, one must consider the possibility that the age of interest is causing eligibility for
potentially many other programs, which could a¤ect the outcome(ibidem, cit, p. 346).
Second, the e¤ect on the outcome must be immediate; and lastly, as individuals approach
the age threshold, they should not anticipate program eligibility (i.e. crossing the age
threshold) and change their behavior. The second and third concern should be small
since inuenza vaccination is protective after about 2 weeks, and needs to be taken yearly
to guarantee e¤ectiveness, implying that anticipating or postponing behavior is not useful.
The age eligibility criteria for the free inuenza vaccination program in the Netherlands
counteracts the rst concern.
The program eligible age (being over-65) is computed on May 1st, at the end of an
inuenza season, and determines whether an individual will receive an invitation in Sep-
tember/October of the preceding year. For example, for the inuenza season of 1998-1999,
eligibility for the program is evaluated based on whether one will be 65 years or over on
May 1st, 1999; and determines whether an individual receives a personal invitation in
September/October 1998 at the start of the inuenza season and a free u shot between
October and December 1998. Therefore, each year, more or less 7 out of 12 of the newly
invited individuals are 64 years old at the start of the inuenza season.20 This feature of
the vaccination program removes the concern that eligibility for other benets that start
on the day one turns 65 in the Netherlands (e.g. pension claims, benets for the elderly),
interferes with eligibility for inuenza vaccination as the start of eligibility only coincides
for those that turn 65 on May 1st. In section 3.4.4 we provide additional checks of the
internal validity of our RD design.
3.2.4 Relation of the identication strategy to existing research
We exploit an age discontinuity to learn about spillover e¤ects from parents to their
adult children in the context of inuenza vaccinations. Our identication strategy is
reminiscent to other studies that exploit age discontinuities in di¤erent contexts, including
20For example, for the inuenza season 1998-1999, all individuals that turn 65 between May 2nd 1998
and May 1st 1999 are newly invited. Hence, all those that turn 65 between May 2nd 1998 and the day
they receive the invitation for the inuenza vaccination (late September/early October) are 65, while all
other newly invited are 64 when they receive the invitation.
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moral hazard e¤ects of social assistance (Lemieux and Milligan, 2008), the retirement
consumption puzzle (Battestin et al., 2008), retirement and home production (Stancanelli
and Van Soest, 2012), health care use (Card et al., 2008), and mortality (Card et al.,
2009; Carpenter and Dobkin, 2009).
At the same time, we must also overcome the typical challenges faced when studying
spillover e¤ects and social interactions (see also section 3.2.1). Early research estimated
social interaction e¤ects by linking individual propensity to behave in a particular way to
the average behavior in a social group, mostly dened by the researcher based on ethnicity
or geographic proximity. It has been criticized for not overcoming biases due to reverse
causality, omitted variables and endogenous group membership.21 Others have used in-
formation on existing social groups rather than dening a potential social network. More
precise information provides better prospects to control for individual and group char-
acteristics and reduces bias due to correlated unobservables22, but the approach cannot
generally address selection issues (Cohen-Cole & Fletcher, 2008b).23 More recent identi-
cation strategies rely on random variation to address self-selection and other identication
threats. Randomized group assignment has been used by Carrell et al. (2011) who an-
alyze tness outcomes among students at the US Air Force academy who are randomly
assigned to squadrons. Other examples use rst year college students who are randomly
assigned a roommate and may inuence each others lifestyle choices (e.g. Duncan et al.,
2005; Yakusheva et al., 2011; Kremer & Levy (2008). While much can be learned from
its design, the problem with this type of research is that social groups are sometimes
created articially and it is di¢ cult to establish whether estimates are specic to the
created situation or capture adequately social interaction e¤ects present in the real world.
Estimates obtained from randomized treatment assignment in naturally occurring social
groups are therefore potentially more convincing. This approach has been successfully ap-
21The inclusion of controls (individual and group-level characteristics and xed e¤ects) can reduce
the biases, but cannot generally guarantee these biases are satisfactorily addressed. Important examples
of this early approach in the health domain are Aizer & Currie (2004) who analyse social interactions
in publicly funded prenatal care and delivery services use within ethnic groups; and Deri (2005) who
presents evidence of peer e¤ects in health service utilization in Canada. There is also a related approach
that studies social multipliers, which eliminates the concerns for reverse causality, but not necessarily
the other endogeneity concerns. Health-related applications of this approach are Auld (2011) on social
interaction e¤ects in body weight, Gray (2013) for breast cancer prevention and Apouey & Picone (2014)
for malaria preventive behaviour.
22Panel data is often used to overcome reverse causality.
23There are several examples in the health domain. Christakis and Fowler (2007, 2008) study obesity
and smoking, and Rosenquist et al. (2010) study alcohol consumption. Several studies used Add Health
Data which is particularly suited to analyze how social contexts a¤ect adolescentshealth and risk-taking
behaviors (e.g. Trogdon et al., 2008; Cohen-Cole & Fletcher, 2008a; Halliday & Kwak, 2009; Fletcher,
2010-2012; Card & Giuliano, 2013).
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plied in developing countries. Kremer & Miguel (2007) analyze social interaction e¤ects
in the usage of deworming drugs in Kenya using information on household social links
and by exploiting a random assignment of schools to the intervention. Oster & Thornton
(2012) look at the role of social interactions in the usage of menstrual cups in Nepal in
a school environment, and Bouckaert (2014) studies the participation in preventive care
exploiting the introduction of the PROGRESA social welfare program in Mexico. Rao et
al. (2012) is a rare example where social interactions in health care usage are estimated
in the developed world. They study vaccination decisions among US students by using
random variation in the ease with which students have access to vaccination locations.
Methodologically, the approach of Dahl et al. (2014) is closest to our work in that it
combines an RD design for randomized treatment assignment in combination with an ex-
ogenously determined social group. The authors exploit a discontinuity in the Norwegian
parental leave system to estimate peer e¤ects in parental leave take-up within workplace
and family networks.
3.2.5 Empirical models
We exploit an age-triggered discontinuity in the costs of inuenza vaccination among
individuals aged 65 or above and analyze the inuence on vaccination rates among their
adult children : all individuals above the age threshold are personally invited by their GP
to receive inuenza vaccination free of charge, while individuals below the age threshold
have to pay and put in more e¤ort to receive inuenza vaccination. The main idea is that
the treatment of parents, the invitation letter and the free vaccination, might inuence
vaccination behavior of their adult children
V ci = 
c + cV pi + "
c
i (3.1)
where vaccination participation V ci of child i is related to their parents vaccination be-
havior V pi and unobservable variables "
c
i .
24 In our fuzzy RD setting, the participation
behavior of the parent can be written as:
V pi = 
p + gp(agepi   t) + hp(agepi   t)T pi + pT pi + "pi (3.2)
24For notational simplicity, we do not include observable characteristics.
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where the age threshold is denoted by t, T pi is a treatment dummy that equals one
if agepi  t, and gp(:) and hp(:) are unknown functional forms.25 The jump in parents
vaccination rates at the threshold is captured by p which measures the divergence in be-
havior between rst-year-treated individuals and nearly treated individuals. It represents
the combined e¤ect of the invitation letter and the free u shot on the vaccination behav-
ior of the parents. Equation (3.1)-(3.2) show that reverse causality is broken since T pi is
included in the parents equation, but not in the childs equation. Plugging equation (3.2)
into equation (3.1) gives the reduced form of equation (3.1) and relates the treatment of
the parent T pi directly to the childs take-up of u shots:
V ci = 
c + c [p + gp(agepi   t) + hp(agepi   t)T pi + pT pi + "pi ] + "ci (3.3)
Equation (3.3) reveals that omitted variables bias is eliminated since treatment T pi is
not correlated with unobserved parent and child characteristics as treatment is quasi-
random.26 Equation (3.3) can be further simplied to:
V ci = 
c + gc(agepi   t) + hc(agepi   t)T pi + cT pi + ci (3.4)
where c is the treatment spillover of the parents treatment on the childs vaccinating
behavior. We use equations (3.2) and (3.4) in the empirical part, and not equation (3.1),
since we do not observe the vaccination take-up of parents and children in the same dataset
(see section 3.3). It follows that our estimates provide intentions to treat(ITT).27
We also analyze the e¤ect of the vaccination policy at age 65 on two additional sets
of outcomes: (1) parental mortality, morbidity and medical care use; and (2) mortality,
morbidity, medical care use and sickness absence among their adult children. For exam-
ple, in case of the direct policy e¤ects on parental mortality, this can be represented by
equation (3.2), the rst stage, and equation (3.5) which shows how parental vaccination
behavior impacts upon parental mortality (Mpi ):
25For small windows, a linear specication is a good approximation for gp(:) and hp(:), polynomials (or
local linear regressions) are preferred for larger windows.
26For example, potential worries about bias due to shared family genes and habits do not apply in this
setting.
27The 2SLS system dened by equations (3.1) and (3.2) is exactly identied with parents treatment
instrumenting for vaccination take-up. Hence, if information on parents and childs inuenza immuniza-
tion were available in the same data, we would be able to compute the social interaction e¤ect (c) as
the ratio of the reduced form coe¢ cient c, and the rst stage treatment coe¢ cient p (Lee & Lemieux,
2010). In absence of that information, Angrist and Krueger (1992) showed that a 2SLS regression can also
be consistently estimated on two separate data sets (termed Two Sample IV (TSIV) or Two Sample 2SLS
(TS2SLS)), under the premise that the two samples are drawn from the same underlying population.
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Mpi = 
po + poV pi + "
po
i (3.5)
While quasi-random variation in invitations for free u shots was su¢ cient to guarantee
identication of equation (3.1), equation (3.5) requires the additional 2SLS assumption
that parental treatment should only a¤ect parental mortality via parental inuenza vac-
cination. This seems an unrealistically strong assumption, since vaccination behavior of
the parents might a¤ect vaccination behavior of their children, and hence might a¤ect the
probability that the parents get inuenza, and die from it.28 ;29 The same problem occurs
when one consider spillover e¤ects among the children on the other outcomes. Also here
we need to assume that parental vaccination does not directly inuence the outcome of the
child. For these reasons, we present ITT estimates for the e¤ects on the other outcomes
of the children and the parents. These ITT can be interpreted in a causal way but for the
e¤ect of vaccination behavior of both children and parents combined.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Data Sources
Our analysis uses linked survey and administrative data from Statistics Netherlands that
can be merged at the individual level using unique individual identiers.
Our main data source is the annual cross-sectional health interview survey (HIS) 1997-
2008, that is part of a more general household survey (POLS). The HIS samples constitute
a representative cross-section of the non-institutionalized Dutch population.30 A wave
includes around 10,000 respondents.31 We have extensive information on health, demo-
graphic and socioeconomic characteristics. The most crucial indicators for our purposes
are the individuals date of birth and vaccination history. In the analysis that considers
the impact of parental age on parental vaccination (and other outcomes), date of birth is
28A partial way out would be to estimate equation (3.5) on the subset of parents whose children do
not vaccinate, and the subset of parents whose children do vaccinate. This is not feasible with our data.
29We mentioned in the introduction that our approach conditions on herd immunity (Ward, 2014).
This is not in contrast with what we write here. Our identication strategy accounts for herd immunity
since parents just below/above the age threshold face the same herd immunity. However, here we consider
the possibility of within-family externalities and these are not addressed by our RD approach.
30A multistage cluster sampling design was used: First, a number of municipalities are selected within
all regions of the Netherlands (probability of selection is related to the population size). Second, within
each municipality, individuals are selected. The number of selected individuals depends on the size of the
municipality with a minimum per municipality.
31More specically: 10,898 in 1997, 9,323 in 1998, 9,877 in 1999, 9,922 in 2000, 9,676 in 2001, 9,745 in
2002, 9,876 in 2003, 11,117 in 2004, 10,378 in 2005, 9,607 in 2006, 8,741 in 2007, 9,499 in 2008.
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used to construct program age in years, which is used as the running variable in our RD
design. In the analysis on the spillover e¤ects, we derive age of the childfrom date of
birth and use it as a control variable. Vaccination history informs whether the individual
ever had an inuenza vaccination, and reports month and year of the last u shot; but
cannot be readily used since a typical inuenza season does not coincide with the civil
year.
A typical inuenza season in the Netherlands ranges from September to May with an
increased activity between November and March. This period does not coincide with the
wave period, which follows the civil year.32 Since the month in which the questionnaire
was completed is known, we have rearranged the waves into inuenza seasons that start
in September and end in August in the following year. We created a dummy variable
that equals one [zero] if the individual has [not] vaccinated against inuenza during the
inuenza season. However, since most shots are reported to be taken in the period Sep-
tember to January33, individuals interviewed in this period might report not having taken
a u shot, but might still vaccinate in the near future. For this particular group, the
dummy equals one if they received an inuenza vaccination in the past inuenza season,
since this is by far the best predictor for a renewed vaccine take-up (Carman & Mosca,
2011).34
Next to vaccination behavior, we also study the e¤ects of the vaccination program on
a wider set of outcome variables. The HIS informs on the occurrence (yes/no) of u-
like symptoms during the last two months. When the individual answers positively, the
individual is asked whether these u-like symptoms have led to sickness absence (recorded
as a binary variable). Medical care use is summarized with two binary indicators: one
for GP visits during the last two months, and another for visits to the medical specialist
during the last two months. Medicine use is reported as a binary variable during the last
32Survey months are almost uniformly distributed. There is a slight underrepresentation of July and
August, which are the main holiday months.
33More specically, 95% of all reported inuenza shots are reported to be taken in this period, and
86% in October and November, which is the recommended vaccination period. 4.5% in September, 2%
in December and 2% in January.
34Not unexpectedly, this procedure has the biggest e¤ect on individuals surveyed in the month Sep-
tember, but a much smaller e¤ect in October-January. The imputation procedure might create some
measurement error in our dependent variable and warrants scrutiny. For the interview months Septem-
ber to January, the vaccination dummy for the newly invited individuals (i.e. those that are 65 on May
1st) is partly based on their vaccination behavior in the previous year. Given that there is a discontinuity
at 65, one might worry that our imputation leads to an underestimation of the jump. One way to verify
this, is to analyze the discontinuity in vaccination behavior at 65 using only those individuals that were
interviewed between February and August. Our estimates show that the age discontinuity in vaccination
behavior of the parents is slightly larger (0.017 percentage points), but not statistically di¤erent from the
one that is obtained from including the observations for September to January.
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month, separately for prescribed and non-prescribed medicines. Each of these variables
will feature as outcome variable for parents and adult children, except sickness absence
which will only be used for the children.
The HIS also provides us with a set of control variables: gender, highest obtained
educational degree (assembled in four categories), household composition (single person,
couple, household with children, other), number of household members, sector of em-
ployment, existing medical conditions (in order to identify individuals who belong to the
high-risk group based on chronic disorders), and presence of a chronic illness.
We obtain additional information from administrative data of Statistics Netherlands.
These data are needed since we do not observe parental age of the individuals included in
the HIS. We retrieve parental age of all individuals in the HIS from the municipal registries
(GBA), which contain data on all residents of the Netherlands. First, a specic registry
provides information that links children with parents. For almost 75% of our HIS sample,
we observe the parents personal identier.35 The parent identiers can be used to obtain
their date of birth36, gender and nationality. When both parents are alive, we focus on
the oldest parent to estimate equations (3.2) and (3.4). This guarantees that no other
parent already qualies for free inuenza vaccination based on age-eligibility, and avoids
that we need to dene our running variable program age separately for fathers and
mothers. Second, for each individual in the HIS and their oldest parent in GBA, we
have an encrypted address location, which can be linked to a neighborhood a small
geographical unit within a municipality , the population density in the neighborhood,
the municipality and any larger geographical division. As vaccination invitation letters
are sent out at the end of September, we x the addresses for each inuenza season on
October 1st. The geographic coordinates of each municipality are known, which allows
to calculate the distance between childrens and parentsmunicipalities of residence.
The administrative data are also needed to study the mortality e¤ects among the
parents, and their adult children. The mortality registry (DO) includes all deaths, the
date of death, and the cause of death, based on the ICD-10 classication. This allows
isolating inuenza-related deaths. However, simply recording inuenza-coded mortality
would lead to an underestimation of the death burden of inuenza, since mortality more
35We only observe parents if they were alive sometime between 1995 and 2010 and lived in the Nether-
lands. The individuals without observed parents are predominantly older individuals and individuals of
foreign origin.
36Similar to the date of birth in the HIS, it is used to construct the parental program age variables,
the running variable.
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frequently results from complications attributable to inuenza than from inuenza itself.
In general, there are two approaches in estimating inuenza-associated mortality: (1)
analyzing cause-coded death notications due to pneumonia and inuenza or even all
respiratory, and circulatory conditions; (2) monitoring all-cause mortality (Nicoll et al.,
2012). We construct four binary indicators reecting whether someone died during the
inuenza season.37 The narrowest denition considers inuenza or pneumonia deaths.
The second category considers diseases of the respiratory system, and the third category
combines diseases of the respiratory and circulatory system. The last considers all-cause
mortality.
3.3.2 Sample restrictions
Since the linked data are rst recorded in 1997, the inuenza season 1996-1997 is only
partly observed, and hence the corresponding observations for 1997 in HIS are dropped.
We pool all waves to provide su¢ cient statistical power to our fuzzy RD design. We use
four combinations of the HIS and the administrative records in our estimations. Two
consider HIS as the main source of information. The rst (parent HIS) does not exploit
the linkage with the administrative records and is used to estimate the e¤ect of the
vaccination policy on vaccination behavior (, medical care use, and medicine consumption)
at age 65. The second (child HIS) does exploit the linkage to parental age in the
administrative data and is used to estimate the spillovers of the policy on the behavior of
the children. The two other datasets are based on the administrative data and are used
to estimate mortality e¤ects.38 Since mortality (and particularly u-related mortality)
are rare events, we do not exploit the linkage with the HIS. This reduces the number of
available controls39, but provides maximum power as every Dutchman is included in the
administrative records. The third dataset (parent admin) is used to estimate mortality
e¤ects at age 65, and the fourth (child admin) exploits the link with parental age to
estimate spillover e¤ects on child mortality.
Parent HISrestricts the pooled HIS cross sections to individuals (i) who have lled
out the question related to vaccination take-up, i.e. 57% of the pooled cross sections40,
37We consider someone dying of a specic cause when the primary or secondary cause of death equals
the specic cause. The primary cause of death is the initial disease. Complications of the initial disease
are secondary causes.
38In the mortality data, we also observe all deaths in 1996, and therefore analyze inuenza seasons
1996/1997 to 2007/2008.
39Note that controls only serve to make RD designs more precise.
40There are three types of non-response: the questions with respect to inuenza vaccination are only
asked to individuals aged 12 years or above; they are surveyed in the written subpart of the HIS, which
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for Child HIS and Parent HIS
Child HIS Parent HIS
Full sample: Program
age 20-51 (irrespective
of oldest parents age)
Sample: oldest
parents program
age 63-66
Sample: oldest
parents program
age 62-67
Sample: program
age 63-66
Sample: program
age 62-67
Sample Characteristics
Vaccination rate 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.24) 0.40 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49)
Vaccination rate (survey month between
February and August)
0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.23) 0.05 (0.23) 0.41 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49)
Inuenza-like symptoms past 2 months
(0=no; 1=yes)
0.45 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50) 0.31 (0.46) 0.32 (0.47)
Non-prescribed medication past month
(0=no; 1=yes)
0.49 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49)
Prescribed medication past month (0=no;
1=yes)
0.31 (0.46) 0.29 (0.45) 0.29 (0.45) 0.65 (0.48) 0.65 (0.48)
Visited GP past 2 months (0=no; 1=yes) 0.32 (0.46) 0.31 (0.46) 0.31 (0.46) 0.42 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49)
Visited medical specialist past 2 months
(0=no; 1=yes)
0.14 (0.35) 0.13 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34) 0.23 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42)
Sickness absence past 2 months (0=no;
1=yes)
0.16 (0.37) 0.17 (0.38) 0.17 (0.38)
Male (0=no; 1=yes) 0.49 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50)
Program age 37.61 (8.05) 35.33 (4.40) 35.24 (4.52) 64.42 (1.11) 64.34 (1.70)
Risk group (0=no; 1=yes) 0.08 (0.28) 0.07 (0.26) 0.07 (0.26) 0.25 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43)
Chronic illness (0=no; 1=yes) 0.27 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44) 0.47 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50)
Education level 1: primary (0=no; 1=yes) 0.08 (0.27) 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.24) 0.23 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42)
Education level 2: lower secondary (0=no;
1=yes)
0.20 (0.40) 0.18 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38) 0.31 (0.46) 0.30 (0.46)
Education level 3: upper secondary
(0=no; 1=yes)
0.42 (0.49) 0.44 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 0.27 (0.44) 0.28 (0.45)
Education level 4: post-secondary (0=no;
1=yes)
0.30 (0.46) 0.32 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47) 0.19 (0.40) 0.19 (0.39)
Number of household members 3.05 (1.32) 3.13 (1.29) 3.10 (1.30) 1.89 (0.57) 1.89 (0.57)
Family type: single person (0=no; 1=yes) 0.13 (0.34) 0.12 (0.33) 0.13 (0.34) 0.19 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40)
Family type: couple (0=no; 1=yes) 0.22 (0.42) 0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.72 (0.45) 0.72 (0.45)
Family type: household with children
(0=no; 1=yes)
0.63 (0.48) 0.67 (0.47) 0.66 (0.47) 0.07 (0.26) 0.08 (0.27)
Family type: other (0=no; 1=yes) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10)
Population density: below 500
inhabitants/km2 (0=no; 1=yes)
0.14 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35) 0.15 (0.36) 0.15 (0.36)
Population density: between 500 and 2500
inhabitants/km2 (0=no; 1=yes)
0.68 (0.47) 0.68 (0.46) 0.68 (0.47) 0.70 (0.46) 0.70 (0.46)
Population density: above 2500
inhabitants/km2 (0=no;1=yes)
0.18 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38) 0.15 (0.36) 0.15 (0.36)
Employment sector: health care provision
(0=no; 1=yes)
0.13 (0.34) 0.13 (0.33) 0.13 (0.34)
Oldest parent male (0=no; 1=yes) 0.57 (0.50) 0.61 (0.49) 0.62 (0.49)
Oldest parents program age 67.24 (9.81) 64.48 (1.11) 64.45 (1.72)
Distance children parents (in km) 24.03 (41.45) 23.91 (41.48) 24.41 (41.23)
N 33,852 3,112 4,720 3,183 4,792
Note: we report the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses)
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for Child Admin and Parent Admin
Child Admin Parent Admin
Full sample: Program
age 20-51 (irrespective
of oldest parents age)
Sample: oldest
parents program
age 63-66
Sample: oldest
parents program
age 62-67
Sample: program
age 63-66
Sample: program
age 62-67
Sample Characteristics
Male (0=no; 1=yes) 0.51 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50)
Program age 34.74 (5.38) 34.57 (5.25) 34.49 (5.23) 64.46 (1.12) 64.41 (1.71)
Mortality: pneumonia and inuenza (Dec-
June)
0.00002 (0.006) 0.00002 (0.006) 0.00002 (0.006) 0.0005 (0.022) 0.0005 (0.022)
Mortality: respiratory diseases (Dec-
June)
0.00004 (0.007) 0.00004 (0.007) 0.00004 (0.007) 0.0011 (0.033) 0.0011 (0.034)
Mortality: respiratory and circulatory dis-
eases (Dec-June)
0.00013 (0.012) 0.00013 (0.012) 0.00013 (0.012) 0.0033 (0.058) 0.0034 (0.058)
Mortality: all-cause mortality (Dec-June) 0.00046 (0.028) 0.00045 (0.027) 0.00046 (0.028) 0.0070 (0.083) 0.0070 (0.084)
Oldest parent male (0=no; 1=yes) 0.71 (0.45) 0.72 (0.45) 0.71 (0.45)
Oldest parents program age 64.48 (2.89) 64.50 (1.12) 64.50 (1.32)
N 23,330,790 9,320,945 14,009,238 7,163,278 10,779,851
Note: we report the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses)
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and (ii) who fall within a specied window around the 65-age threshold. In Child HIS,
the windows apply to the oldest parents program age. It additionally restricts to those in-
dividuals whose parents are alive and credibly identied from the administrative records41,
i.e. almost 75% of the remaining sample. Parent adminand child adminare derived
from the pooled administrative records of all Dutchmen, and no additional data selection
criteria are used, except that respectively own age and parental age should fall within the
windows. For all analyses, we selected two windows: a window of +/- 2 years around
the age threshold, based on the criterion by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), and a
window of +/- 3 years around the age threshold in order to increase the statistical power
and precision in the estimation of vaccination behavior and health outcomes of adult
children.42
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the di¤erent datasets. The HIS samples
are shown in panel A and the administrative datasets in panel B. We nd very little, if
any, di¤erence between the narrow and broad window.
Columns 2 to 4 in panel A show the average characteristics of the adult children with
parents whose age falls within the specied parental age windows as well as the average
characteristics of all individuals between 20 and 51 in our sample (i.e. the observed
minimum and maximum age when the parents age is restricted to di¤er between 15 and
45 years with the childs age). Vaccination rates show that we study a subpopulation with
a below average vaccination coverage (see also Figure 3.1). Only 6% of the individuals
in our sample has been vaccinated during the current inuenza season. Almost 50% has
su¤ered from inuenza-like symptoms in the past 2 months, resulting in sickness absence
for 17% of the individuals. GP visits and usage of prescription medicines is around 30%.
About half of the individuals in our restricted samples are male and about two thirds
live in a household with children. A quarter of the sample su¤ers from a chronic illness
and 7% belongs to the high-risk group, who qualies for free inuenza vaccination based
on existing disorders. The oldest parent is more likely to be male and the parents age
prole is almost perfectly centred around the age threshold. Individuals tend to live close
has a lower response rate; and some individuals chose not to answer the question.
41If the di¤erence between a childs and a parents age falls below 15 years or exceeds 45 years, the
observations are considered as outliers and excluded from the analysis. The restriction is binding for less
than 0.5% of the individuals with parents.
42Power analysis shows for example that we need more than 5000 observation to detect signicant
di¤erences in average vaccination behavior of adult children at both sides of the cut-o¤ with power 80%
and type I error of 5%. Limiting the bandwidth to +/- 2 years around the age threshold provides a
sample of 3112 individuals, increasing the bandwidth with 1 additional year at each side increases the
sample to 4720 observations. The power of a test is the probability to correctly reject the null hypothesis
when the null hypothesis is false.
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to their parents, with on average 24 km distance between the municipalities of residence.
In fact, 55% of our sample lives in the same municipality as their parents.
If we compare the characteristics of the individuals in the age window restricted samples
and those in the general sample of individuals of the same age, we conclude that they are
very similar, except perhaps for parents age. This is again reassuring with respect to our
sampling strategy.
Columns 5 and 6 in panel A show the average characteristics of the individuals in
parent HIS. Around 40% of the individuals around the 65-age threshold has been
vaccinated during the current inuenza season, and this rate is only marginally higher for
those surveyed between February and August.43 Around 30% of the individuals su¤ered
from inuenza-like symptoms in the past 2 months, a smaller fraction than the one in the
Child HIS. Consultations of the GP and the medical specialists, on the other hand, are
more frequent with visit rates of 42% and 23%, respectively. Moreover, about two thirds
of the elderly has used prescription medicines in the past month. About three quarters of
the individuals live in a couple, and only 7% has cohabiting children. About half of the
sample su¤ers from a chronic illness and one quarter belongs to the high-risk group, who
qualies for free inuenza vaccination based on existing disorders.
Figure 3.3: Inuenza vaccination rate of individuals around the 65-age threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is the
individuals program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average inuenza
vaccination rate, grouped in yearly bins based on program age. The solid line shows a linear trend based
on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence intervals. The vertical line represents
the age threshold.
43See also footnote 34.
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Panel B in Table 3.1 provides average characteristics of the administrative datasets used
to analyze mortality e¤ects. Both the child and parent sample are balanced with respect
to gender. We consider mortality between December and June (see below). Amongst
adult children, mortality rates are 2, 4, 13 and 45 deaths per 100,000 individuals, re-
spectively for pneumonia and inuenza, respiratory diseases, respiratory and circulatory
diseases combined and all-cause mortality. Amongst individuals around the age threshold,
mortality rates are higher, respectively at 5, 11, 33 and 70 deaths per 100,000 individuals.
Table 3.2: RD estimates of policy e¤ects at the 65-age threshold
+/- 2 years window around +/- 3 years window around
the age threshold the age threshold
Policy e¤ect (p) 0.168*** 0.184***
Standard error (0.035) (0.026)
N 3183 4792
Notes: See text and Section 3.2 for details on the RD set-up. Pooled data of the inuenza seasons
1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. We use linear trends in program age that can di¤er at each side of
the cuto¤. Control variables include dummies for gender, member of risk group based on existing
disorders, population density, chronic illness, education level, number of household members,
family type, inuenza season (see also Table 3.1). OLS regression estimates are reported that use
sample weights and cluster standard errors at the wave-municipality level to mimic the sample design.
Signicance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
3.4 Results: Direct and spillover e¤ects of the Dutch
inuenza vaccination policy
3.4.1 Direct policy e¤ect: vaccination at age 65
A major advantage of an RD design is that the magnitude of the e¤ects can easily be
visualized using graphical methods. Figure 3.2 suggest an age discontinuity in vaccination
take-up at age 65, but this is more clearly visible from Figure 3.3 which shows inuenza
vaccination take-up in a +/- 3 year window surrounding the 65-age threshold. Yearly bins
are used (see also section 3.3.1). The Appendix provides additional graphs with a larger
window, smaller bins and quadratic trends (Figures 3.5 to 3.7).
Figure 3.3 reveals a clear discontinuity at the age threshold of about 18 percentage
points in the vaccination rate. This is an important policy e¤ect implying a direct increase
in take-up at the threshold from about 30% to 50% after receiving a personal invitation for
a free inuenza vaccination. There is an increasing trend on both sides of the threshold,
but the increase in vaccination rates is steeper among age-eligible individuals. Carman &
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Mosca (2011) suggest that this is due to a further inux into the immunization program
and a negligible drop-out rate. Table 3.2 shows regression estimates of the magnitude
of the policy e¤ect at age 65, denoted p in equation (3.2).44 The estimates indicate a
similar, and highly signicant, increase in inuenza vaccination rates for the +/- 3 year
window. The smaller window leads to a slightly lower point estimate. It is reassuring that
the jump in the RD graph does not change after adding a large set of control variables.
3.4.2 Spillover e¤ect: vaccination among adult children
Having established the presence of a policy e¤ect in the previous subsection, we now
turn to the spillover e¤ects on the vaccination behavior of the adult children which are
presented in Figure 3.4. Take-up rates to the right [left] of the age threshold are from
adult children whose oldest parent does [not] qualify for free inuenza vaccination based
on age. A negative discontinuity of around 4 percentage points at the cuto¤ is observed.
This is an important decline in relative terms from around 9% to 5%. Not only do we
observe a jump at the age threshold, also the increasing slope in vaccination uptake before
the age threshold has diminished. The Appendix provides additional graphs with a larger
window, smaller bins and quadratic trends (Figures 3.8 to 3.10).
Figure 3.4: Inuenza vaccination rate of children
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is
the parents program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average inuenza
vaccination rate of adult children, grouped in yearly bins based on the oldest parents program age. The
solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence
intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
44Marginal e¤ects obtained from a probit specication reveal slightly larger point estimates: 0.183
[0.197] for the +/- 2 [3] year window.
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Table 3.3: RD estimates for spillover e¤ects of parents on children at the age threshold
+/- 2 years window around +/- 3 years window around
the age threshold the age threshold
Treatment spillover e¤ect (c) -0.040* -0.037**
Standard error (0.022) (0.016)
N 3112 4720
Notes: See text and Section 3.2 for details on the RD set-up. Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008
are used. We use linear trends in program age that can di¤er at each side of the cuto¤. Control variables include
dummies for gender, member of risk group based on existing disorders, population density, chronic illness, education level,
number of household members, family type, inuenza season (see also Table 3.1). There are separate dummies for child
gender and the oldest parents gender, and there is a child age dummy for every age. OLS regression estimates are
reported that use sample weights and cluster standard errors at the wave-municipality level to mimic the sample design.
Signicance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
The reduced form estimates of the spillover e¤ects in equation (3.4) are shown in Table
3.3. We conclude that the RD estimate of a childs decision to vaccinate against inuenza
at the 65-age threshold of the oldest parents program age is -4 percentage points in a 2
year window and -3.7 percentage points in a 3 year window.45 The estimate is signicant
at a 10% signicance level using the smaller window and precision increases as more
observations are used. The regression-based results match the visual discontinuity in
Figure 3.4. Treatment of the parents at program age 65 leads to a decrease in inuenza
vaccination among their adult children.
3.4.3 Further e¤ects
While the free vaccination policy has a large benecial impact on the immunization be-
havior at age 65, and substantial negative spillover e¤ects among the adult children, these
e¤ects are silent about the e¤ects on sickness absence, morbidity, medical care consump-
tion and mortality. Arguably, policy makers are more concerned with these e¤ects, rather
than with the simple and direct e¤ect on vaccination behavior. We study these e¤ects in
this section. The interpretation of the e¤ects however di¤ers from the e¤ects presented in
section 3.4.2. Both the estimates in this section and in section 3.4.2 are ITT estimates,
but the estimates in this section as explained in section 3.2.5 are the result of policy
induced changes in the vaccination behavior of both the parents and their adult children;
and it is not possible to disentangle their separate contributions.
45Marginal e¤ects obtained from probit regressions show similar e¤ects: -0.031 and -0.030 for respec-
tively the smaller and larger window.
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3.4.3.1 Policy e¤ects at age 65
In this section, we consider the impact estimates of the vaccination policy on morbidity,
medicine and medical care use, and mortality at the 65-age threshold. If inuenza vac-
cination a¤ects these outcomes, then it seems only reasonable that the e¤ect size should
be larger during those months that inuenza prevalence is high. We expect little or no
e¤ect in other months since inuenza is an acute infectious disease and potential e¤ects
on morbidity/care/mortality occur in the short run. The estimates in Table 3.4 and the
Appendix Figures 3.12 to 3.28 reect the policy impact during the potential inuenza-
epidemic months of November to May for morbidity and health care usage. Since individ-
uals do not immediately die from inuenza(-related complications), but usually within a
month, we consider the period December to June for the mortality indicators. In case of
the mortality indicators, the estimates exactly correspond to mortality during the months
December-June, but the other dependent variables have recall periods of 1 to 2 months.
We use January to June for inuenza-like symptoms and GP/specialist visits which have
a 2 month recall period; and December to June for medicine use which has a 1 month
recall. While subdivision into epidemic and non-epidemic periods makes a lot of sense,
it runs the danger of losing precision in the estimates due to insu¢ ciently large sample
sizes (except for mortality where we use the administrative data which covers the entire
Dutch population). Table 3.4 shows that, despite this potential worry, several e¤ects are
estimated with high precision.46
The estimates in column 2 of Table 3.4 show that those receiving an invitation for a
free inuenza vaccination show an almost 14 percentage points reduction in the use of
prescribed medicines and GP visits, and a reduction of 0.8/100,000 deaths due to pneu-
monia and inuenza and 1.1 out of 100,000 due to respiratory diseases. The estimates also
reveal 1.7 out of 100,000 averted deaths due to respiratory and circulatory diseases, but
this e¤ect is estimated with less precision.47 At the same time, we observe no signicant
(and much smaller) e¤ects on inuenza-like symptoms, non-prescribed medication, visits
46We have also estimated 132 separate models for the 4 mortality indicators for each month-year com-
bination, i.e. 11 inuenza seasons times 12 months. This has the advantage that it allows comparing
the estimated month-year-specic e¤ect sizes with month-year-specic inuenza incidence rates obtained
from inuenza surveillance data (Donker, 2010). Moreover, as shown by Ward (2014), inuenza vacci-
nation will only adequately work when the match between the prevailing inuenza viruses and the virus
strains used in the inuenza vaccine is good, which is only revealed ex-post. Hence, one expects large
e¤ect sizes of inuenza vaccination in months with a high inuenza prevalence and a good match of the
vaccine, and smaller or no e¤ects in the other months. Our results, available on request, show very noisy
patterns over the months-years. This suggests that, despite using administrative data which covers the
entire Dutch population, there is insu¢ cient variation across months/years at the age threshold.
47The RD design deals with issues of selective mortality (or survivor bias) by nature.
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to medical specialists, and all-cause mortality. Estimates obtained from a +/- 3 year
window show smaller and slightly less precisely estimated e¤ect sizes, but the same gen-
eral picture emerges (see Appendix Table 3.8). Estimates obtained from identical models
on the non-epidemic period reveal much smaller and mostly insignicant e¤ect sizes.48 ;49
The story that seems to emerge from these results suggests that the impact of the free
vaccination policy on inuenza-like symptoms is limited at age 65, but that the more
serious consequences of inuenza infection, i.e. GP visits and mortality, are averted. The
contrast between the results for prescribed and non-prescribed, and GP and medical spe-
cialist visits are in line with this interpretation. For medicines, the interpretation of the
di¤erent e¤ects is relatively straightforward as individuals can only consume prescribed
medicines after having visited a GP.50 The insignicant and much smaller e¤ect size of
visits to the medical specialist (as compared to GP visits) is in line with the acute nature
of an inuenza infection.
3.4.3.2 Spillover e¤ects among adult children
The third column in Table 3.4 shows the impact estimates on the same set of outcomes and
inuenza-related sickness absence51 during the inuenza-epidemic months for the children
with parents at the 65-age threshold. We nd relatively large e¤ect sizes for inuenza-
like symptoms (7 to 10 percentage points) and sickness absence (7.5 percentage points),
but for sickness absence the e¤ect turns only signicant in the +/- 3 year window (see
Appendix Table 3.8). All other estimated e¤ect sizes are insignicant. When compar-
48For inuenza-like symptoms, medication use and medical care use, all estimated e¤ects are (positive
and) non signicant for the 3 year window. A similar pattern emerges for the 2 year window, but here GP
visits and visits to the medical specialist are signicant at respectively the 5 and 10% signicance level.
More importantly, we nd that the di¤erence between the coe¢ cients in the epidemic and non-epidemic
periods is statistically signicant for GP visits and prescribed medicines at the 5% level in both windows
and amounts to round respectively 40 and 30 percentage points. The other coe¢ cient di¤erences are
not statistically signicant. For the mortality indicators, we did not estimate separate models for the
non-epidemic period, but rather estimated models on the full inuenza season (i.e. from September to
August). We do this because it is unclear how to classify individuals that survive the rst months of the
non-epidemic period (September-November), but who die in the last months of the non-epidemic period
(July-August). This problem does not occur for the indicators derived from HIS, because we only observe
individuals who are alive in HIS. Estimates derived from the full September-August inuenza season only
show (positive) signicant e¤ects for all-cause mortality conrming that inuenza vaccination protects
against inuenza related deaths during the epidemic period only.
49We also nd, not unexpectedly, that all 4 mortality indicators decline over time. In addition, we nd
higher mortality rates during the inuenza seasons of 1999/2000 and 2004/2005, which had much higher
than average levels of inuenza prevalence.
50It could also be that the insignicance of the non-prescribed medicines reects that medicines for
inuenza-like symptoms only constitute a minor share of all consumed non-prescribed medicines, but this
cannot be checked with our data.
51We consider the survey months January to June for sickness absence, since the question refers to the
last two months.
118
3.4 Results: Direct and spillover e¤ects of the Dutch inuenza vaccination policy
Table 3.4: RD estimates for other outcomes on parents and children during the inuenza
epidemic period (in a +/- 2 year window)
Parents Children
Inuenza-like symptoms 0.004 0.109
(0.071) (0.070)
Non-prescribed medication -0.071 -0.048
(0.050) (0.045)
Prescribed medication -0.139 -0.009
(0.044)*** (0.040)
GP visits -0.137 -0.029
(0.056)** (0.041)
Visits to medical specialist -0.014 0.038
(0.047) (0.046)
Sickness absence 0.071
(0.048)
Mortality: pneumonia and inuenza -0.000082 0.000005
(0.000038)** (0.000006)
Mortality: respiratory diseases -0.000113 0.000008
(0.000059)* (0.000009)
Mortality: respiratory and circulatory diseases -0.000171 0.000006
(0.000102)* (0.000017)
Mortality: all-cause mortality -0.000008 -0.000010
(0.000148) (0.000034)
Notes: See text and Section 3.2 for details on the RD set-up. We use linear trends in program age that can di¤er
at each side of the cuto¤. Control variables include dummies for gender, member of risk group based on existing
disorders, population density, chronic illness, education level, number of household members, family type and
inuenza season for outcomes 1 to 6. Control variables for mortality include gender and inuenza season. In
addition all regressions for children include dummies for childrens program age per year and parents gender.
Standard errors between brackets. Regression estimates with HIS use sample weights and cluster standard errors
at the wave-municipality level to mimic the sample design. Regressions on administrative data apply robust
standard errors. The inuenza epidemic period is dened as November-May: (a) inuenza-like symptoms, sickness
absence and GP/specialist visits refer to the last two months, so the survey months January to June are
considered; (b) medicine use refers to the last month, so the survey months December to June are used; and
(c) mortality refers to the actual months December-June since most inuenza-related deaths occur within one
month of the original infection. Signicance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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ing the estimates for the epidemic months with those of the non-epidemic months, we
nd that inuenza-like symptoms and sickness absence are statistically signicantly (at
the 5% level) higher in the epidemic periods.52 All other coe¢ cient di¤erences between
epidemic and non-epidemic periods are not signicant. These ndings suggest that the
free vaccination program at age 65 has important spillover e¤ects beyond the vaccina-
tion behavior of the adult children: there seems to be little or no impact on medicine use,
medical care visits and inuenza-related mortality, but there is a very substantial increase
of inuenza-like symptoms and sickness absence.53 The nding that there is no e¤ect on
GP visits, despite the increase in symptoms and sickness absence, is in line with the low
mean number of GP visits in the Netherlands compared to other OECD countries (Van
Doorslaer et al., 2006).54
3.4.4 Robustness analysis: Internal validity of our ndings
The estimates presented in sections 3.4.1-3.4.3 represent intentions to treat(ITT). These
ITTs are internally valid when the assumption of independence, which means that treat-
ment is random, is satised. In our RD setting, this implies that the only discontinuous
change within a small window around the 65-age threshold is the change in vaccination
policy. As mentioned in section 3.2.3, there is little a priori reason to believe this as-
sumption does not hold: age cannot be manipulated; anticipation makes little sense as
inuenza vaccination needs to be taken yearly to be protective; and potential interference
with age-triggered eligibility for other programs (such as pension benets) should be lim-
ited, since eligibility for free inuenza vaccination is determined by being 65 or older on
May 1st.
We have done several tests that conrm the independence assumption. First, there
should be no discontinuous di¤erences between the characteristics of individuals just below
and above the age threshold. We ran RD models with the child and parental control
covariates) as the dependent variables. Appendix Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show that none
of the RD estimates of the child covariates is signicantly di¤erent from zero. A similar
picture emerges for the parents sample, with the exception of family type (couple versus
single) and population density of the place of residence which turn signicant at the 5%
52The coe¢ cients are respecively 15 and 19 percentage points higher in the epidemic versus non-
epidemic periods.
53We also estimated month-year specic models, but the resulting estimates, which are available on
request, reveal even noisier patterns compared to those for the parents at the 65-age threshold;
54In addition, employers do not require a GP to conrm sick leave, a practice that is compulsory in
several European countries.
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and 10% level, respectively. The corresponding RD graphs, which are available on request,
nevertheless suggest that the unbalancedness of family type and population density around
the 65-age threshold vanish for larger windows. In addition, controlling (or not) for family
type and population density do not strongly a¤ect the estimated treatment e¤ects in
Tables 3.2-3.4 (see also discussion and Table 3.5 below). We conclude that covariates in
the parents sample are reasonably balanced around the 65-age threshold. We did not
check balancedness of covariates in the parents and child administrative samples as the
covariates are limited to gender (and child age in the child sample) which we do not expect
to be unbalanced around the age threshold.
A second test checks whether the density of age is balanced at both sides of the age
threshold. Again there is no a priori reason to expect a violation in the parents HIS
sample and the administrative datasets, but it could potentially play a role in the child
HIS dataset when parental age at time of the childs birth is systematically related to a
childs later inuenza decision. A frequency histogram of the density of parental age in the
child sample of HIS is relatively smooth, but shows a slightly lower frequency at the age of
66 (see Appendix Figure 3.11). If this deviation is random, then the estimates presented
in sections 3.4.2-3.4.3.2 are valid, but unfortunately this is untestable. Instead, we can
calculate bounds on the RD estimates in Figures 3.3-3.4 and Tables 3.2-3.4 assuming that
all missingindividuals with parents of 66 are compliers or non-compliers. In practice, we
weigh the compliers or the non-compliers in the RD estimation procedure such that the
frequency of individuals with parents of 66 becomes identical to the average frequency
of the other age groups in Appendix Figure 3.11. Despite the fact that some of these
hypothetical states are very unrealistic55, the derived bounds are very small and zero is
never included in these bounds, essentially meaning that our estimates pass this test.
We have also tested the sensitivity of the estimates to the assumptions imposed to
capture the trends in the outcome variables, i.e. the choice of parametric form and the
window size. In Appendix Table 3.11, the window size around the age threshold is varied
for the models of vaccination take-up with linear trends in program age. We conclude
that the estimates are relatively stable (in particular the ones for the spillover e¤ects onto
the children) for di¤erent window specications, but the direct policy e¤ects at age 65
are larger for wider windows, and the opposite trend is observed for the negative spillover
e¤ects among the adult children. Table 3.5 (row quadratic trends) reveals the impact
55In particular, when the compliers or the non-compliers constitute a very small group of the individuals
in the sample with parents aged 66.
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Table 3.5: Robustness checks in a +/- 3 year window around 65-age-threshold
Parents Children
Baseline e¤ect 0.184*** -0.037**
(0.026) (0.016)
No controls 0.179*** -0.046***
(0.026) (0.016)
Region-time xed e¤ects 0.185*** -0.036**
(0.026) (0.016)
Clustering at program age 0.184*** -0.037**
(0.027) (0.013)
Quadratic trend 0.158** -0.042
(0.062) (0.040)
Notes: See text and Section 3.2 for details on the RD set-up. Unless otherwise specied, we
use linear trends in program age that can di¤er at each side of the cuto¤. Control variables
include dummies for gender, member of risk group based on existing disorders, population
density,chronic illness, education level, number of household members, family type,
inuenza season. In addition the analysis for adult children includes dummies for childrens
program age per year and parents gender. OLS regression estimates are reported that use
sample weights and cluster standard errors at the wave-municipality level to mimic the sample
design. Standard errors between parentheses. Signicance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
of experimenting with quadratic trends instead of the linear trends (see also Figures 3.5-
3.10). Note that the small window and the yearly bins do not provide us with many data
points to estimate polynomial trends. Table 3.5 shows that the estimates are not very
much a¤ected by the quadratic trend, but they are less precisely measured. The spillover
e¤ects are no longer signicant at the 10% level.
In addition, Table 3.5 reports alternative specications keeping the +/- 3 year window
xed. The rst row reproduces the baseline results. A rst alternative is to exclude the
control variables from the regression. We however keep the xed e¤ects for the inuenza
season and childrens age in the regression specication, since these variables capture
trends in our pooled cross-section data. Second, we include province xed e¤ects per
inuenza season. There are 12 provinces in the Netherlands with varying population sizes
(ranging between 400,000 to 3,500,000 individuals). The region-time xed e¤ects are a
exible way to capture variation in our data that may originate from e.g. regional GP
medical practices, a di¤erent intensity and spread of previous inuenza seasons across
provinces, regional variation in incidence of other infectious diseases, regional information
campaigns etc. Our results remain una¤ected. Next, we apply a di¤erent clustering of the
standard errors. Up to now, we have allowed the standard errors to be clustered at the
municipality-wave level to mimic the sampling procedure. Alternatively, we can cluster at
the level of the running variable, i.e. the program age of the parents. We observe that the
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standard errors are somewhat larger using the alternative clustering, but the estimates
remain signicant at the 5% level.
Our general conclusion is that the list of tests support the ndings reported in sections
3.4.1-3.4.3. These tests su¢ ce for the internal validity of our results since we only report
ITT estimates, but are uninformative on the channels underlying the treatment e¤ects of
crossing the 65-age threshold. All one can conclude from these tests is that crossing the
65-age threshold has an internally valid causal impact on the dependent variables, but
not that these e¤ects only reect the impact of the free inuenza vaccination policy. A
potential worry is that our estimates are partly driven by age-triggered eligibility for other
programs, such as pensions for which Dutchmen turn eligible at age 65 in the Netherlands.
As explained before, there is little reason to expect an e¤ect since the age eligibility of the
free inuenza vaccination policy does not coincide with the day one turns 65. Moreover,
monetary aspects of being retired might not matter for vaccination take-up since inuenza
vaccination is free; and changes in time costs might be limited since GPs organize exible
hours to receive the inuenza vaccination. Nevertheless, we did run RD models with
being retired as the dependent variable. We dened being retired in a broad sense, i.e.
individuals not working56, to make sure that we consider the monetary and time aspects
of being retired/not working. The resulting RD estimate shows a signicant increase at
the 65-age threshold, but the e¤ect is very small and hence unlikely to be driving the jump
in vaccination take-up at age 65. We also ran RD models of vaccination take-up at age 65
for the subgroup of retired individuals only. The resulting estimates are very similar to,
and not statistically di¤erent from, the estimates in section 3.4.1. In addition, we ran two
types of placebo RD regressions. The rst replaces the dependent variable by indicators
of preventive care use to exclude the possibility that crossing the 65-age threshold makes
one more or less likely to use preventive care. The resulting estimates conrm that our
RD design is not picking up patterns of preventive care use.57 The second type of placebo
RD regressions sticks to vaccination take-up as the dependent variable, but changes the
age threshold to 62 (to make sure that the true cuto¤ of 65 is not in the window). None
of the resulting estimates is signicant.
56The non-working category consists of three broad categories: (1) individuals that are 65 or more;
(2) individuals that are unemployed, full-time students, or not working; and (3) individuals that receive
disability insurance benets or pension benets.
57We ran models for the direct policy e¤ects and the spillover e¤ects with a +/- 2 and 3 year window.
We used the following dependent indicators: (a) having diabetes; (b) exercising at least once a month;
(c) BMI (to capture the combination of physical exercise and food intake); (d) engaging in breast cancer
screening. None of the resulting RD estimates was statistically signicant, except for BMI in the child
sample in the +/- 2 year window which turned signicant at the 10% level (not signicant in the +/- 3
year window).
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3.5 Results: spillover e¤ect channels
In this section, we dig deeper into the spillover e¤ects of the free inuenza vaccination pol-
icy. Section 3.4.2 showed negative spillover e¤ects reducing the vaccination coverage rate
among the adult children from around 9% to 5%, and section 3.4.3.2 conrmed increased
prevalence of inuenza-like symptoms and sickness absence. These e¤ects are substantial,
but it is less clear what channels are causally linking the free inuenza vaccination policy
to reduced vaccination coverage among the adult children. The question of unraveling the
causal link with inuenza-like symptoms and sickness absence is further complicated as
explained in section 3.2.5 by the fact that both parental and child vaccination take-up
might play a role. Since it is impossible to unravel their separate impact without ad-
ditional exogenous variation that drives child vaccination take-up , we limit this section
to the channels leading to reduced vaccination coverage among the children.
This does not mean that the channels underlying vaccination take up among the chil-
dren are easy to uncover. The sensitivity analyses in section 3.4.4 suggest that vaccination
take up among the children is driven by increased vaccination take-up among the parents
at age 65. We believe this is a reasonable explanation (also because the vaccination cost
of the children remains una¤ected by the free vaccination coverage), but our data does
not allow excluding alternative explanations for the negative spillovers.58 For example,
children whose parents where already vaccinating before crossing the age threshold might
have reduced their vaccination take-up. Similarly, children might become more suscepti-
ble to campaigns on inuenza vaccination as soon as their parents have reached the age of
65. These two alternative explanations, in combination with our data limitations, show
that we can at best provide suggestive evidence on the underlying mechanisms.
The negative spillover e¤ect in section 3.4.2 should not be uniform across all individ-
uals, and the estimates in Table 3.3 might conceal heterogeneity in the treatment e¤ect.
Heterogeneity (or the lack thereof) can provide suggestive evidence about the mecha-
nisms/channels at work. Since we do not have direct information on vaccination take-up
of parents in our child sample, we obtain heterogenous treatment e¤ects by estimating
pooled regression models with interactions between childrens characteristics on the one
hand, and the treatment e¤ect and the trends at both sides of the age threshold on the
other hand.
A potential explanation why children forgo immunization when their parents vaccinate
could result from epidemiological externalities within the family. As explained before, this
58This derives from the fact that vaccination behavior of the parents is not included in the child sample.
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Table 3.6: Heterogeneity in negative spillover e¤ect (+/- 3 year window around 65-age
threshold)
Children
Baseline -0.037 (0.016)**
Panel A: Education level
Education level 1: primary -0.183 (0.108)*
Education level 2: lower secondary -0.025 (0.037)
Education level 3: upper secondary -0.039 (0.023)*
Education level 4: post-secondary -0.019 (0.025)
Panel B: Distance with parentsmunicipality of residence
Same municipality -0.049 (0.016)***
Distance 0 to 20 km -0.041 (0.020)**
Distance 20 to 60 km -0.024 (0.024)
Distance 60 km or more -0.006 (0.030)
Panel C: Member of risk group based on existing disorder
Member of risk group -0.129 (0.105)
Not a member of risk group -0.029 (0.014)**
Panel D: Employed as health care worker
Employed as health care worker -0.051 (0.023)**
Not employed as health care worker -0.036 (0.016)**
Panel E: Family type
Single person -0.040 (0.041)
Couple -0.057 (0.035)*
Household with children -0.030 (0.020)
Panel F: Employment
Not employed -0.030 (0.031)
Salaried employment -0.039 (0.016)**
Self-employed -0.037 (0.026)
Notes: See text and Section 3.2 for details on the RD set-up. We use linear trends in program age that
can di¤er at each side of the cuto¤. Control variables include dummies for gender, member of risk group
based on existing disorders, population density, chronic illness, education level, number of household
members, family type, inuenza season, dummies for childrens program age per year and parents gender.
OLS regression estimates are reported that use sample weights and cluster standard errors at the wave-
municipality level to mimic the sample design. Standard errors between parentheses. Signicance level:
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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is di¤erent from the externalities considered by Ward (2014). If this were the case, we
would expect the externalities to be relatively more important for individuals who (i) have
regular physical contact with their parents, (ii) are less likely to be infected from other
sources, and (iii) are less inclined to take up inuenza for other (important) reasons, such
as their own health. While we cannot explicitly test these hypotheses, we can provide
suggestive evidence using proxy variables. Point (i) is addressed in panel B of Table 3.6.
We test the idea that individuals who live close to their parents and therefore potentially
have more physical contact might have a more negative spillover e¤ect. Point (ii) is
dealt with in panels D, E and F. Panel E considers the idea that adult children who
have kids themselves are probably less worried to be infected through contacts with their
parents than through their children, in particular since young children are more important
inuenza transmitters than the elderly (Galvani et al., 2007; Halloran & Longini, 2006).
Panel D and F test the same idea for respectively health care workers who tend to have
regular contact with sick individuals and the work environment which is a likely disease
intermediary. With regard to point (iii), we test in panel C the idea that members
in the high-risk group based on existing disorders are less a¤ected by epidemiological
externalities, since they have a stronger personal incentive to be vaccinated. Overall, our
ndings in Table 3.6 are not very much in favor of the externality explanation. While we
cannot reject that externalities within the family matter, our results suggest that they
play a minor role at most. Only two of the 5 panels show the expected patterns (panel
B and E), and none of the di¤erences in spillover e¤ects within panels are statistically
signicant (not even at the 20% signicance level).
Alternatively, learning about costs related to vaccination could explain our results.
What costs should we think of? The costs are revealed to individuals when their old-
est parent crosses the age threshold, so upon receiving the invitation or related to the
vaccination (procedure) itself. It appears that the costs are less relevant for the par-
ents themselves, since vaccination participation jumps upwards at the cuto¤ and further
increases afterwards.
We conclude from previous studies in the Netherlands that analyze the motivation for
non-vaccination against seasonal or pandemic inuenza, that not being part of the target
group is an important reason not to vaccinate. Using a sample of 4000 Dutch citizens,
Krooneman & Verheij (2003) show that it is the principal reason not to vaccinate for
adults without chronic disease (indicated by 56% of the individuals) and the second most
important reason for individuals that belong to the high-risk group (reported by 23% of
the individuals at risk). The latter is surprising, and indicates that an important share
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Table 3.7: Heterogeneity in treatment e¤ect (+/- 3 year window around 65-age threshold)
Parents Children
Month of birth between November and April 0.141 (0.040)*** -0.054 (0.023)**
Month of birth between May and October 0.198 (0.040)*** -0.027 (0.024)
Notes: See text and Section 3.2 for details on the RD set-up. We use linear trends in program age that can di¤er
at each side of the cuto¤. Control variables include dummies for gender, member of risk group based on
existing disorders, population density, chronic illness, education level, number of household members, family
type, inuenza season for the rst stage and the reduced form. In addition the reduced form includes dummies
for childrens program age per year and parents gender. OLS regression estimates are reported that use sample
weights and cluster standard errors at the wave-municipality level to mimic the sample design. Standard errors
between parentheses. Signicance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
of the individuals at risk might not be fully aware that they are being targeted by the
vaccination program or prefer not to participate. Bults et al. (2010) and van der Weerd et
al. (2011) analyze reasons not to vaccinate against the Mexican u. Van der Weerd et al.
(2011) analyze a nationally representative sample of 8060 individuals contacted in three
phases: the early phase, the pandemic alert phase and the o¢ cial epidemic. They show
that information campaigns reached the general population, with 58% of the individuals
informed in phase 2 and 85% in phase 3.59 Among the reasons to refuse vaccination,
not being part of the high-risk group was the 6th most important reason in phase 2, but
as information coverage increased, it became the second most important reason in phase
3. Bults et al. (2010) also underline the importance of being targeted for vaccination
take-up.
Next, we look at the invitation letters drawn up by the Dutch college of general prac-
titioners that serve as example for the GPs to personally invite the population at risk.60
The last three example invitation letters (of 2009, 2011 and 2012) are obtained.61 The
letters underline that vaccination o¤ers protection against inuenza, that vaccination is
free of charge and provide the following denition of the target group: Individuals aged
60 or more62, and individuals of all ages with heart, lung or renal disease, diabetes or
with immune dysfunctions, are at increased risk to fall seriously ill due to inuenza. You
59Note that Dutch citizens are among the European citizens that put most trust in their national and
regional governments (see Eurobarometer) and attach importance to governmental information on health
issues (van der Weerd et al. (2011), Bults et al. (2010)).
60Note that the GP is not obligated to follow the example invitation letter, and is free to formulate an
alternative invitation letter or not to send out an invitation at all. As we discussed in footnote 17, most
GPs do send out a personal invitation.
61We contacted the Dutch college of general practitioners to obtain all example invitation letters
between 1996 and 2012, but only the invitation letters of 2009, 2011 and 2012 were recovered.
62Since 2008, the lower age threshold of 60 was in place.
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belong to one of these groups. That is why you are eligible for inuenza vaccination.In
2011 and 2012, the invitation letter mentions for a second time: Inuenza vaccination is
for individuals at increased risk to fall seriously ill due to inuenza.We conclude that,
rst, it is made very explicit who is targeted and who is not. Second, the reference to the
age threshold in the letter can be confusing for individuals who receive the letter for the
rst time. The invitations are received around September/October. Since program age is
determined as of May 1st in the following year, the real age of individuals whose month
of birth is between November and April falls below the age threshold. For this group, the
receipt of the letter can come across as a mistake made in the invitation procedure.
The explicit framing of the target group in the invitation letter can be picked up by
the children of eligible individuals as a reason not to vaccinate and might induce a social
stigma cost to vaccinate. Social stigma in this context can be more important for lower
educated than for higher educated individuals (Panel A in Table 3.6). The latter might be
less impressed by the wording of the invitation letter or generally better informed about
the program and the possibilities to vaccinate when not targeted. More frequent regular
contact can facilitate the exchange of information and explain why we nd a stronger
e¤ect if parents and children live close to one another (panel B in Table 3.6). Finally, in
order to analyze whether or not the information in the invitation letter has the potential to
a¤ect individuals behavior, we analyze behavioral di¤erences between individuals based
on the oldest parents date of birth. Remember that for parents with month of birth
between November and April, the information in the letter might be confusing, which can
contribute to discussing the letter more intensely with friends and family and to changing
their own vaccination behavior. Table 3.7 shows that the parents vaccination behavior is
signicantly lower for parents born between November and April. There is a 5 percentage
points di¤erence in take-up between both groups. In addition, the RD estimate on the
adult children is almost double the size if the parent is born between November and April.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigated spillover e¤ects of an extension of the target group for
the Dutch inuenza vaccination program on vaccination coverage of the individuals not
targeted by the policy. A major reform redened the target group in 1996. Before 1996,
only individuals with specic disorders were targeted. In 1996, all healthy individuals
aged 65 or more were added to the eligible population. Members of the target group
qualify for free inuenza vaccination and receive a personal invitation letter from their
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GP.
Using a rich dataset that combines survey data on health with administrative records
from Statistics Netherlands, we exploited the quasi-random variation that was introduced
at age 65 by the reform. As being 65 on May 1st determines whether one receives an
invitation for a free u shot, and not the actual day one turns 65, our fuzzy RD design
does not su¤er from the typical concern that the discontinuity at age 65 may coincide with
eligibility for other welfare programs or government transfers such as retirement benets.
Our dataset also allows to move beyond the rst order e¤ect on vaccination behavior, and
in addition analyzes impacts on the arguably even more important outcomes of morbidity,
medical care use, sickness absence and mortality.
Our results indicate a positive direct policy e¤ect on vaccination coverage of the parents,
accompanied by a negative spillover e¤ect from parents to children. The vaccination
policies in place increase immunization of the elderly by 18 percentage points at age 65,
leading to a direct increase in vaccination rates from about 30% to 50%. Vaccination
participation further increases after crossing the age threshold. The positive direct e¤ect
observed among targeted parents translates into a negative spillover e¤ect on vaccination
behavior among their children. The estimate of a childs decision to vaccinate against
inuenza shows a decrease in participation by 4 percentage points if the parents age is
above the threshold. In addition, we estimate that the inuenza vaccination program
saves 0.8 individuals out of 100,000 at the age threshold, and reduces the number of
individuals consulting a GP and using prescribed medicines with 10 percentage points
during the typical inuenza months. Mortality and GP visits of the adult children are
not a¤ected, but the occurrence of inuenza-like symptoms increases from 45% to 55%
and sickness absence among this group increases with 8 percentage points (from 14% to
22%). All our results are robust to di¤erent specications at the 65-age threshold, and
robustness checks suggests that the identifying assumptions of our fuzzy RD design hold.
We explore several possible channels that might generate the negative spillover e¤ects
and nd suggestive evidence that a social stigma cost is revealed to adult children who
are not targeted by the vaccination program when their oldest parent crosses the age
threshold. A potential trigger for the social stigma cost is the explicit framing of the
target group in the invitation letter sent out to eligible parents.
Our study improves upon existing studies in the inuenza domain by considering the
behavioral response in terms of vaccination take-up among the non-targeted group. It
also contributes to the literature on social interactions by exploiting the quasi-random
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variation created by the Dutch inuenza vaccination program to overcome the typical
identication challenges that arise when estimating social interaction e¤ects. While one
should be careful to extrapolate our ndings outside the 65-age threshold, our ndings
suggest that family networks are relevant social networks and contribute to information
transmission on social costs and benets. Our results also underline the importance of
public health campaigns to pay attention to the e¤ects of information dissemination on
public perceptions and attitudes on (voluntary) preventive care participation. In the
case of inuenza vaccination, participation outside the target group is not harmful for the
personal health of the untargeted individual, it generates indirect protection to individuals
at risk, it reduces productivity loss due to work absence and is considered cost-e¤ective
for large subgroups in the population. If untargeted individuals wish to nance their
own vaccination, it should not be discouraged by policymakers, but directly or indirectly
encouraged, e.g. by adjusting the information message that is distributed. Our ndings
also suggests that many (European) countries with similar inuenza vaccination policies
in place might face similar negative spillover e¤ects amongst family members.
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Figure 3.5: Inuenza vaccination rate of individuals around the 65-age threshold (yearly
bins, larger window)
Panel A: Linear trend line
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is the
individuals program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average inuenza
vaccination rate, grouped in yearly bins based on program age. The solid line shows a linear trend based
on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence intervals. The vertical line represents
the age threshold.
Panel B: Quadratic trend line
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is the
individuals program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average inuenza
vaccination rate, grouped in yearly bins based on program age. The solid line shows a quadratic trend
based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence intervals. The vertical line
represents the age threshold.
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Figure 3.6: Inuenza vaccination rate of individuals around the 65-age threshold (four-
month bins, baseline window)
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is the
individuals program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average inuenza
vaccination rate, grouped in four-month bins based on program age. The solid line shows a linear trend
based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence intervals. The vertical line
represents the age threshold.
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Figure 3.7: Inuenza vaccination rate of individuals around the 65-age threshold (four-
month bins, larger window)
Panel A: Linear trend line
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is the
individuals program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average inuenza
vaccination rate, grouped in four-month bins based on program age. The solid line shows a linear trend
based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence intervals. The vertical line
represents the age threshold.
Panel B: Quadratic trend line
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is the
individuals program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average inuenza
vaccination rate, grouped in four-month bins based on program age. The solid line shows a quadratic
trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence intervals. The vertical
line represents the age threshold.
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Figure 3.8: Inuenza vaccination rate of children (yearly bins, larger window)
Panel A: Linear trend line
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is
the parents program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average inuenza
vaccination rate of children, grouped in yearly bins based on the oldest parents program age. The solid
line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence
intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
Panel B: Quadratic trend line
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is
the parents program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average inuenza
vaccination rate of adult children, grouped in yearly bins based on the oldest parents program age.
The solid line shows a quadratic trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95%
condence intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
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Figure 3.9: Inuenza vaccination rate of children (four-month bins, baseline window)
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is
the parents program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average inuenza
vaccination rate of adult children, grouped in four-month bins based on the oldest parents program
age. The solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95%
condence intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
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Figure 3.10: Inuenza vaccination rate of children (four-month bins, larger window)
Panel A: Linear trend line
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is
the parents program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average inuenza
vaccination rate of children, grouped in four-month bins based on the oldest parents program age. The
solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence
intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
Panel B: Quadratic trend line
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is
the parents program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average inuenza
vaccination rate of adult children, grouped in four-month bins based on the oldest parents program age.
The solid line shows a quadratic trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95%
condence intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
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Figure 3.11: Frequency histogram of observations of children around the parents age
threshold, inuenza seasons 1997-1998 up to 2007-2008.
Figure 3.12: Inuenza-like symptoms prevalence of individuals around the 65-age thresh-
old
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable
is the individuals program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average
inuenza-like illness prevalence between Nov.-May, grouped in yearly bins based on program age. The
solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence
intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
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Figure 3.13: Inuenza-like symptoms prevalence of adult children with parents around
the age threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is the
parents program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average inuenza-like
illness prevalence of adult children between Nov.-May, grouped in yearly bins based on the oldest parents
program age. The solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent
the 95% condence intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
Figure 3.14: Non-prescribed medication usage of individuals around the 65-age threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable
is the individuals program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average
non-prescribed medication usage between Nov.-May, grouped in yearly bins based on program age. The
solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence
intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
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Figure 3.15: Non-prescribed medication usage of adult children with parents around the
age threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is
the parents program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average non-
prescribed medication usage of adult children between Nov.-May, grouped in yearly bins based on the
oldest parents program age. The solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted
lines represent the 95% condence intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
Figure 3.16: Prescribed medication usage of individuals around the 65-age threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is the
individuals program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average prescribed
medication usage between Nov.-May, grouped in yearly bins based on program age. The solid line shows
a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence intervals. The
vertical line represents the age threshold.
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Figure 3.17: Prescribed medication usage of adult children with parents around the age
threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is the
parents program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average prescribed
medication usage of adult children between Nov.-May, grouped in yearly bins based on the oldest parents
program age. The solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent
the 95% condence intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
Figure 3.18: GP visited by individuals around the 65-age threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is
the individuals program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average of
individuals who visited a GP between Nov.-May, grouped in yearly bins based on program age. The
solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence
intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
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Figure 3.19: GP visited by adult children with parents around the age threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable
is the parents program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average adult
children who visited a GP between Nov.-May, grouped in yearly bins based on the oldest parents program
age. The solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95%
condence intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
Figure 3.20: Medical specialist visited by individuals around the 65-age threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is
the individuals program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average of
individuals who visited a medical specialist between Nov.-May, grouped in yearly bins based on program
age. The solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95%
condence intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
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Figure 3.21: Medical specialist visited by adult children with parents around the age
threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is
the parents program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average adult
children who visited a medical specialist between Nov.-May, grouped in yearly bins based on the oldest
parents program age. The solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines
represent the 95% condence intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
Figure 3.22: Sickness absence by adult children with parents around the age threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is the
parents program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the weighted average of sickness
absence of adult children between Nov.-May, grouped in yearly bins based on the oldest parents program
age. The solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95%
condence intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
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Figure 3.23: Mortality from inuenza and pneumonia of individuals around the 65-age
threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is
the individuals program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the average mortality from
inuenza and pneumonia of individuals between Dec.-June, grouped in yearly bins based on program
age. The solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95%
condence intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
Figure 3.24: Mortality from inuenza and pneumonia of adult children with parents
around the age threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is
the parents program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the average mortality from
inuenza and pneumonia of adult children between Dec.-June, grouped in yearly bins based on the oldest
parents program age. The solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines
represent the 95% condence intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
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Figure 3.25: Mortality from respiratory diseases of individuals around the 65-age threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is
the individuals program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the average mortality from
respiratory diseases of individuals between Dec.-June, grouped in yearly bins based on program age. The
solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence
intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
Figure 3.26: Mortality from respiratory diseases of adult children with parents around
the age threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is
the parents program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the average mortality from
respiratory diseases of adult children between Dec.-June, grouped in yearly bins based on the oldest
parents program age. The solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines
represent the 95% condence intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
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Figure 3.27: All-cause mortality of individuals around the 65-age threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable is
the individuals program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the average mortality of
individuals between Dec.-June, grouped in yearly bins based on program age. The solid line shows a
linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence intervals. The
vertical line represents the age threshold.
Figure 3.28: All-cause mortality of adult children with parents around the age threshold
Notes: Pooled data of the inuenza seasons 1997-1998 to 2007-2008 are used. The running variable
is the parents program age. Each observation (represented by diamonds) is the average mortality of
adult children between Dec.-June, grouped in yearly bins based on the oldest parents program age. The
solid line shows a linear trend based on the observations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence
intervals. The vertical line represents the age threshold.
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Table 3.8: RD estimates for other outcomes on parents and children during the inuenza
epidemic period (in a +/- 3 year window)
Parents Children
Inuenza-like symptoms 0.047 0.077
(0.051) (0.050)
Non-prescribed medication -0.044 -0.021
(0.037) (0.033)
Prescribed medication -0.090 -0.028
(0.031)*** (0.029)
GP visits -0.090 -0.017
(0.039)** (0.030)
Visits to medical specialist -0.024 0.003
(0.035) (0.033)
Sickness absence 0.076
(0.035)**
Mortality: Pneumonia & inuenza -0.000063 0.000007
(0.000028)** (0.000005)
Mortality: respiratory diseases -0.000050 0.000010
(0.000043) (0.000007)
Mortality: respiratory and circulatory diseases -0.000013 0.000012
(0.000074) (0.000012)
Mortality: all-cause mortality 0.000139 -0.000002
(0.000108) (0.000024)
Notes: See text and Section 3.2 for details on the RD set-up. We use linear trends in program age that can di¤er
at each side of the cuto¤. Control variables include dummies for gender, member of risk group based on existing
disorders, population density, chronic illness, education level, number of household members, family type and
inuenza season for outcomes 1 to 6. Control variables for mortality include gender and inuenza season. In
addition all regressions for children include dummies for childrens program age per year and parents gender.
Standard errors between brackets. Regression estimates with HIS use sample weights and cluster standard errors
at the wave-municipality level to mimic the sample design. Regressions on administrative data apply robust
standard errors. The inuenza epidemic period is dened as November-May: (a) inuenza-like symptoms, sickness
absence and GP/specialist visits refer to the last two months, so the survey months January to June are
considered; (b) medicine use refers to the last month, so the survey months December to June are used; and
(c) mortality refers to the actual months December-June. Signicance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.9: RD treatment estimates on covariates in equation (3.4)
Sample with oldest
parents program age
between 63 and 66
Sample with oldest
parents program age
between 62 and 67
Male -0.028 (0.040) 0.018 (0.029)
Program age -0.039 (0.331) 0.040 (0.237)
Risk group -0.026 (0.019) -0.012 (0.013)
Chronic illness 0.013 (0.036) -0.010 (0.025)
Education level 1 (primary school) -0.003 (0.021) -0.011 (0.016)
Education level 2 0.018 (0.031) -0.006 (0.022)
Education level 3 -0.070 (0.040) -0.032 (0.029)
Education level 4 (college education) 0.054 (0.037) 0.049 (0.026)
Number of household members 0.021 (0.052) 0.018 (0.039)
Family type: single person -0.014 (0.030) -0.030 (0.022)
Family type: couple -0.049 (0.033) -0.022 (0.025)
Family type: household with children 0.055 (0.073) 0.048 (0.027)
Family type: other 0.007 (0.006) 0.005 (0.004)
Oldest parent male -0.039 (0.039) -0.042 (0.028)
Population density: below 500
inhabitants/km2
-0.031 (0.026) -0.003 (0.019)
Population density: between 500 and
2500 inhabitants/km2
0.007 (0.040) -0.006 (0.030)
Population density: above 2500
inhabitants/km2
0.024 (0.036) 0.009 (0.027)
Notes: See text and Section 3.2 for details on the RD set-up. We use linear trends in program age that can
di¤er at each side of the cuto¤. Sample restrictions and control variables are similar as those in Table 3.3
OLS regression estimates are reported that use sample weights and cluster standard errors at the
wave-municipality level to mimic the sample design. Signicance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.10: RD treatment estimates on covariates in equation (3.2)
Sample with program
age between 63 and 66
Sample with program
age between 62 and 67
Male -0.034 (0.047) -0.037 (0.046)
Risk group 0.020 (0.035) 0.016 (0.036)
Chronic illness 0.004 (0.042) 0.004 (0.042)
Education level 1 (primary school) 0.011 (0.035) 0.012 (0.035)
Education level 2 -0.024 (0.041) -0.027 (0.041)
Education level 3 -0.036 (0.039) -0.036 (0.039)
Education level 4 (college education) 0.049 (0.034) 0.050 (0.034)
Number of household members 0.017 (0.018) 0.017 (0.018)
Family type: single person -0.065 (0.037)* -0.067 (0.037)*
Family type: couple 0.099 (0.042)** 0.100 (0.042)**
Family type: household with children -0.033 (0.026) -0.033 (0.026)
Family type: other -0.000 (0.009) -0.000 (0.009)
Population density: below 500 inhabi-
tants/km
-0.012 (0.030) -0.013 (0.030)
Population density: between 500 and
2500 inhabitants/km
0.079 (0.042)* 0.075 (0.041)*
Population density: above 2500 inhabi-
tants/km
-0.067 (0.035)* -0.062 (0.033)*
Notes: See text and Section 3.2 for details on the RD set-up. We use linear trends in program age that can
di¤er at each side of the cuto¤. Sample restrictions and control variables are similar as those in Table 3.2
OLS regression estimates are reported that use sample weights and cluster standard errors at the
wave-municipality level to mimic the sample design. Signicance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 3.11: Window robustness checks
Parents Children
+/- 1 year window 0.197*** -0.027**
(0.022) (0.013)
+/- 2 year window 0.168*** -0.040*
(0.035) (0.022)
+/- 3 year window 0.184*** -0.037**
(0.026) (0.016)
+/- 4 year window 0.216*** -0.026**
(0.022) (0.013)
+/- 5 year window 0.230*** -0.027**
(0.020) (0.011)
+/- 6 year window 0.242*** -0.027***
(0.018) (0.010)
Notes: See text and Section 3.2 for details on the RD set-up. We use linear trends in program age
that can di¤er at each side of the cuto¤. Sample restrictions and control variables are similar as
those in Table 3.2 for parents and similar as those in Table 3.3 for adult children. OLS regression
estimates are reported that use sample weights and cluster standard errors at the wave-municipality
level to mimic the sample design. Standard errors between parentheses. Signicance level:
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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